Strategic Corporate Governance, Employment Risk, and Firm Risk Taking: A Three-Essay Investigation in the U.S. and Taiwan by LI SHUPING




STRATEGIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 
EMPLOYMENT RISK, AND FIRM RISK TAKING: A 







NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE 
2014 




STRATEGIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 
EMPLOYMENT RISK, AND FIRM RISK TAKING: A 
THREE-ESSAY INVESTIGATION IN THE U.S. AND 
TAIWAN 
SHUPING LI 
(M.A. in Economics) 
 
 
A THESIS SUBMITTED 
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF MANAGEMENT 
DEPARTMENT OF STRATEGY AND POLICY 
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE 
2014 
  





I hereby declare that the thesis is my original work and it has been written by 
me in its entirety. I have duly acknowledged all the sources of information 
which have been used in the thesis. 
This thesis has also not been submitted for any degree in any university 
previously. 
 









It takes a world to finish a dissertation. On the top of my thank you list are 
my dissertation committee members Professors Ishtiaq Pasha Mahmood, Will 
Mitchell, Ivan Png, and Vivek Tandon. They cajoled me into doing something 
other than reporting regular statistics and getting in touch with the reality to 
really open the black box. As importantly, they never hesitated to give me 
advice and support when I frowned and moaned over the course. I couldn’t 
have finished this dissertation without their intellectual generosity.  
I owe most to Pasha and Will. As my co-chairs, they spent numerous 
hours helping me build up my niche and also my confidence as an independent 
scholar. Because of their constant mentoring and encouragement, I started to 
think that maybe I could survive in the field after all. 
Outside my committee, I would like to thank Dr. Sai Yayavaram for 
equipping me with rigorous STATA programming from scratch, Dr. Ya-Hui 
Lin and Dr. Chi-Nien Chung for helping me access a large part of my 
dissertation data. These valuable assets benefit my work beyond the scope of 
the dissertation. I also want to thank my support group: Jackie Yan, Zen Goh, 
Suzy Yu, Jessie Liang, Xiangyu Gao, Toshimitsu Ueta, and Qian Lu. The 
regular lunches and outings with them have made my Ph.D. life memorable. 
And, finally, my deep gratitude to my dearest family. Their endless love 
and comic relief keep me in touch with my childhood innocence despite the 
increasing complexity of life. My special thanks are due to my mom for 
inspiring me to live a life with passion and intelligence, Wendong for sharing 
my happiness and sorrows, and Bo for bringing me courage and hope. I 
dedicate this work to them.  
















This dissertation comprises three studies investigating how corporate 
governance affects firm risk taking through shaping executives’ employment 
risk. It aims to reconcile inconsistent findings on the impact of corporate 
governance on firm risk taking in strategic corporate governance literature. 
The three studies address two particular questions. First, does corporate 
governance affect firm risk taking through shaping executives’ employment 
risk? And second, how does the relationship vary with distinct market 
institutions? Based on longitudinal analyses on public firms in the U.S. and 
Taiwan, the findings provide new insights to resolving debates on the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm risk taking as well as to 
relaxing agency theory's simplistic assumptions, including constant agent risk 
aversion, congruent principal interests, and overlooked social contexts. They 
also provide important managerial and policy implications in the face of 
increased executive employment risk around the globe. 
Chapter 1, titled “Unbalanced changes in the codified and tacit 
dimensions of monitoring: The impact on shifts in managerial risk 
preferences”, is a joint work with Vivek Tandon and Will Mitchell. It 
examines how imbalanced changes in different dimensions of information in 
the monitoring within U.S. public firms after Sarbanes-Oxley Act affect 
managerial investment horizons. Using a Difference-in-differences estimation 
based on a matched set of 856 U.S. high-tech firms and 118 foreign cross-
listed high-tech firms from 1996 to 2006, the study finds that increasing 
codified information without concurrently increasing tacit information in 
monitoring unexpectedly shifts managers’ preferences away from long-term 




investment (i.e., R&D) to short-term investments (i.e., IVST) due to monitors’ 
increased reliance on codified criteria in managerial evaluation. The shift is 
stronger with greater ex-ante ambiguity regarding the veracity of codified 
information and with greater value of codified information in predicting a 
firm’s competitiveness.  
Chapter 2, “Caught in the crossfire: How conflict of interests among large 
shareholders affects precipitate management turnover”, is a joint work with 
Will Mitchell. It assesses the impact of interest conflicts among shareholders 
in a firm’s ownership structure on senior executives’ employment risk as 
reflected as their forced and abrupt voluntary exits. Analyses based on 599 
Taiwanese firms from 2000 to 2011 show that precipitate management 
turnover increases with the interaction between family and non-family large 
shareholders due to increased power struggles within the firm and 
incompatible job demands faced by executives. The relationship is stronger 
with weaker corporate governance, higher resource intangibility, and some 
forms of lower executive power, each of which amplifies power struggles 
and/or incompatible job demands.  
In Chapter 3, “Employment risk and risk taking with different time 
horizons: The moderating impacts of internal and external executive markets”, 
I further examine how the threat of executive dismissals, i.e., employment risk, 
affects their risk taking independently and interactively with executive market 
conditions. Analyses based on 715 Taiwanese firms from 1997 to 2011 show 
that executives’ employment risk reduces their long-term risk taking (i.e., 
investment flow to Chinese subsidiaries, R&D, and technological exploration) 
while not affecting short-term risk taking (i.e., acquisition). The impacts of 




employment risk on different time horizons of risk taking become weaker 
when a firm’s external managerial ties increase executives’ prospect of future 
job opportunities; this effect is stronger for executives more sensitive to 
external executive market due to high power contestation in the firms’ top 
management.  
Despite the different empirical settings the studies are compatible in terms 
of the underlying micro-mechanisms centered on executive employment risk 
and the careful use of recent empirical methods to address endogeneity. 











































Chapter 1: Unbalanced Changes in the Codified and Tacit Dimensions of 
Monitoring: The Impact on Shifts in Investment Horizons 
Abstract: Strategic governance studies commonly argue that stringent 
monitoring reduces information asymmetry between shareholders and 
executives, thereby increasing managers’ long-term orientation. However, 
increasing monitoring based only on codified information about firm 
performance and procedures without a parallel increase in tacit information 
about decision contexts will tend to increase monitors’ reliance on codified 
measures in managerial evaluation. We argue this change leads to higher 
immediate earnings pressure, shifting managers’ preferences away from 
uncertain long-term investments. This paper uses the 2002 U.S. Sarbanes-
Oxley Act to show that greater monitoring based on codified information that 
did not concurrently increase tacit information often reduced R&D and 
increased short-term investments in U.S. high-technology firms. The shift was 
stronger for firms with higher managerial discretion and/or in industries with 
lower technological intensity. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance studies in strategic management, building on 
agency theory, commonly suggest that stringent monitoring will increase long-
term investments (Jensen & Meckling, 1976;  Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 
2007). The core idea is that monitoring reduces information asymmetry 
between risk-neutral shareholders and risk-averse executives and thus 
constrains managers from over-emphasizing short-term activities (Alchian & 
Demsetz, 1972; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Walsh &Seward, 1990). However, 
evidence for this idea is mixed; studies have found increased monitoring to be 
associated with both increased and decreased long term investments (Zahra, 
1996). The ambiguity may arise because extant literature has only begun to 
address the idea that information in agency relations is multifaceted and that 
monitoring mechanisms vary in their capabilities to access and process 
different types of information (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Hoskisson, Hitt, 
Johnson, & Grossman, 2002); these different types of information may, in turn, 




affect evaluation criteria and managerial preferences differently (Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). This paper distinguishes 
codified information about a firm’s procedures and performance from tacit 
information about managerial decision contexts; we propose that changes that 
increase monitoring based on codified information without increasing 
monitoring based on tacit information will induce managers to shift 
preferences away from long-term towards short-term investment. 
We argue that increasing access and reliability of codified information 
without also increasing tacit information increases monitors’ tendency to rely 
on codified criteria (e.g., ROA and sales growth) to evaluate firm performance, 
which increases short-term earnings pressures. This in turn shifts managers’ 
strategic preferences away from long-term investments such as R&D. We 
build a theoretical framework to identify the conditions under which altering 
the balance between codified and tacit information has more or less impact on 
managerial strategic choices. In particular, we argue that increased access and 
reliability of codified information is more consequential when there is greater 
ex-ante ambiguity regarding the veracity of codified information and when 
codified information is more informative of a firm’s competitive prospects. 
We exploit an exogenous change in the U.S. securities regulation, the 
2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), to test our framework. This setting is 
conceptually and empirically relevant to test our theory for three reasons. First, 
the regulatory changes increased the monitoring of U.S. public firms based on 
codified information by enhancing the disclosure of financial reports and 
internal controls without increasing monitoring based on tacit information 
about managerial decision contexts. This enables us to distinguish different 




changes in codified and tacit dimensions of monitoring, a difficulty faced by 
prior studies on monitoring. Second, the change in monitoring applies to all 
U.S. public firms without affecting a subgroup of comparable foreign cross-
listed firms. This enables us to use the differences-in-differences (DID) 
methodology to compare the changes in strategic choices of affected firms 
with the changes in unaffected firms across the same time period to rule out 
confounding factors such as counterfactual trends as well as nationwide and 
industrial events around 2002 (e.g., the IT boom collapse and Iraq war). Third, 
compared to firm-level measures for change in monitoring that are often 
endogenous to firms’ investment strategies, the exogenous nature of our 
setting can establish causality more effectively; the exogenous population-
level change allows us to examine firm-varying contingencies that will affect 
the firms’ actions. 
We conduct additional tests to account for critical alternative mechanisms 
(e.g., compliance costs of the regulatory changes). Our tests show that 
increased monitoring based on codified information as opposed to tacit 
information led to shifts away from long-term investment and, in some 
conditions, increases in short-term investment. The conclusion is further 
buttressed by tests of firm-varying elements of our theoretical framework: the 
impact of the shift in monitoring demands increases when there is greater ex-
ante ambiguity regarding the veracity of codified information (for firms with 
higher managerial discretion) and when codified information is more 
informative of a firm’s competitive prospects (for firms in industries with 
lower technological intensity).  




The study contributes to strategic corporate governance studies. We 
advance the strategic governance literature on monitoring, particularly studies 
that examine the impact of reducing information asymmetry (Hill & Snell, 
1988; Hoskisson et al., 2002; Kor, 2006); we differentiate codified and tacit 
dimensions in the information gathering process of monitoring and then 
demonstrate that imbalanced changes in the two dimensions lead to 
unexpected shifts in managerial investment horizons. We also add insights to 
governance studies on financial vs. strategic control (e.g., Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) by identifying conditions 
under which an emphasis on codified indicators results in shorter-term 
managerial orientation: when managerial discretion is high and/or 
technologically intensity is low. These two contingencies provide guidance 
about offsetting potential adverse consequences of general organizational 
control processes such as formalization (Eisenhardt, 1985; Pierce & Delbecq, 
1977; Walsh & Seward, 1990). 
BACKGROUND 
Managers lack incentives for appropriate long-term investments when 
principal-agent relationships face moral hazards, which arise from two 
conditions (Laverty, 1996). First, shareholders and managers often have 
different risk preferences (Hill and Snell, 1988). Shareholders tend to be risk 
neutral because they can diversify their shareholdings (Eisenhardt, 1989), 
whereas managers tend to be risk averse because their employment is tied to 
one firm (Narayanan, 1985). Second, information asymmetry about 
managerial actions exists when shareholders delegate decision rights to 
executives who may use resources based on their own preferences (Jensen & 




Meckling, 1976). Managers tend to have information advantages over 
shareholders because they are involved in firm operations (Walsh & Seward, 
1990); shareholders cannot accurately assess whether managerial activities 
serve self-interests or seek to create shareholder value. This problem is 
especially acute for long-term activities: due to the inherent uncertainty of 
many long-term investments, it is difficult for shareholders to assess potential 
value, even as they recognize current costs.  
The strategic corporate governance literature has found ambiguous results 
in tests of the prediction that intense monitoring will boost long-term 
investment. Stringent monitoring through ownership concentration by 
institutions has been found to both suppress (e.g., Graves, 1988) and increase 
R&D investment (Hill & Snell, 1988; Hansen & Hill, 1991; Kochhar & David, 
1996). The role of outside directors as monitors in facilitating long term 
investment also remains puzzling. Contradictory to the traditional agency 
theory prediction that outside directors increase the effectiveness of 
monitoring and thus reduce managerial short-termism, several studies find that 
outsider board representation reduces R&D investments (e.g., Hill & Snell, 
1988; Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991; Zahra, 1996) or has no impact on 
long-term investment (Hoskisson et al., 2002; Kor, 2006). 
The ambiguity reflects two limitations in the traditional agency 
framework: limited attention to monitoring based on different types of 
information, plus under-emphasis of changing managerial risk preferences. 
First, research has under-explored different dimensions of information in 
principal-agent relationships, which in turn obscures the effectiveness of 
monitoring in reducing information asymmetry (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). 




Monitors need to access and process multifaceted information, with varying 
implications for long- and short-term performance (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 
1990; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Agency theory traditionally does not 
distinguish different types of information, implicitly assuming that monitoring 
devices access all types of information. Strategic governance studies do 
suggest that the motivation and capability of monitors to access and process 
different types of information vary with the kind of monitors, such as inside 
versus outside directors (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Hillman, Nicholson, 
& Shropshire, 2008). Such studies, though, do not deeply examine how 
differential access and processing of information by monitors affects 
managerial preferences for decisions such as investment horizons. 
Second, studies often do not address the idea that managers’ risk attitudes 
may change owing to increased risk to managerial wealth and well-being that 
can result from concerns about compensation and/or employment (Wiseman & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Managerial risk increases when governance mechanisms 
tie managerial evaluation more closely to firm performance. Managers tend to 
avoid risky investments when they bear the consequences of higher risk, 
because risky strategies increase the probability of suffering poor performance 
and thus trigger reduced compensation and, ultimately, dismissal. 
To address these points, we distinguish two types of information in 
monitoring relations: codified and tacit. Monitoring mechanisms help access 
both codified and tacit information regarding a firm’s performance and 
procedures. Codified information provides standardized data about “what” is 
occurring within a firm; examples of codified information include a firm’s 
cash flow, reported profitability, and specifications of control procedures 




(Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2013). Codified information increases comparability 
of performance outcomes and formal procedures. Comparisons based on 
codified information are more relevant for assessing decisions with short-term 
than with long-term horizons because short-term horizons involve less 
uncertainty and are more amendable to codification (Landier, Nair, & Wulf, 
2007).  
By contrast, tacit information involves nuanced and multifaceted 
interpretations of the reasons “why” decisions and outcomes arise in a firm 
(Polanyi, 1966); examples of tacit information include decision contexts such 
as strategic rationales, opportunity costs, and multifaceted causes of 
performance (Landier et al., 2007). Compared to codified information, tacit 
information enables monitors to develop a richer understanding of the intent 
and value of managerial activities, because multifaceted understandings of 
decision contexts can reveal potential uncertainties inherent in the activities 
more comprehensively (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). The value of tacit 
information is more prominent for long-term horizons than for short-term 
horizons, because long-term horizons involve more uncertainty. 
Increasing both codified and tacit information helps reduce information 
asymmetry. Codified information can be enhanced by making reporting 
standards more stringent, thereby increasing the reliability and 
comprehensiveness of the information. However, importantly, changing 
reporting stringency does not change information asymmetry regarding tacit 
information, which requires more in-depth interactions with the management 
and context.  




Monitoring mechanisms may access and process codified and tacit 
information differently. For instance, monitoring via passive investors, outside 
directors who are interlocked in multiple boards, securities analysts who 
analyze corporate reports, the market for corporate control, and securities 
legislation often can access more codified information than tacit information 
within a firm due to limited channels for such monitors to interact with 
executives (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Hoskisson, Castleton, & Withers, 
2009). By contrast, monitoring via inside directors and active blockholders 
may provide access to more tacit information in addition to codified 
information because monitors have more chances to interact with managers 
(Elango et al., 1995; Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Connelly, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, 
& Certo, 2010). Our conceptualization of asymmetric access to different 
dimensions of information adds to existing studies of monitoring, with 
implications for executives’ investment preferences.  
HYPOTHESES 
Impact on investment time horizons of monitoring based on codified 
information  
We highlight the potentially unbalanced nature of monitoring in accessing 
codified and tacit information, independent of stringency of monitoring. In 
particular, we focus on how increased monitoring based on codified 
information without a concurrent increase in tacit information affects 
managers’ investment horizons. Figure 1 summarizes our core argument.  
********** Figure 1.1 ********** 
We propose that monitoring that increases the abundance and reliability of 
codified information without a concurrent increase in tacit information induces 




monitors to rely more on codified measures (e.g., ROA and sales growth) in 
performance evaluation and attribution, for three reasons. First, because 
monitoring is costly, monitors often make decisions regarding executives’ 
performance evaluation and attribution based on information that is easily 
available to them (Feldman & March, 1981). As such, when abundance of 
codified information increases within a firm while tacit information does not 
increase, monitors are likely to shift their criteria to increasingly emphasize 
evaluation and attribution based on codified information, because it is easier to 
access such data than to access tacit information.  
Second, increased reliability and completeness of codified information 
increase monitors’ confidence in the accuracy of evaluation and attribution 
decisions made based on codified data. As the codified information becomes 
more reliable and detailed, monitors can conduct more reliable, meaningful, 
and fine-grained comparisons with a firm’s past performance and/or its peer 
firms’ performance (Walsh & Seward, 1990). These comprehensive and 
reliable comparisons make it easier for monitors to make a fuller assessment 
of firm performance and rule out the impacts of external confounding factors 
reliably. The detailed data also makes it easier to spot internal inconsistencies 
in managerial decisions and activities. As a result, monitors are more confident 
in using codified criteria in making evaluation and attribution decisions. 
Third, increased reliability of codified information facilitates consensus in 
decision making among monitors in performance evaluation and attribution. 
Monitors with diverse backgrounds may individually frame responses 
according to idiosyncratic processing and prioritization schemes (Waller, 
Huber, & Glick, 1995), resulting in particular perceptions and interpretations 




of managerial behaviors (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Compared to tacit 
information, more standardized codified information provides a common basis 
for monitors to assess managerial activities and outcomes in performance 
evaluation and attribution. Forming consensus based on codified information 
will occur only when monitors agree on reliability (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 
1998); when the reliability of codified information increases, monitors are 
more likely to use codified criteria to reach consensus. 
When monitors increase their reliance on codified measures in 
performance evaluation and attribution, managers face greater pressure to 
generate positive immediate earnings and consequently become more averse 
to making uncertain investments. As we mentioned above, increased codified 
information such as firm procedures enhances the exposure of managerial 
activities and outcomes to objective comparisons. This increases the likelihood 
of identifying unfavorable codified outcomes (Walsh & Seward, 1990).  
Without a concurrent increase in tacit information that allows rich 
interpretations of the intent and potential value of managerial activities, an 
increased focus on codified criteria increases the likelihood that under-
performance in codified outcomes will be interpreted as lower managerial 
capability to meet shareholder interests, thereby endangering managerial 
compensation and employment (Wiersema & Zhang, 2011). Meanwhile, 
because codified criteria limit multifaceted interpretations, managers will be 
constrained from justifying their behaviors and related outcomes with 
alternative interpretations. As a result, managers will expect a higher 
likelihood for monitors to attribute lower codified outcomes to their self-
interest or lack of skills, generating pressures to perform well on codified 




measures. As we argued above, short-term earnings and costs are more 
amenable to codification. Thus, increased codified criteria increases pressure 
of generating positive current performance. 
Managers who face greater earnings pressure will often reduce their long-
term emphasis and increase their preference for short-term investments, for 
two reasons. First, compared to long-term investments, which tend to incur 
current costs that are not balanced by immediate revenue and thus reduce 
current earnings, short-term investments are more likely to provide early pay-
offs. Second, it is difficult for monitors who lack nuanced understanding of the 
value of long-term opportunities to assess whether long-term investments 
reflect appropriate responses to competitive conditions or, instead, arise from 
managers’ personal goals. Therefore, when monitoring enhances codified 
information without increasing tacit information, we expect investment shifts 
from long-term to short-term horizons. 
Managers can attempt to counter the short term pressures. They might 
release additional tacit information about their long-term opportunities. 
However, the nature of tacitness makes it difficult for many monitors to assess 
the reliability of the information (Polanyi, 1966; Nonaka, 1995), a difficultly 
that is likely to become especially germane in face of increased reliability and 
comprehensiveness of codified data. Managers can also attempt to balance 
earnings pressure via creative accounting (Degeorge, Patel, & Zeckhauser, 
1999) and higher wages (Hoskisson et al., 2009). However, these strategies 
will be ineffective when monitors can detect inappropriate compensation or 
efforts to manipulate account, particularly as more reliable codified 
information becomes available. 




Hypothesis 1 [H1]: An increase in monitoring based on codified 
information without a concurrent increase in monitoring based on tacit 
information will shift firms’ investment away from long-term investments 
towards short-term investments. 
Contingencies: Managerial discretion and technological intensity 
We now elaborate our theoretical model to explain heterogeneity in firms’ 
shift from long-term investments in response to increased monitoring based on 
codified information. If the theoretical mechanism in H1 applies, the shift will 
be particularly notable in two contexts where monitors are more sensitive to 
increased access to and reliability of codified information: first, when there is 
greater ex ante ambiguity regarding the veracity of codified information; 
second, when codified information has more relevance to a firm’s 
competitiveness. Accordingly, we focus on two factors: high managerial 
discretion and high technological intensity.  
High managerial discretion increases ambiguity regarding the information 
provided to monitors. High discretion arises when a firm or its environment 
endows managers with both latitude and means (e.g., slack resources) to 
realize their motives (Williamson, 1963; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Finkelstein, 1992). Because higher discretion often reduces constraints on the 
ability to pursue personal agendas (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987; Finkelstein 
& Hambrick, 1990), high discretion managers can use firm resources to pursue 
their self-interest and can hide information they do not want to reveal. 
Therefore, in firms with greater managerial discretion, monitors often face 
difficulty in determining the reliability of information managers provide 




(Walsh & Seward, 1990). It is precisely in this condition that increasing the 
reliability and completeness of codified information will have the most impact. 
When access to and reliability of codified information increase, monitors 
of firms with higher levels of managerial discretion are likely to be more 
sensitive to the changes and rely more on codified criteria in performance 
evaluation and attribution. This is because increased reliability of information 
concerning performance indicators and control processes addresses monitors’ 
concern about managerial manipulation of codified measures, a concern that is 
more relevant in high discretion contexts. The trustworthiness of information 
often amplifies its influence on decision making (Weick, 1995). By contrast, 
there is no additional increase in the tacit information available to monitors of 
firms with higher managerial discretion than of firms with lower discretion. 
The increased reliance on codified information as a criterion for evaluation 
leads to a higher immediate earnings pressure for managers who had higher 
discretion. In turn, managers are likely to shift preferences away from long-
term investment. 
Hypothesis 2 [H2]: The shift away from long-term investment towards 
short-term investments in response to increased monitoring based on 
codified information will be greater in firms with higher managerial 
discretion.  
The extent to which increased access and reliability of codified 
information shifts evaluation criteria towards codified measures also depends 
on the predictive value of codified information regarding firm competitiveness. 
Decisions makers vary their attention allocated to information depending on 
their situated contexts (Ocasio, 1997). In a situation where codified data such 




as reports about current costs and revenue and comparisons based on such 
metrics are less informative in predicting a firm’s future competitiveness, 
monitors are less likely to attach importance to such data in performance 
evaluation and attribution, irrespective of the volume and accuracy of the data; 
that is, monitors will not attach greater importance to information that is 
inherently less useful and yet imposes considerable information-processing 
demands on them (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Consequently, marginal 
impact of increased access and reliability of codified information on a 
monitor’s criteria in performance evaluation and attribution will be attenuated.  
A key factor indicating the value of codified information is the level of 
technological intensity in a firm’s industry. Codified information is less 
valuable for monitors of firms in technologically-intensive industries because 
the short-term horizons associated with codified information cannot accurately 
predict the inherently uncertain long-term pay-offs of investments such as 
R&D. Monitors in such settings know that firms need to undertake R&D and 
other long-term investments to remain viable in the market (Aoki, 1991). 
Hence, monitors in such industries are more likely to tolerate fluctuations in 
current performance measures and perceive codified indicators to be less 
useful in performance evaluation and attribution; lack of tolerance may make 
managers overly conservative about technological investments (Manso, 2011). 
Indeed, firms in technologically-intensive industries often compensate 
managers based on innovative activities such as R&D rather than current 
financial indicators (Balkin, Markman, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000). 
Because monitors attach less meaning to changes in codified performance 
metrics up front, monitoring that increases access to and reliability of codified 




information is less likely to affect monitors’ weights for codified criteria in 
performance evaluation and attribution. Consequently, increasing access and 
reliability of codified information is less likely to shift long-term investments 
in firms that operate in industries with higher-technological industry. 
Hypothesis 3 [H3]: The shift away from long-term investment towards 
short-term investments in response to increased monitoring based on 
codified information will be lower in firms in industries with higher 
technological intensity.  
EMPIRICAL SETTING AND METHODS 
We focus on an exogenous regulatory change in U.S. securities 
legislations that increased monitoring based on codified information without 
increasing monitoring based on tacit information, i.e., the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
(SOX) enacted on July 30, 2002; we assess its impact on U.S. technological 
firms’ investments changes. SOX increased codified disclosure of firms’ 
financial information and control procedures by requiring more 
comprehensive and reliable reporting regarding a firm’s financial information 
and internal control procedures. For instance, the regulatory change mandates 
more detailed disclosure of items in a firm’s annual reports, requires more 
standardized procedures for generating financial information, and requires 
executives to certify the accuracy and reliability of financial reports and 
information-generating procedures. By contrast, the change did not increase 
disclosure of tacit information by exempting mandatory requirements 
regarding reporting about firm-specific idiosyncrasies and strategically 
sensitive information (e.g., rationales for R&D investment). In addition, SOX 
(e.g., Section 207 and 301) requires higher independence of governance 




bodies (Dalton et al., 2007), limiting the scope of monitors’ regular 
interactions with executives to collect tacit information within a firm. 
Therefore, the change in monitoring intensity of U.S. public firms reduced 
information asymmetry between managers and monitors (e.g., investors, 
securities analysts), it did so by addressing only the codified dimension of 
information asymmetry (Engel, Hayes, & Wang, 2007: page 119). 
The setting of SOX offers two empirical strengths for studying 
unbalanced changes in the codified and tacit dimensions of monitoring. First, 
SOX responded to several corporate scandals (e.g., Enron, Tyco, Adelphia, 
and WorldCom) in the early 2000s. Hence, increased monitoring based on 
codified information associated with the change was exogenous to firms’ 
investment activities. By contrast, firm-level choices about changes in 
monitoring tend to be endogenous to firm attributes that determine firms’ 
investment strategies concurrently. Second, the regulatory change affects all 
U.S. public firms,1 but has no impact on a subset of foreign cross-listed firms 
in U.S. securities markets. Therefore, the change enables us to employ a 
difference-in-differences (DID) empirical approach that can isolate the impact 
of the change from other confounding events more effectively than traditional 
approaches. 
Figure 1.2 provides an initial illustration of the temporal trend of median 
R&D intensity in a constant set of U.S. public high-technology firms from 
1987 to 2006 (457 firms that operated throughout the period). The figure 
shows that the firms’ median R&D intensity rose during the 1990s and early 
2000s, then fell substantially after 2002. In the context of this paper, the core 
                                                            
1 Although implementation of section 404 (internal control) was deferred for small firms (below $75 
million capitalization), other sections (e.g., auditor rotation, increased director independence) applied to 
even small firms from the beginning. 




question about the patterns is whether SOX contributed to the decline. The 
analysis we report next attempts to tease out the primary relationships by 
assessing year-to-year changes in a matched set of U.S. and foreign cross-
listed high-technology firms. 
********** Figure 1.2 ********** 
Data sources and sample of U.S. and foreign cross-listed firms 
The data include annual panels of U.S. public firms and a control group of 
foreign cross-listed firms in seven high-technology sectors from 1987 to 2006. 
The initial sectors include drugs (SIC 283), office and computing (SIC 357), 
communications equipment (SIC 366), electronic components (SIC 367), 
scientific instruments (SIC 382), medical instruments (SIC 384), and software 
(SIC 737); the sample excluded sectors with high levels of government-funded 
R&D (e.g., aerospace and military). R&D is highly relevant in the seven 
sectors, which encompass innovative activity that is important for U.S. 
competitive advantage in global markets (Brown, Fazzari, & Petersen, 2009). 
The sample period starts when financial information for both groups of firms 
became available in 1987; it ends in 2006 so that the subsequent U.S. financial 
crisis would not be a confounding event.  
The Compustat North America annual database provided the sample of 
U.S. firms; the Citigroup Global DR Directory provided the control group of 
foreign firms that are cross-listed in U.S. exchanges. Compustat provided an 
initial sample of 1,856 U.S. high-technology firms. Citigroup identified an 
initial comparison set of 263 foreign high-technology firms; we describe the 
selection procedure for the control group below. 




We obtained financial information from Compustat’s North America and 
Global annual databases. Compustat Global normalizes firm fundamentals and 
market information to reflect differences in accounting standards and practices 
across countries. We converted absolute measures such as R&D expenditures 
to U.S. dollars based on exchange rates from IMF. Two sources provided data 
on corporate governance, which are available only for U.S. firms. Execucomp 
(S&P) provides information about senior executives’ compensation and board 
membership. Thomson Financial’s CDA Spectrum database (Wharton 
Research Data Services) provides data on institutional ownership.  
The control sample of foreign firms reflects two criteria. First, unlike the 
focal U.S. firms, the control firms should not be affected by the regulatory 
change. Second, control firms should be affected equally by U.S. macro-
economic conditions that may cause identification problems. Following Litvak 
(2007), we exploit a subset of foreign cross-listed firms in U.S. securities 
markets. Foreign securities can be listed in the U.S. at four levels: Level 1 
ADRs are sold over-the-counter (OTC) with minimal SEC registration; Level 
2 ADRs trade on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ and must comply with the 
SEC’s full reporting requirements; Level 3 ADRs involve public offering of 
securities in the U.S. that typically trade on U.S. exchanges and comply with 
SEC requirements; Level 4 ADRs are restricted securities for trading by large 
institutional investors in the “PORTAL” or “Rule 144A” markets without SEC 
review.2 The regulatory change does not apply to level 1 and 4 cross-listed 
                                                            
2 We assigned the most regulated listing for firms with more than one level (nine of the 
foreign firms in our analysis); e.g., if a firm traded on both NYSE (level 2) and OTC (level 1), 
we classed it at level 2. 




foreign firms because they do not face SEC review; these firms provide a 
relevant control group.  
We used three data filters. First, we deleted firm-year observations with 
zero or negative total assets, sales, or capital expenditure. Second, we 
excluded cases with negative or missing R&D expense or short-term 
investments. Third, we excluded cases with extreme values of total assets 
(above 99th percentile; 269 of 32,869 cases).This provided 1,393 high-
technology firms: 1,172 U.S. firms and 221 foreign firms cross-listed with 
level 1 or 4 ADRs. 
Panel-level propensity score matching 
Although foreign cross-listed firms on level 1 and level 4 ADRs may 
differ substantially from the focal U.S. firms and thus create a potential 
selection bias, propensity score matching can address this concern by 
constructing a sample containing treated and control firms that are comparable 
in important firm-level and environment-level attributes. We estimated firm i’s 
propensity score of receiving the SOX treatment in period t based on logistic 
regression with robust standard errors. The equation estimates a firm’s 
propensity of being affected by SOX with a vector of covariates Xit (size, 
current ratio, equity dependence, return on assets, return on equity, debt to 
asset ratio, and debt to equity ratio, plus year and industry dummies).  
Two procedures helped ensure that matching occurs at the panel level and 
retains temporal information (Nielsen & Shefield, 2009). First, propensity 
scores included five lag periods of covariates in addition to current terms, 
which captures the temporal trajectories of a panel prior to treatment and 
provides panel-level matches. The propensity scores were normally distributed. 




Second, we stratified ten groups based on the scores and created dummy 
variables for each stratum.3 With this approach, the initial matched sample 
included 974 firms that operate at some point from 1996 to 2006: 856 U.S. and 
118 foreign high-technology firms cross-listed with level 1 or 4 ADRs. 
Measures 
Dependent variables: Long-term and short-term investments 
We measure long-term investment based on annual R&D expenditure. 
R&D is an important long-term investment because it often takes years to 
yield financial results and yet adds costs to current financial reports. The 
dependent variable is the natural log of R&D (R&D spending is positively 
skewed); the results indicate percentage change in R&D. Percentage change in 
R&D reflects the argument that executives will seek to reduce long term 
investments that would be recorded as current expenditures (González & Pazó, 
2008).  
For short-term investments, we include investments that mature within 
one year (IVST in Compustat); these include items such as cash in escrow, 
certificates of deposit, marketable securities, repurchase agreements, and real 
estate investment trusts’ shares of beneficial interest. Similar to our approach, 
Bargeron, Lehn, & Zutter (2010) used cash and cash-equivalents (CASH in 
Compustat) to measure low-risk investments. Such liquid items provide quick 
returns and allow firm to pursue operating opportunities as they arise. 
                                                            
3 The approach improves on propensity score techniques such as nearest neighbor matching 
that match comparable observations rather than comparable firms, assume independent 
observations even though observations in panel data are often dependent, and discard unfitted 
observations of a panel from the middle of a time series thereby losing temporal information 
that is crucial for causal inference (Nielsen and Sheffield, 2009). 





Unbalanced change in codified and tacit dimensions of monitoring. We 
employ the differences-in-differences (DID) methodology to compare the 
changes in investment strategies of firms affected by SOX (treated group) with 
a comparable group of firms listed in the US stock market but not affected by 
SOX (control group). The treated and control groups are distinguished by the 
cross-sectional dummy variable US, which equals 1 for U.S. firms and 0 for 
the foreign comparable firms listed in the U.S. stock market but not impacted 
by SOX. To conduct a before and after comparison, we construct a temporal 
dummy variable SOX distinguishing the period before the promulgation of the 
Sarbanes Oxley law from the period after the promulgation of the law; the 
variable equals 0 from 1996 to 2001, then 1 from 2002 to 2006.  
As we discuss in more detail later, the coefficient on the interaction of the 
two variables (US*SOX) measures the difference between the change in 
investment strategy of the treated firms and that of the control firms across the 
time period. The change in the investment strategy of the control firms reflects 
the counterfactual investment trends that would be there across the time period 
even if SOX had not occurred. The additional change in the treated group (i.e., 
the difference between U.S. firms and comparable U.S. listed foreign firms), 
arises from the treatment of the tilt toward monitoring due codified 
information in U.S. firms due to SOX. The interaction term therefore is the 
relevant variable of interest.  
Managerial discretion (firm level). Two items created a composite 
measure of managerial discretion, building on research in corporate 
governance (Williamson, 1963; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Finkelstein, 1992): 




(1) scarcity or abundance of slack resources, plus (2) stringency or looseness 
of governance. To determine slack resources, we examined each firm’s 
operating cash flow (EBITDA) relative to the sample median. Values of 
EBITDA above or equal to median indicate abundant slack (results are 
equivalent if we class the few cases of median values with scarce slack); 
values below median indicate scarce slack.  
To determine the second item of discretion, governance stringency, we 
compare three firm-level governance attributes: (A) executive board presence, 
based on the proportion of a firm’s senior executives who serve as board 
directors; (B) compensation flexibility, measured by percentage change of a 
firm’s total executive compensation relative to change in industry median; and 
(C) lack of shareholder activism, represented by the inverse of institutional 
ownership percentage (Hoskisson, Castleton et al., 2009). Values of each of 
the three governance measures above or equal to the sample median indicate 
loose governance (results are equivalent if we class the few cases of median 
values with stringent governance); values below median indicate stringent 
governance. 
We then split the sample into high and low values of the composite 
measure of discretion. The combination of abundant slack with loose 
governance (both factors equal or above sample median) indicates high 
discretion. Combinations involving stringent governance and/or scarce slack 
(at least one factor below median) indicate low discretion. 
Technological intensity (industry level). The degree of technological 
intensity in an industry reflects the extent to which a firm’s success depends 
on R&D activities and other long-term investments. To determine a firm’s 




technological intensity, we compared average R&D intensity of all firms in 
each firm’s primary industry in each year with median R&D intensity across 
all industries in the sample for the full period. We then split the firms based on 
high and low technological intensity of their industries. Firms in industries 
with lower-than-median R&D intensity have lower technological intensity; 
firms in industries with higher-than or equal-to-median R&D intensity have 
higher technological intensity.4 
Control variables 
We controlled for firm factors (capital structure, equity dependence, 
liquidity, size, financing ease, compliance cost of SOX, SOX propensity score 
strata dummies), industry factors (technological intensity, market 
concentration), and period effects. Capital structure is the ratio of debt to 
assets and of debt to equity. Equity dependence is the ratio of net equity issues 
(sale of common and preferred stock less redemption value of preferred stock) 
to capital expenditure (Brown et al., 2009). Liquidity is the ratio of current 
assets to liability. Size is the natural log of total sales and of total assets. Ease 
of financing in equity markets is the log of total dividends (higher dividend 
rates facilitate refinancing from investors). Compliance cost of SOX takes the 
value of 0 from 1996 to 2002, and 0.289%, 0.501%, 0.618%, and 0.371% of a 
firm’s sales in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 (Maher & Weiss, 2008). We used 
fixed effects for the ten strata of SOX propensity scores because we have more 
treated than control firms (Nielsen & Sheffield, 2009). Industry R&D intensity 
is mean R&D expenditure over sales in a firm’s primary industry. Market 
                                                            
4 R&D varied substantially even among the high-technology firms in our sample. Below-
median firms tended to produce electronics, medical, and communication equipment; above-
median tended to be computing and drugs; scientific instruments firms often fell near the 
median. 




concentration is the percentage of sales occupied by the top five firms in a 
firm’s primary industry. Year dummies control period effects. Sensitivity 
analysis also assessed home country annual GDP growth rates to address 
possible differences in macro-economic conditions. 
Difference-in-differences (DID) estimator 
We use a DID estimator to assess how the regulatory change affected 
shifts in investments. The estimator first calculates the foreign firms’ (control 
group) investment changes before and after SOX, which represents 
counterfactual investment changes by U.S. firms if they had not been affected 
by the regulatory change. Next, the estimator calculates the investment 
changes in U.S. firms before and after the regulatory change. Finally, the 
estimator obtains SOX’s average impact on U.S. firms’ by subtracting the 
control group average investment changes from the average investment 
changes in U.S. firms. This approach controls time-invariant factors that vary 
across treated firms and also controls time-varying factors common to treated 
firms. 
We used parametric regressions (rather than estimated differences in 
means) because the matching is approximate (the treated and control panels 
are similar but not identical) (Nielsen and Sheffield, 2009). The parametric 
specifications for our baseline predictions are:  
[1] ln R&Dit=ߚ0	+ߚ1USi +ߚ2SOXt +ߚ3USi*SOXt	൅ߚXit-1+Yeart +αi +Stratai 
+εit  
[2] ln IVSTit=ߚ0	+ߚ1USi +ߚ2SOXt +ߚ3USi*SOXt	൅ߚXit-1+Yeart +αi +Stratai 
+εit 




In these equations, ݅	indexes firms, t indicates observation years, and εit is the 
error term. Xit-1 represents the matrix of control variables in the last period 
[e.g., ln Sales]. Yeart indicates year fixed effects. αi represents firm-specific 
fixed effects. To investigate the firm-level moderating effects of managerial 
discretion and technological intensity (H2 to H3), we examined how 
differences across categories of firms based on different levels of managerial 
discretion and/or technological intensity led to differences in β3.5  
Sample characteristics and descriptive statistics  
The initial matched sample included 974 firms but missing data limited 
the DID analyses to 586 firms (3,881 firm-year observations); the missing data 
excluded all firms in SIC 737 from the primary analysis; we do include the 
sector in robustness checks. Although U.S. high-technology firms are more 
represented than foreign firms, the two groups are randomly exposed to the 
change in monitoring requirements because the distribution of their propensity 
scores is nearly normal (Figure A1.1 in the appendix).  
Tables 1.1a and 1.1b report descriptive statistics and sample comparisons. 
The 586 U.S. and foreign high-technology firms in our sample have mean 
annual R&D spending of $11 million (e2.40), with a range from zero to $4.6 
billion. The firms rely on equity financing more heavily than debt 
(Debt/Equity = 0.30; Debt/Assets = 0.18). Compared with indicators in 
governance studies (Hoskisson et al., 2009; Gillan and Starks, 2007), the U.S. 
firms in our sample have relatively high executive board presence (28%) and 
                                                            
5 We considered using interactions rather than subsamples to test H2 to H4. However, 
interactions would be intractable owing to multiple dimensions of managerial discretion 
together with the need to interpret three- and four-way interactions (SOX x U.S. x discretion 
and/or technological intensity) along with underlying two- and three-way interactions. 
Subsample analysis, testing differences of coefficients, is more meaningful. 




compensation flexibility (67%), together with medium institutional ownership 
(39%).  
********** Table 1.1a and Table 1.1b ********** 
RESULTS 
Hypothesis 1: Baseline results and robustness tests 
Table 1.2 reports DID estimates that support H1, which expected 
managerial risk preferences to shift away from long-term toward short-term 
investments when monitoring based on codified information increased without 
a concurrent increase in monitoring based on tacit information. Model 1 shows 
that R&D investment in U.S. high-technology firms decreased after the 
regulatory change imposed greater codified monitoring requirements 
compared to the control group of foreign cross-listed firms, with a relative 
decline of 18% (p<0.01). Model 2 shows that short-term investments in U.S. 
high-technology firms increased by 46% (p<0.05) compared to the foreign 
cross-listed firms.  
********** Table 1.2 ********** 
Several tests address the robustness of the baseline results. A falsification 
strategy (Popper, 1959; Png, 2012) assessed the assumption that U.S. and 
comparable foreign firms had similar investment trends before the regulatory 
change despite differences in environments, finding no significantly lower 
R&D investment changes in U.S. versus foreign firms if we applied falsified 
shocks in 1998, 1999, or 2000, prior to the corporate scandals in 2001 that led 
to SOX in 2002. We also found similar results when we constrained the 
analysis to end in 2003, before any effects of subsequent events such as the 




Iraq War might have occurred. Overall, the results are strong when we apply 
the regulatory change treatment. 
We assessed two other dependent variables, three other samples, and two 
other estimation methods [Tables A1.1-A1.2 in the appendices]. (1) Consistent 
with our logic, after SOX, U.S. firms increased two forms of more certain 
investments (operational investments and capital expenditures). (2) We find 
consistent results with three other samples: a matched sample with unaffected 
foreign firms at level 1 and 4 ADRs and a subset of affected U.S. firms at the 
same exchanges; a non-matched sample with U.S. firms and foreign cross-
listed firms; and an unmatched sample of only U.S. high-technology firms 
over a longer period from 1987 to 2011. (3) Alternative propensity score 
matching and estimation based on robust standard errors found similar results 
for R&D; more mixed results for short-term expenses suggest greater 
sensitivity of short-term responses to the regulatory change. 
Hypotheses 2: Moderating effect of managerial discretion  
We now turn to the firm-varying contingencies concerning H2 to H3, to 
assess whether investment shifts are more prominent in firms that are more 
likely to rely on codified criteria for performance evaluation and attribution 
after the change in monitoring. The contingencies help deepen the 
understanding of the monitoring mechanism by assessing influences that 
deepen or attenuate the first order effects. We first tested whether managerial 
discretion affected the sensitivity of investment shift to the change in 
monitoring (H2). DID estimates considered subsamples characterized by high 
and low discretion. Table 1.3 reports the results for three measures of 
managerial discretion: resource slack combined with (A) executive board 




presence; (B) executive compensation flexibility; and (C) lack of shareholder 
activism. 
********** Table 1.3 ********** 
The R&D results in Panels A1, B1, and C1 of Table 1.3 support H2. 
Model 1a in Panel A1 shows that, relative to the control group, R&D declines 
by 16% (p<0.05) with high discretion based on executive board presence. 
Model 3a in Panel B1 shows that R&D declines by 21% (p<0.01) with high 
discretion based on executive compensation flexibility. Model 5a in Panel C1 
shows that R&D declines by 19% (p<0.05) with high discretion based on 
shareholder activism. T-tests show that R&D declines more for firms with 
high managerial discretion of all three types than for firms with low discretion.  
The results for short-term investments in Panels A2, B2, and C2 of Table 
1.3 also support H2. Short-term investments increase significantly relative to 
the control group in conditions with high managerial discretion, increasing by 
61% with executive board presence (Model 1b; p<0.01) and 66% with 
compensation flexibility (Model 3b; p<0.01); t-tests show that increases in 
short-term investments in the two settings are significantly higher than with 
lower levels of discretion. In parallel, although Model 5b shows that short-
term investments do not increase significantly with high managerial discretion 
based on lack of shareholder activism, the comparison based on Models 5b 
and 6b (p<0.05) shows that short-term investments increase significantly more 
with high discretion than with low discretion of this form. Overall, the shift 
away from long- towards short-term investments compared to the control 
group is greatest in firms with high managerial discretion, consistent with H2.  




Hypotheses 2: Moderating effect of technological intensity 
Table 1.4 reports the results concerning the moderating effect of high and 
low technological intensity, to test H3. The results hold for R&D, but not for 
short-term investments. Models 1a and 2a in Panel A show that, relative to the 
control group, R&D investment in U.S. high-technology firms declines in less 
technologically-intensive industries (Model 2a: -27%; p<0.01) whereas, as 
expected, R&D investment does not decline significantly in technologically 
more intensive industries (Model 1a; n.s.); the coefficients in Models 1a and 
2a differ significantly from each other based on a t-test (p<0.05). By contrast, 
unexpectedly, Panel B shows significant increases in short-term investments in 
technologically more intensive industries (Model 1b: 66%; p<0.05), with no 
significant increase in less technologically-intensive industries (Model 2b; 
n.s.). Thus, firms that face lower technological intensity have a greater shift 
away from long-term investment, but the parallel pattern does not hold for 
short-term investments, so that the results only partially support H3.  
********** Table 1.4 ********** 
The unexpected results regarding short-term investments for firms across 
levels of technological intensity suggest that even in highly R&D intensive 
settings, greater clarity about codified information can generate earning 
pressures without reducing long-term investment incentives, perhaps because 
the dynamic conditions in these industries not only make long-term 
positioning important but also create short-term pressures for which codified 
information is relevant. High earnings pressure may push executives to make 
investments that seek quick payoffs, in addition to continuing R&D needed to 
maintain competitive position. In turn, managers with high discretion may 




increase both short- and long-term investments because they have the most 
latitude to respond to the earnings pressure. 
Exclusion of alternative theories 
We addressed the concern that our setting of SOX may reflect a series of 
confounding events, creating difficulties for establishing our theory of 
imbalanced change in monitoring. In particular, nationwide events around 
2002 (e.g., a ripple effect of corporate scandals and macroeconomic 
fluctuations), industrial shocks around 2002 (e.g., dot.com bubble collapse and 
delisting of innovative firms in U.S. securities), and firm-specific 
characteristics associated with implementation of SOX (e.g., compliance costs 
such as paying auditors to attest to new reports, increased liability and risk 
aversion of directors, and increased valuation difficulty for intangible assets) 
may confound our theory. We ruled out six alternative explanations based on 
confounding events by conducting a series of robustness checks (Tables A1.3a 
and A1.3b in the appendices); none of the alternative explanations drive the 
baseline relationship between change in monitoring requirements and 
investment shifts.  
We also further conducted contingency tests based on the logic behind H2 
and H3, showing that investment shifts in response to increased access and 
reliability of codified information will be greater when the conditions of high 
managerial discretion and low technological intensity both arise. In such a 
joint scenario, monitors have concerns about the veracity of codified 
information due to high managerial discretion and the predictive value of 
codified in assessing the competitive position of the firm is high as well. As a 
result, when access to and reliability of codified information increases, 




monitors are most likely to enhance their reliance on codified criteria in 
performance evaluation and attribution (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Walsh 
and Seward, 1990; Weick, 1995). The results (Tables A1.4a and A1.4b in the 
appendices) provide support for a greater decrease in R&D investment in all 
predicted scenarios and also a greater increase in short-term investments a 
subset of the predicted scenarios. 
DISCUSSION 
Understanding why managers prefer short-term investments to potentially 
higher payoffs from long-term investment is critical to strategic management 
(Marginson & McAulay, 2008; Souder & Shaver, 2010). The strategic 
governance literature based on traditional agency theory argues that short-term 
orientation arises from managerial moral hazard due to divergent risk attitudes 
and information asymmetry in principal-agent relationships. Thus, reducing 
information asymmetry through monitoring can increase long-term orientation. 
Recent literature, however, has suggested that the efficacy of monitoring 
devices may vary with their information processing capabilities (Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990; Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel, & Bierman, 2010). We focus on 
monitoring that reduces information asymmetry about codified firm 
performance and control procedures without reducing information asymmetry 
about tacit managerial decision contexts. We show that increasing access and 
reliability of codified information without affecting tacit information enhances 
monitors’ reliance on codified measures in performance evaluation and 
attribution, increasing immediate earnings pressure and managerial risk 
aversion. Examining changes in long and short-term investments by U.S. high-
technology firms, we find that U.S. firms shifted investments away from R&D 




to short-term investments, mainly in firms with high managerial discretion 
and/or facing low technological intensity when an exogenous shock increased 
monitoring based on codified information without increasing monitoring based 
on tacit information. 
These findings contribute to the strategic governance literature by 
providing a deeper explanation of how monitoring impacts strategic choices. 
Prior strategic governance studies focusing on the effectiveness of monitoring 
devices (e.g., large blockholding and outside directors) have found ambiguous 
relationships between monitoring and a firm’s long-term investment. While 
the studies implicitly suggest that monitors’ varying capabilities of gathering 
different types of information may account for different levels of long term 
investment by affecting a firm’s evaluation processes (e.g., Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990; Zahra, 1996), little empirical evidence tests this proposition. 
Extending prior studies, we distinguish codified information about firm 
performance and procedures and tacit information about strategic rationales of 
managerial decisions, showing that increasing codified information without 
increasing tacit information increases a firm’s reliance on codified criteria in 
performance evaluation and attribution; in turn, the change inhibits long-term 
investment. As such, our study highlights that the balance between these two 
types of information in monitoring needs to be a key consideration in both 
creating monitoring mechanisms as well as in deriving predictions regarding 
how monitoring mechanism may influence managerial behaviour. 
We also add insights to literature on the impact of financial and strategic 
controls on firm strategy, as well as provide implications to broader 
management studies on organizational control. Prior governance studies often 




assume that accessing financial (strategic) information leads to financial 
(strategic) evaluation within a firm (e.g., Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; 
Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003). However, 
we show that the extent to which increased access to codified information 
induces evaluation and attribution based on codified criteria also depends on 
two contingent factors: ex-ante ambiguity regarding the veracity of the 
codified information and the relevance of codified information in predicting 
competitive performance. Both amplify the likelihood that monitors will rely 
on codified criteria in performance evaluation and attribution when codified 
information increases. More generally, the two contingencies provide 
guidance about factors that can help offset the adverse consequences (e.g., 
reduced innovation) of a firm’s internal control processes such as 
formalization (Eisenhardt, 1985; Pierce & Delbecq, 1977). 
The empirical setting of SOX adds insights to the policy debate on 
whether stringent scrutiny of public firms through securities legislation 
constrains potentially beneficial risk taking (Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 
2005). Our baseline findings may raise policy concerns, particularly given the 
generally-accepted idea that economic development depends on on-going 
investment in R&D. The firm-varying contingencies in the study partially 
attenuate these concerns. Reduced R&D mainly occurs in contexts where 
managers are most likely to have made inefficient investments in the first 
place: those facing least technological intensity. By contrast, firms that face 
higher technological intensity, at all levels of managerial discretion do not 
significantly reduce R&D following the regulatory changes. Hence, the more 
stringent regulations appear had most impact on firms for which there are 




fewer concerns about reduced incentives for long-term investment. 
Nonetheless, even firms that face limited technological intensity may well 
benefit from investing in R&D and other long-term activities if that helps them 
create sustainable competitive advantages for themselves and for the countries 
in which they operate. 
The study moves beyond prior accounting-based studies of the Sarbanes 
Oxley legislation (e.g., Bargeron et al., 2010; Dey, 2010; Kang, Liu, & Qi, 
2010). We identify unexamined firm-varying contingencies that amplify the 
impact of unbalanced changes in the codified and tacit dimensions of 
monitoring: ex-ante ambiguity regarding the veracity of codified data and high 
relevance of codified information in decisions. These contingencies both help 
isolate our mechanism from the effects documented in prior accounting studies 
and also provide managerial guidance about offsetting potential adverse 
consequences of general organizational control processes such as 
formalization. 
Two limitations of this study highlight research opportunities. First, we 
consider one form of monitoring, securities legislation, to highlight the impact 
of asymmetric increase in use of codified information relative to tacit 
information on long-term investments; future studies need to explore how 
other monitoring mechanisms influence the balance between these two 
dimensions of information and potential consequences. Second, R&D 
spending reflects only one aspect of long-term activity and, moreover, may be 
manipulated in financial reports; future studies can examine other aspects of 
long-term orientation such as activities that explore product and geographic 
markets. 




Figure 1.1. The Impact of Unbalanced Changes in the Codified and Tacit 






















Change in investment horizons 
 
H1: Shift from long term toward short-term investment  
Managerial employment risk 
Increase: Immediate earnings pressure faced by managers 
H2: Managerial discretion 
 
H3: Technological intensity  
Performance evaluation and attribution 
 Increase: Reliance on codified criteria in performance evaluation and attribution 
 No increase: Information about intent and opportunities of managerial investments 
Codified and tacit dimensions of monitoring 
 Increase: Monitoring based on codified information about firm performance and procedures 
 No increase: Monitoring based on tacit information about investment context (strategic 
rationales) 
(e.g., passive investors, outside directors, takeover threats, securities legislation) 




Figure 1.2: Median R&D Intensity (R&D/Sales) of a Constant Set of U.S.  High-
technology Firms: 1987-2006 
 
Notes: 
 The trend reports median R&D intensity for U.S. high-technology firms listed by Compustat in sectors 283,357, 
366, 367, 382, 384, and 737 from 1987 to 2006. 
 The data include 457 firms that operated during the full period; this constant set of firms ensures that any 
changes in the depicted trend of R&D intensity result from firm-level differences rather than from changes in 
the composition of firms across time.  
 The figure illustrates R&D trends over time for the constant set of U.S. firms; the analysis that we report next 
assesses year-to-year changes by a matched set of U.S. and foreign cross-listed high-technology firms rather 
than only the illustrative firms. 




Table 1.1a. Summary Statistics  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1.Long-term (log R&D)  1.00                  
2.Short-term (log IVST) 0.66* 1.00                 
3.SOX (treatment) 0.07* 0.13* 1.00                
4.U.S. -0.06* -0.07* -0.20* 1.00               
5.Inverse institutional share -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 . 1.00              
6. Executive board presence -0.10* -0.07* -0.11* . 0.06 1.00             
7. Compensation flexibility 0.01 -0.01 0.00 . -0.01 0.04 1.00            
8. Slack (EBITDA) 0.58* 0.43* 0.01 -0.05* -0.01 0.03 0.00 1.00           
9. ln sales 0.84* 0.51* 0.08* -0.14* -0.04 -0.08* 0.02 0.52* 1.00          
10. ln assets 0.90* 0.60* 0.11* -0.16* -0.04* -0.06* 0.02 0.53* 0.95* 1.00         
11. Current ratio -0.12* 0.10* 0.02 0.06* -0.01 0.10* 0.00 -0.10* -0.21* -0.11* 1.00        
12. Debt asset ratio -0.07* -0.12* 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08* -0.08* -0.18* 1.00       
13. Debt equity ratio 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.07* 0.00 0.01 0.05* 0.05* -0.02 0.01 1.00      
14. Equity dependence 0.02 0.04* -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.13* -0.13* 0.00 1.00     
15. Ease of financing 0.52* 0.28* 0.05* -0.24* -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.66* 0.57* 0.58* -0.14* 0.01 0.03* -0.02 1.00    
16. Compliance cost  0.29* 0.25* 0.18* -0.11* -0.01 -0.06* 0.01 0.42* 0.27* 0.28* -0.05* -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.28* 1.00   
17. Industry R&D intensity 0.09* 0.07* 0.01 -0.06* -0.01 0.10* 0.01 0.09* -0.03 0.05* 0.04* 0.03* 0.00 0.04* 0.09* 0.05* 1.00  
18. Market concentration  -0.09* -0.05* 0.28* -0.01 -0.02 -0.14* -0.05 -0.14* -0.04* -0.06* -0.01 -0.06* -0.02 -0.02 -0.11* 0.06* -0.30* 1.00 
Mean 2.40 1.53 0.40 0.94 867.9 0.28 0.67 166.10 4.45 4.61 3.84 0.18 0.30 3.28 0.63 1.13 1.42 0.87 
Standard deviation 1.86 2.11 0.49 0.24 29,048.3 0.16 3.82 615.79 2.20 2.18 4.63 0.38 4.28 98.35 1.40 7.80 3.41 0.12 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.00 -29.16 -753.36 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 -149.78 -2436.5 -0.01 0.00 0.08 0.33 
Maximum 8.44 9.43 1.00 1.00 1,177,788 1.00 53.02 7,930.5 10.59 10.30 137.52 8.52 79.46 3508.8 7.69 246.06 16.30 1.00 
* p<0.05; n=3,881 for all variables, other than inverse institutional ownership (n=2,614), executive board presence (n=1,321), and executive compensation 
change (n=1,260)  




Table 1.1b. Distribution of Matched U.S. and Foreign High-technology Firms 
Sector (SIC) Initial Matched Sample Final Matched Sample 
Drugs (SIC 283) 162: 130 (U.S.), 32 (foreign) 134: 110 (U.S.), 24 (foreign) 
Office and computing (SIC 357) 135: 121 (U.S.), 14 (foreign) 81: 76 (U.S.), 5 (foreign) 
Communications equipment (SIC 366) 114: 103 (U.S.), 11 (foreign) 82: 75 (U.S.), 7 (foreign) 
Electronic components (SIC 367) 143: 114 (U.S.), 29 (foreign) 105: 92 (U.S.), 13 (foreign) 
Scientific instruments (SIC 382) 126: 125 (U.S.),1 (foreign) 86: 85 (U.S.),1 (foreign) 
Medical instruments (SIC 384) 118: 104 (U.S.), 14 (foreign) 98: 87 (U.S.), 11 (foreign) 
Software (SIC 737) 176: 159 (U.S.), 17 (foreign) 0 
Total 974 586 
Notes:  
The samples are based on approximate matching (Nielsen and Sheffield, 2009). Missing data limits the final matched sample for analysis to 586 firms from six high-technology 
sectors; this excluded sector 737 although we are able to use the firms in SIC 737 for robustness checks that do not rely on matching (IT v. non-IT firms in the collapse of the 
dot.com bubble). 




Table 1.2: DID Estimation for H1: Investment Shift after Increased Monitoring 
Based on Codified Information  
(Negative coefficients indicate reduced investment after change) 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 
H1 predictions 




H1: DID effect of change in monitoring on U.S. firms 
(U.S.*SOX) -0.18*** (0.06) 0.46** (0.19) 
SOX: Post-SOX investment change of foreign firms (control 
group) 0.21*** (0.07) 0.22 (0.23) 
U.S.: Pre-SOX investment difference between U.S. and 
foreign firms  Dropped (a) Dropped (a) 
Debt to asset ratio 0.23 (2.05) -3.49 (6.56) 
Debt to equity ratio -0.23* (0.13) 0.27 (0.04) 
Equity dependence 0.01 (0.01) 0.03* (0.02) 
Current ratio 0.14 (0.18) 2.46*** (0.57) 
Ln sales 
0.12*** (0.02) -0.21*** (0.06) 
Ln assets 0.38*** (0.02) 0.67*** (0.06) 
Ease of financing -0.64 (1.40) -0.62 (1.30) 
Compliance cost 0.06 (0.10) 0.06 (0.10) 
Industry R&D intensity 0.27 (0.20) -0.03 (0.20) 
Market concentration 0.38** (0.16) 0.81 (0.50) 
Constant -0.34** (0.14) -1.21*** (0.44) 
Propensity score strata dummies, year fixed effects, firm fixed 
effects 
yes yes 
Observations 3,879 3,863 
R-squared 0.48 0.16 
Number of sample firms 586 585 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (two-tailed tests; standard errors in parentheses).  
 The U.S. dummy, as a time-constant constant firm-specific variable, drops out of the firm 
fixed effects analysis. 
 Coefficients and standard errors on debt asset ratio, debt equity ratio, equity dependence, 
current ratio, ease of financing, compliance cost, and industry R&D intensity are multiplied 
by 100 due to small magnitudes. 
 Implication: H1 holds for both R&D and short-term investments.  
 




Table 1.3. DID Estimation for H2: Managerial Discretion and Investment Shift  
(Negative coefficients indicate reduced investment) 
 
 A. Managerial Discretion: Resource Slack & Executive Board Presence 
H2 predictions A1. R&D investment (H2: 1a v. 2a A2. Short-term investments (H2: 1b v. 2b 
Model 1a Model 2a Model 1b Model 2b
 High Low High  Low 
H2: DID effect of change in  -0.16** -0.09 0.61*** -1.17** 
monitoring on U.S. firms 
(US*SOX)
(0.07) (0.17) (0.22) (0.52) 
Change in monitoring (SOX) 0.21 *** -0.05 0.42 1.35** 
 (0.08) (0.18) (0.33) (0.55) 
Constant -0.24 -0.75*** -0.42 -1.74** 
 (0.30) (0.20) (0.87) (0.68) 
Observations 1,627 2,252 1,619 2,214 
R-squared 0.49 0.453 0.15 0.111 
Number of firms 382 454 382 453 
 B. Managerial Discretion: Resource Slack & Compensation Flexibility 
H2 predictions B1. R&D investment (H2: 3a v. 4a B2. Short-term investments (H2: 3b v. 4b 
 Model 3a Model 4a Model 3b Model 4b 
 High  Low High Low 
H2: DID effect of change in  -0.21*** -0.07 0.66*** -1.15** 
monitoring on U.S. firms 
(US*SOX)
(0.07) (0.17) (0.25) (0.50) 
Change in monitoring (SOX) 0.22*** -0.05 0.11 1.13** 
 (0.08) (0.17) (0.28) (0.52) 
Constant -0.35 -0.70*** 0.32 -1.71*** 
 (0.28) (0.20) (1.00) (0.60) 
Observations 1,707 2,172 1,698 2,165 
R-squared 0.49 0.438 0.17 0.133 
Number of firms 400 470 400 469 
 C. Managerial Discretion: Resource Slack & Lack of Shareholder Activism 
H2 predictions C1. R&D investment (H2: 5a v. 6a C2. Short-term investments (H2: 5b v. 6b 
 Model 5a Model 6a Model 5b Model 6b 
 High Low High Low 
H2: DID effect of change in  -0.19** -0.08 0.11 -1.23** 
monitoring on U.S. firms 
( S*SO )
(0.09) (0.17) (0.32) (0.53) 
Change in monitoring (SOX) 0.16 0.11 1.34** 1.51*** 
 (0.19) (0.17) (0.64) (0.55) 
Constant -0.90 -0.24 1.30 -1.08* 
 (0.57) (0.15) (1.96) (0.57) 
Observations 497 3,382 495 3,186 
R-squared 0.45 0.490 0.10 0.186 
Number of firms 135 533 135 526 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (two-tailed tests; standard errors in parentheses). 
 The U.S. dummy, as a time-constant constant firm-specific variable, drops out of the firm fixed effects analysis. 
 Variables included in estimates but not reported to conserve space are: debt asset ratio, debt equity ratio, current ratio, 
equity dependence, ln sales, ln assets, ease of financing, compliance cost, industry R&D intensity, market 
concentration, propensity score strata dummies, year fixed effects, and firm fixed effects. 
 T-test statistics show that the coefficients in italics (model 1a v. 2a; 3a v. 4a; 5a v. 6a; 1b v. 2b; 3b v. 4b; 5b v. 6b) 
differ significantly (p< 0.05). 
 Implication: H2 holds for both R&D and short-term investments.  




Table 1.4. DID Estimation for H3: Technological Intensity and Investment Shift  
(Negative coefficients indicate reduced investment after change) 
 
 
A. R&D investment B. Short-term investments 
H3 predictions (H3: 2a v. 1a -) (H3: 2b v. 1b +) 
 
High Technological  
intensity 




Low Technological  
intensity 
 Model 1a  Model 2a Model 1b  Model 2b  
H3: DID effect of change in monitoring -0.01 -0.27*** 0.66** 0.32 
on U.S. firms (US*SOX) (0.10) (0.10) (0.31) (0.35) 
Change in monitoring (SOX) -0.11 0.24** -0.29 -0.21 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.35) (0.37) 
Constant -1.00*** 0.53** -4.16*** 0.69 
 (0.23) (0.2) (0.69) (0.79) 
Observations 1,830 2,049 1,825 2,038 
R-squared 0.49 0.49 0.16 0.20 
Number of firms 413 435 412 435 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (two-tailed tests; standard errors in parentheses).  
 The U.S. dummy, as a time-constant constant firm-specific variable, drops out of the firm fixed effects analysis. 
 Variables included in estimates but not reported to conserve space are: Debt asset ratio, debt equity ratio, current ratio, equity dependence, ln sales, ln assets, ease of financing, 
compliance cost, industry R&D intensity, market concentration, propensity score strata dummies, year fixed effects, and firm fixed effects. 
 T-tests show that the coefficients in italics (models 1a v. 2a; 1b v. 2b) differ significantly (p<0.05). 
 Implication: H3 holds for R&D but not for short-term investments.  
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Chapter 2: Caught In the Crossfire: How Conflict of Interests among Large 
Shareholders Affects Precipitate Management Turnover 
Abstract: This paper investigates how conflict of interests among a firm’s large 
shareholders affects senior executives’ forced and abrupt voluntary exits, which 
we refer to as precipitate management turnover. Taking into account socio-
political factors in principal-agent relations, we argue that interest conflicts 
increase precipitate management turnover by increasing both power contestation 
within a firm and the incompatibility of executives’ job demands. Longitudinal 
analyses based on 599 Taiwanese firms from 2000 to 2011 reveal that 
management turnover increases with the interaction between family and non-
family large shareholders. The relationship with management turnover is stronger 
under three contingencies – weaker corporate governance, higher resource 
intangibility within a firm, and some forms of lower executive power – each of 
which amplifies power struggles and/or incompatible job demands. Our study 
contributes to the management turnover literature and strategic corporate 
governance literature by revealing the role of shareholder conflicts in affecting 




Corporate governance scholars have long been interested in the determinants 
of management turnover (e.g., Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988; Shen & 
Cannena, 2002; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004; Wiersema & Zhang, 2011). The 
possibility of executives’ forced and abrupt voluntary job turnovers (distinct from 
exits due to illness or planned exits such as retirements), which we term 
precipitate management turnover, often shapes their risk attitudes and, in turn, 
their firms’ strategies (Larraza‐Kintana, Wiseman, Gómez-Mejía, & Welbourne, 
2007). Extant literature recognizes the individual role of influential shareholders 
(e.g., outside blockholders or insider owners) in affecting precipitate management 
turnover by shaping a firm’s control processes (e.g., Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1997; 
Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980), but studies have not yet considered how interactions 
among influential shareholders affect precipitate management turnover. This 
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paper focuses on conflict of interests among a firm’s large shareholders, i.e., 
investors who own a substantial fraction of a firm's voting rights (Connelly, 
Hoskisson, Tihanyi, & Certo, 2010). We argue that potential interest conflicts 
among large shareholders will shape the social-political environments 
surrounding shareholder-executive relations, which in turn increases precipitate 
management turnover. 
We propose that interest conflicts among large shareholders increase 
precipitate management turnover through two parallel mechanisms. First, conflict 
of interests increases contests for power among large shareholders within an 
organization (Ocasio, 1994). Power contestation leads directly to replacement of 
the agents of competing interests (in our case, senior executives) independent of 
executives’ job performance and can also induce executives’ abrupt voluntary 
exits by increasing the turbulence in their work environment. Second, conflict of 
interests increases the divergence of large shareholders’ strategic goals and 
performance expectations (Wiseman & Gómez-Mejía, 1998; Kim, Kim, & Lee, 
2008), exposing executives to incompatible job demands. The incompatibility 
increases executives’ work stress and the difficulty they face in achieving 
performance goals (Hambrick, Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005), increasing 
voluntary and forced departures.  
We investigate three contingencies that amplify the power contestation and/or 
incompatible job demands mechanisms, magnifying the impact of shareholder 
conflicts on precipitate management turnover. First, weak corporate governance 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000) 
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induces power contestations among large shareholders, thereby increasing 
precipitate management turnover arising from the contestation. Second, higher 
resource intangibility within a firm (March & Olsen, 1976; Wiseman & Gómez-
Mejía, 1998) provides fewer common frames for large shareholders to develop 
congruent strategic and performance expectations, which in turn increases 
precipitate management turnover due to incompatible job demands. Third, lower 
executive power (Finkelstein, 1992; Daily & Johnson, 1997) at least partly 
increases the sensitivity of executive jobs to power contestation and also 
constrains executives’ ability to limit incompatible job demands, thereby 
increasing the effect of shareholder conflicts on precipitate management turnover. 
Fredrickson et al. (1988: 257; citing Pfeffer 1981), refer to this as being “caught 
in the crossfire” of competing interests. 
We test the propositions with a panel of 599 non-financial public firms in 
Taiwan from 2000 to 2011.The setting is characterized by weakly enforced 
shareholder rights and thus provides an appealing context of studying shareholder 
conflicts (Yeh & Woidtke, 2005). We focus on interactions between two groups 
of influential shareholders that are widely documented to embrace divergent 
interests such as distinct preferences for investment horizons and socioeconomic 
wealth (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 
2011; Connelly et al., 2010) – family large shareholders and non-family large 
shareholders; the contrast allows us to examine the impact of potential 
shareholder conflicts on precipitate management turnover. Our approach is 
generalizable to other emerging economies, as well as to traditional developed 
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economies; corporate ownership structures prominently feature interest conflicts 
(Hambrick, Werder, & Zajac, 2008) and family-controlled firms are common 
around the world (Villalonga & Amit, 2004;Villalonga & Amit, 2010). The 
analyses use a recently developed simulation-based negative binomial regression 
to account for the challenge of examining interaction effects in prior studies on 
executive turnovers. The findings, after accounting for major institutional 
idiosyncrasies in Taiwan, provide important implications to firms in distinct 
institutions. 
This study advances the literature on management turnover, particularly the 
literature on ownership structure and management turnover, by explicitly 
considering the impact of conflicting interaction among influential shareholders 
with divergent interests on management turnover. We emphasize two 
understudied social-political mechanisms rather than the traditional monitoring 
mechanism through which the shareholders affect management turnover. In doing 
so, we extend strategic corporate governance research and traditional agency 
theory by showing that shareholder configuration shapes socio-political 
environments surrounding principal-agent relations, which in turn affects agents’ 
risk bearing.  
BACKGROUND 
Senior executives (e.g., CEO and other C-level positions) often face threats of 
precipitate exit, whether via forced dismissal or abrupt voluntary resignation. 
Understanding how such precipitate management turnover arises is important for 
strategic management for three reasons. First, costs associated with job exits, 
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including foregone income and loss of reputation and future job opportunities, 
shape executive’s risk attitudes (Fama, 1980; Eisenhardt, 1989; Wiesenfeld, 
Wurthmann, & Hambrick, 2008), which in turn affects firm strategies such as 
market entry, R&D, and acquisitions (Wiseman & Gómez-Mejía, 1998; Larraza-
Kintana et al., 2007). Second, precipitate executive turnovers affect a firm’s 
strategic persistence (Grusky, 1963; Guest, 1962) and potentially create 
downward spirals (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988). Third, precipitate exits can 
damage human and social capital (Fredrickson et al., 1988), while also disrupting 
the lives of many other employees who change roles or lose their jobs along with 
senior executives.  
Corporate governance studies identify firm ownership structure as a cause for 
precipitate management turnover. Studies typically focus on the role of influential 
shareholders such as outside blockholders, corporate insiders, and founding 
families in affecting the effectiveness of internal monitoring, consequently 
causing executive turnovers. For instance, Denis et al. (1997) find that top 
executive turnover increases with the presence of an outside blockholder due to 
enhanced internal monitoring of the executives, and decreases with the ownership 
stake of officers and directors as monitoring is attenuated. Similarly, Dahya, 
McConnell, and Travlos (2002) and Kang and Shivdasani (1995) find outside 
blockholders increase management turnover. Consistently, Parrino, Sias, and 
Starks (2003) and Helwege, Intintoli, and Zhang (2012) show that institutional 
owners may exert effective monitoring through selling their shares in poorly 
managed firms and thus increase forced CEO turnover. By contrast, family large 
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shareholders are often found to be associated with low management turnover due 
to weakened financially-based monitoring of top executives (Allen & Panian 1982; 
Smith & Amoako-Adu, 1999; Lausten, 2002). 
However, extant studies do not consider conflict of interests among a firm’s 
co-existing shareholders, a phenomenon documented worldwide. Conflicting 
interests among shareholders commonly arise from shareholders’ divergent 
backgrounds or identities, which in turn lead to distinct frames of reference in the 
firm’s management decisions such as strategic goals and investment horizons 
(Hambrick et al., 2008). For instance, corporate and institutional blockholders 
often emphasize firms’ economic returns and thus tend to refer to a firm’s 
financial indicators in assessing strategies. State-owned large shareholders such as 
sovereign funds, by contrast, may prioritize political interests over economic 
goals and thus refer less to financial indicators in firm management (Connelly et 
al., 2010). Even within the same category of shareholders, such as financial 
institutions, different investors (e.g., pension funds v. mutual funds) may embrace 
different frames of reference in choosing investment horizons due to distinct 
backgrounds (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002).  
An often highlighted example of shareholder conflicts affecting firm 
management concerns family large shareholders and non-family large 
shareholders (see Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011 for a review). Families, which tend to 
be large and undiversified investors, often pursue risk reduction strategies through 
diversification (Anderson & Reeb, 2003), lower R&D (Chrisman & Patel, 2012) 
and lower reliance on debt in a firm's capital structure (Mishra & McConaughy, 
Strategic Corporate Governance, Employment Risk, and Risk Taking   Shuping Li  2014 
 
      48 
 
1999; Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003). Such strategies may not benefit non-
family large shareholders who often hold more diversified investment portfolios 
and thus are more risk tolerant. In addition, family large shareholders may also 
differ from non-family large shareholders by using non-economic gains or losses 
as their primary frame of reference in decision making, which in turn affects a 
firm’s control process in distinct ways. Compared to non-family large 
shareholders whose primary interest is maximizing firm value, family large 
shareholders tend to embrace affective needs and thus seek to preserve 
socioemotional wealth such as family identity, the ability to exercise family 
influence, and perpetuation of the family dynasty (Cruz,  Gómez-Mejía, & Becerra, 
2010; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007, 2011). As a result, families tend to hand over 
executive and board positions to family members rather than to competent 
external managers (Chung & Luo, 2008). 
Conflict of shareholder interests greatly affects precipitate management 
turnover, especially when the shareholders can effectively exert influence within a 
firm (Connelly et al., 2010; Hambrick et al., 2008; Wiseman & Gómez-Mejía, 
1998). In this paper, we focus on a firm’s large shareholders, i.e., investors who 
own at least 5% of a firm's voting rights. Because large shareholders collectively 
participate in a firm’s monitoring and performance evaluation and attribution, the 
conflict of interests among them greatly affect top executives’ job environment.  
For instance, interest conflicts among large shareholders may motivate them to 
actively collect information and cross-monitor each other, thereby increasing the 
monitoring stringency of executives (Attig, Guedhami, & Mishra, 2008). In 
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addition, conflicting interests may create inconsistent performance evaluation 
criteria of executives (e.g., financial v. behavioural indicators) (Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990; Wiseman & Gómez-Mejía, 1998). Moreover, conflicting 
interests may shape the social-political environment surrounding the relations 
between shareholders and executives, resulting in the loose coupling between 
financial performance and executive turnover (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Cannella 
& Lubatkin, 1993; Walsh & Seward, 1990; Boeker, 1992). 
Articles in the business press often discuss executive turnovers following 
interest conflicts among large shareholders. For example, large shareholders’ 
conflicting orientation in Chesapeake Energy Corporation (NYSE: CHK), the 
second-largest U.S. natural gas producer, triggered executive overhaul. 
Southeastern Asset Management Inc., the largest shareholder of CHK (13.6% 
holding), had implemented aggressive strategies since the firm’s inception in 
1989. After the investor Carl Icahn acquired a 7.6% stake in CHK and became the 
second largest shareholder in May 2012, CHK underwent severe conflicts among 
the two large shareholders because Icahn pressed for cost savings and 
conservative strategies. As a result, CHK replaced almost half its board members 
within one month  (Carrol & Polson, 2012). CEO/Co-founder, Aubrey McClendon, 
was forced to step down even though board scrutiny of his 23-year employment 
suggested no personal misconduct (Carrol, Mider, & Polson, 2013).  
Interest conflicts among large shareholders in emerging economies also 
threaten executives’ job security. VimpelCom Ltd. (NYSE: VIP), Russia’s 
second-largest telecom operator, is owned by two large shareholders, a 
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Norwegian telecom company Telenor ASA (TEL) holding 39.5% of shares and a 
private equity investor Alfa Group holding 40.5% of shares. Backed by Alfa 
Group, Alexander Izosimo was appointed as CEO in 2003. Telenor called for a 
proxy vote to terminate Izosimo’s employment in 2006 due to a disagreement 
over Alfa’s overseas expansion (Telenor, 2006). Izosimo was forced to step down 
in 2009 following the completion of a $6 billion merger deal, which had been 
promoted by Alfa despite strong opposition from Telenor. A Telenor veteran, Jo 
Lunder, succeeded as CEO with the expectation that he would handle shareholder 
conflicts more effectively (Ben-Aaron, 2011). 
HYPOTHESES 
Conflict of interests and management turnover 
Figure 2.1 summarizes how interest conflicts among a firm’s large 
shareholders can affect precipitate management turnover through two mechanisms. 
First, interest conflicts among a firm’s large shareholders increase power 
contestation, which directly threatens the incumbency of their agents (i.e., senior 
executives), independent of executives’ job performance. Second, conflict of 
interests among large shareholders leads to divergent strategic expectations, 
which increase the incompatibility of executives’ job demands and reduce the 
attainability of shareholders’ performance expectations.  
********** Figure 2.1********** 
Our argument about power contestation builds directly on March’s (1962) 
view of firms as systems of conflicts, with political coalitions among competing 
interests as solutions to the conflicts. March (1962) suggests that political 
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coalitions exist at different levels within a firm, involving stakeholders such as 
investors, managers, employees, and customers; within the coalitions, decision 
makers often reflect the interest of influential actors. We focus particularly on the 
coalition among large shareholders with competing interests. Power contestation 
occurs when one controlling party and its rivals compete for control within the 
firm. Because executives serve as agents of a subset of shareholders rather than all 
owners, power contestation among large shareholders can lead to executive 
turnover. Such threats to job security are often independent of executives’ job 
performance. 
Our conceptualization of power contestation is compatible with corporate 
governance research on power dynamics within top management teams (see 
Combs, Ketchen, Perryman, & Donahue, 2007 for a review). Considering the top 
management team as the dominant political coalition within a firm (Hambrick & 
Mason 1984), scholars have focused on how power struggles occur among 
executives with competing interests, which in turn increase CEO turnovers (e.g., 
Ocasio, 1994; Ocasio & Kim, 1999; Shen & Cannella, 2002; Zhang, 2006). While 
our research focuses on a higher level of analysis – large shareholders – the 
phenomenon of interest (i.e., power contestation among competing interests) is 
consistent. Moreover, the mechanisms underlying power contestation and 
executive turnovers will be consistent because top executives are stewards of 
large shareholders’ interests and report to the board.  
Lenta, Russia’s largest retail food chain, illustrates the idea that competition 
for control between large shareholders leads to abrupt executive replacements. 
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During the 2000s, continuing political fights have occurred between Lenta’s two 
large shareholders, the private equity firm TPG allied with VTB Capital and 
others that jointly hold a 40% ownership stake and an individual large shareholder, 
August Meyer, who held 41% of the shares. To settle on-going political disputes, 
the two large shareholders agreed in 2006 to appoint TPG and VTB’s candidate 
Jan Dunning as CEO and Meyers’ candidate Dmitry Kosygin as deputy CEO. 
However, the agreement broke down in 2010 when Meyer acquired additional 
shares. Jan Dunning was ousted in August in favour of Meyer’s candidate, Sergey 
Yushenko, but TPG and VTB refused to endorse Yushenko’s appointment and 
Dunning used private guards to retake control of the firm’s headquarter in 
September. 6 Dunning’s challenge failed, however, and he was forced to leave the 
company again in October 2010 (Ustinova, 2010).  
In addition to increasing precipitate management turnover via the 
politicalized channel, interest conflicts among large shareholders also affect 
turnover by shaping executives’ job demands. A key governance function for 
large shareholders concerns shaping strategic goals and evaluating executive 
efficacy based on performance expectations (Walsh & Seward, 1990). Large 
shareholders’ expectations are greatly shaped by their backgrounds and incentives 
(Murphy, 2001; Hoskisson et al., 2002). As such, large shareholders with 
conflicting interests tend to develop divergent expectations concerning strategic 
objectives and ultimate performance. Since executive efficacy is collectively 
evaluated by all large shareholders (Wiseman & Gómez-Mejía, 1998), divergent 
performance expectations force executives to engage in incompatible jobs that 
                                                            
6 Video footage of Jan Dunning’s struggle is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TqF_Osbutbs. 
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compete for attention and effort (Holmström & Milgrom, 1991).  
Divergent performance expectations are common, causing stress for 
executives. Hoskisson et al. (2002) show that institutional shareholders interested 
in maximizing short-term profits (e.g., mutual funds) often expect executives to 
pursue external growth such as acquisitions, whereas institutional shareholders 
concerned with long term variability (e.g., pension funds) may prefer executives 
to conduct internal R&D. With limited resources, the different expectations 
generate incompatible executive job demands. The job demands often become 
highly divergent, forcing executives to make trade-offs. As large shareholders 
compete to achieve their preferences, for example, one large shareholder may 
prompt executives to create private benefits on his or her behalf at the expense of 
the rivals, while rival shareholders seek competing private benefits. As a result, 
job demands faced by executives will conflict. 
Executives facing incompatible job demands often underperform in their jobs, 
triggering precipitate turnover. Due to bounded rationality and the scarcity of time 
and effort, executives face multifaceted and yet competing tasks can only 
selectively or sequentially focus on a subset of their tasks (Cyert & March, 1963; 
Holmström & Milgrom, 1991; Ocasio, 1997). Partial fulfilment of demands at any 
point of time, however, can be unsatisfactory because evaluation often requires 
consensus among all large shareholders. Executives can try to attend to all 
demands by taking short-cuts in performing their jobs, but short-cuts are often 
flawed, resulting in poor outcomes (Hambrick et al., 2005). Moreover, as 
Hambrick and D’Aveni (1988) show, heightened job demands accompanied by 
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executive stress induce strategic extremism and vacillation by executives, which 
can hurt performance. Shareholders tend to over-attribute underperformance to 
executives’ misaligned interests or incompetence rather than the social context 
faced by executives, i.e., conflicting pressures within the firm (Fiske & Taylor, 
1991; Kolev, 2008), and consider executive replacement as a control mechanism 
to improve the situation (Walsh & Seward, 1990). As such, large shareholders 
often force executives they believe to be underperforming to leave.  
Shareholder conflicts can also induce abrupt voluntary leaves of top 
executives. Ongoing power contestation among large shareholders increases 
uncertainty and turbulence in executive work environment, motivating executives 
to seek securer positions in other firms. In addition, incompatible job demands 
limit executives’ strategic discretion and increase their work stress, which also 
causes abrupt resignations. Moreover, recognizing that they are under pressure 
from conflicting demands, executives may leave voluntarily rather than wait to be 
dismissed. The example in which CEO Jeremy Levin of Teva Pharmaceuticals, 
the world's largest generic drugmaker, resigned in 2013 due to conflicts among 
the firm’s board members over job cuts and efficiency measures illustrates how 
shareholder conflicts worsen an executive’s job environment, triggering 
precipitate voluntary exits (Staton, 2013; Wainer, 2013). 
Hypothesis 1 [H1]: The higher the conflict of interests among a firm’s large 
shareholders, the greater the precipitate management turnover. 
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Contingencies: Corporate governance quality, resource intangibility, and 
executive power 
We propose three contingencies that affect the mechanisms of power 
contestation and/or incompatible job demands, which in turn moderate the 
relationship in H1. We expect weak corporate governance to amplify the 
sensitivity of management turnover to interest conflicts because abundant 
opportunities of extracting private benefits under weak governance often magnify 
power struggles among conflicting shareholders. In parallel, higher resource 
intangibility often induces more incompatible job demands from conflicting large 
shareholders, thereby amplifying the relationship of shareholder conflicts with 
precipitate management turnover. By contrast, higher executive power insulates 
management from the influences of internal power contestation and also enables 
executives to limit incompatible job demands, thereby reducing the sensitivity of 
precipitate management turnover to interest conflicts. 
A fundamental issue of corporate governance concerns protecting shareholder 
interests against managerial opportunism and expropriation among shareholders 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Weak corporate governance arises in many conditions, 
including underdeveloped legal institutions (La Porta et al. 2000), adoption of 
pyramid ownership structure or dual-class shares (Khanna & Yefeh, 2007), and 
information ambiguity related to a firm’s governance process (Aguilera, 
Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 2008). In a weak governance regime, shareholder 
rights are often loosely enforced. As a result, the control that controlling large 
shareholders exert within a firm may not align perfectly with their ownership.  
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Weak governance creates opportunities for a firm’s large shareholders to 
extract private benefits that contribute to their private interests (Barclay & 
Holderness, 1989; Huang & Hu, 2009). For instance, controlling large 
shareholders such as family owners may divert firm resources through transfer 
pricing or asset stripping; they may also appoint unqualified people in 
management (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2011). Such activities often dampen the 
interests of other shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000). Because extracting private 
benefits can take many legal forms, it is difficult to detect or sanction such 
activities under weak governance. Opportunities for extracting private benefits in 
weak governance motivate large shareholders to engage in power contestation 
because winning the competition for control enables them to leverage the firm’s 
weak governance condition to maximize private benefits. This increases power 
contestation among large shareholders and in turn can lead to abrupt exits of 
executives. 
Hypothesis 2 [H2]. The weaker the corporate governance within a firm, the 
greater the relationship of conflict of interests among large shareholders with 
precipitate management turnover.  
In parallel, the intangibility of a firm’s resource portfolio may increase the 
chance for incompatible job demands to arise from large shareholders with 
divergent interests, thereby increasing precipitate management turnover. 
Compared to tangible resources such as plants and machinery, intangible assets 
are often characterized by greater ambiguity about how to utilize a firm’s 
resources to create value among shareholders. For instance, a firm’s intellectual 
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property may be used internally or be licensed out to create greater value. In firms 
with high resource intangibility, heterogeneous large shareholders tend to have 
few common frames of reference to develop their performance expectations. As a 
result, interest conflicts result in more incompatible job demands towards 
executives that face higher ambiguity (Wiseman & Gómez-Mejía, 1998). 
Consequently, conflicting shareholders are more likely to impose incompatible 
job demands that create higher management turnover. While resource intangibility 
moderates the impact of shareholder conflicts on management turnover, the factor 
alone may not lead to incompatible job demands. If a firm is dominated by 
shareholders with congruent interests, incompatible job demands will not arise 
regardless of the firm’s resource characteristics. 
Hewlett-Packard (NYSE:HPQ) illustrates how conflicting large shareholders 
impose incompatible job demands on how executives should use a firm’s 
ambiguous resources, which in turn increases precipitate management turnover. 
HP has experienced multiple CEO turnovers since 1999, including Lew Platt 
(1999), Carly Fiorina (2005), Mark Hurd (2010), and Leo Apotheker (2011). Part 
of the reason for the turnovers were diverse and inconsistent strategic demands 
among board members, particularly a member of one of the founding families, 
concerning utilization of HP’s highly intangible assets including potential spin-off 
of several businesses (Tait, 2002; Fazard, 2012; Sheehan, 2012). Such turmoil has 
made it difficult for HP’s CEOs to satisfy board members. As current CEO Meg 
Whitman has stated, high among her agenda is “to create the environment for the 
board to work together as a team” and ensure focus of the firm’s strategic 
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directions (Sheehan, 2012).  
Hypothesis 3 [H3]. The greater the resource intangibility within a firm, the 
greater the relationship of conflict of interests among large shareholders with 
precipitate management turnover.  
Finally, we predict that the relationship between interest conflicts and 
management turnover will be weaker in firms with stronger executive power, due 
to reduced influences of both power contestation and incompatible job demands. 
Executive power insulates executives from shareholder influences within a firm 
(Walsh & Seward, 1990). Power may accrue to executives in multiple ways 
(Finkelstein, 1992; Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009). For instance, 
executive power may originate from representing the interests of the ultimate 
controller rather than non-dominant shareholders. Executive power may also 
increase as executives hold greater equity in a firm and thus have more legal 
rights to participate in the firm’s strategic management as well as entrench 
themselves to pursue individual interests (Fredrickson et al., 1988). Moreover, 
executives can also obtain power through board appointments, which reduces 
other board members’ control of management by enabling negotiations (Westphal 
& Zajac, 1995). 
Executive power protects executives’ job security from being endangered by 
large shareholders’ power contestation. As Ocasio (1994) suggests, shareholders 
are less likely to exert influence on CEO dismissal with increased CEO power in a 
firm. In parallel, Denis et al. (1997) show that executive ownership has a negative 
effect on the probability of top executive turnover because managerial 
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entrenchment insulates executives from both internal and external investor 
influence.  
Executive power also attenuates the sensitivity of executive job security to 
large shareholders’ incompatible job demands. Powerful executives can often 
communicate and negotiate with large shareholders over incompatible job 
demands or unattainable performance expectations, thereby reducing the 
sensitivity of their turnovers to divergent performance targets. Moreover, when 
firms miss performance targets, powerful executives can attribute their 
underperformance to subordinates or the external environment, thereby reducing 
the likelihood that the board will fire them (Boeker, 1992; Walsh & Seward, 
1990). Supporting this argument, Cannella & Lubatkin (1993) find that incumbent 
executives’ power reduces management turnover despite unmet performance 
expectations. Denis et al. (1997) find that executive ownership attenuates the 
sensitivity of top executive turnover to poor firm performance due to attenuated 
internal monitoring by shareholders. By contrast, Weisbach (1988) finds that 
sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance is greater for firms with a higher 
portion of outsider directors who presumably are more effective than insider 
directors in constraining CEO power. 
Hypothesis 4 [H4]. The greater the executive power, the weaker the 
relationship of conflict of interests among large shareholders with precipitate 
management turnover.  
DATA AND METHODS 
Our setting is Taiwanese firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE). 
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Compared to traditional contexts such as U.S., shareholder rights are more weakly 
enforced in Taiwan (Yeh & Woidtke, 2005). As such, interest conflicts between a 
firm’s large shareholders are more likely to arise, resulting in competition for 
control and disputes about strategic decisions. We focus on potential interest 
conflicts between a firm’s two groups of dominant shareholders holding at least 5% 
of the firm’s voting rights (or are listed among the top ten shareholders in firms 
with highly dispersed ownership): family and non-family large shareholders. 
Family large shareholders constitute the most prominent investor in Taiwanese 
firms. They consist of individuals, corporations, and funds controlled by a focal 
firm’s founding family (usually only one family), embracing such interests as 
preserving long-term socioemotional wealth (Luo & Chung, 2012). Non-family 
large shareholders in Taiwanese firms often consist of unaffiliated business 
groups, government institutes, domestic and foreign financial institutions, and 
external individual investors. Compared to family shareholders, non-family large 
shareholders tend to focus on shorter-term goals such as maximisation of dividend 
payments to outside shareholders. The interest conflicts between family and non-
family large shareholders are especially salient because the influence of non-
family large shareholders relative to family owners is increasing in Taiwan 
(Carney & Child, 2012).  
Our empirical focus on the interaction between family and non-family large 
shareholders can be appropriately generalized to developed contexts such as U.S. 
and Europe where family-controlled firms are also highly prominent. As noted by 
Gómez-Mejía et al. (2011),  while family firms comprises around 95% of firms in 
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Asia and the Middle East, in the U.S. they account for around 70% of public firms 
and close to 50% of the Fortune 1000 firms. For instance, six of the seven largest 
cable system operators in the U.S., including Comcast, Cox, Cablevision, and 
Charter Communications, are controlled and actively managed by their family 
founders or the founder’s heirs. Eleven of the twelve largest publicly-traded 
newspaper companies, including New York Times and Washington Post, are 
family controlled (Villalonga and Amit, 2004; 2010). Anderson and Reeb (2003) 
note that a third of the S&P 500 firms are dominated by family owners. Moreover, 
Faccio and Lang (2002) find that 44% of 5,232 corporations in thirteen Western 
European countries are family controlled.   
Our data stem from two sources. First, the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) 
database, the most comprehensive data for public companies in the Asia-Pacific 
region, provides comprehensive corporate governance information including 
ownership and board composition from 1996 to 2011. Recent studies on 
Taiwanese firms have used this data (e.g., Luo & Chung, 2012). TEJ also 
documents turnovers of CEOs, CFOs, and board chairs in Taiwanese firms from 
2000 to 2011. Second, Compustat Global, available on WRDS, provides financial 
information for all Taiwanese public firms from 1991 to 2011. We combined the 
two datasets, took one-period lags for all independent variables, and excluded 
missing data. The procedures yield an unbalanced panel of 599 non-financial 
firms (3,919 firm-year observations) from 2000 to 2011. We excluded financial 
firms in the banking, securities, and insurance sectors because they face different 
governance regulations (Luo & Chung, 2012).  
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Three points stand out in the sample (Table A2.1 in the appendices). First, the 
data include 19 Taiwanese industries, with about half (285 firms) from electronics, 
the most globally competitive industry in Taiwan. Second, 92% of the sample 
firms have family large shareholders, reflecting the prominence of family control 
in Taiwanese economy; nonetheless, non-family large shareholders are also 
prominent, ranging from one (e.g., paper and pulp; glass and ceramics) to four 
(electronics; electric and machinery), with a mean of three non-family large 
shareholders. Third, consistent with findings in global contexts such as the U.S. 
(Kaplan & Minton, 2012), average CEO or top executive tenure in Taiwan is six 
years. 
Measures 
Dependent variable: Management turnover 
We measured management turnover based on the total turnovers of a firm’s 
senior executives during a three-year period;7 the three-year window is what the 
TEJ source reports (annual turnover is not available). We defined two dependent 
variables. First, we examined the number of CEO turnovers over three years; the 
value ranges from 0 to 6. Second, we assessed the number of top executive 
turnovers over three years, including the exits of a firm’s CEO and CFO; the 
value ranges from 0 to 10. Top executive turnover is highly relevant to our focus 
on general management turnover; shareholder conflict has a direct effect on the 
tenure of CEO as well as that of the CFO due to scapegoating at the top (Boeker, 
                                                            
7 For each observation year t, our dependent variable, i.e., CEO/executive turnover over the past three years, 
is the aggregated number of CEO/executive turnovers in year t-3, t-2, and t-1. Accordingly, the explanatory 
variables in our models are lagged for 4 years, i.e., at t-4. For instance, we used explanatory variables in 2008 
to predict the total executive turnovers occurring in 2009, 2010, and 2011. 
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1992).  
The dependent variable needs three clarifications. First, the data do not 
disentangle exits due to executive retirements, sickness, and death from 
precipitate turnover, whether due to forced dismissals or abrupt voluntary 
resignations. Our theory – and hypotheses – applies to forced dismissals and 
abrupt voluntary resignations, but does not apply to executive retirements, 
sickness, and death. However, since retirements, sickness, and death are rare and 
not systematic in Taiwanese firms, the measurement error of combining them into 
the dependent variable will not bias the results. Second, while we focused on 
counts of CEO and top executive turnovers to reflect intensity of management 
turnover, robustness tests found consistent results with dummy variables 
indicating CEO and top executive turnovers, as well as dummies and counts for 
CEO, CFO, and board chairman turnover. Finally, we used a three-year window 
of terminations due to data limits; we accounted for potential bias arising from 
overlapping observations on the dependent variable using a reduced sample of 
three-year periods, finding similar results. 
Independent variables 
Conflict of interests among large shareholders. As noted above, interest 
conflicts of shareholders in Taiwanese firms often arise from the interactions 
between the firm’s influential family and non-family large shareholders. 
Therefore, we measure interest conflicts of large shareholders based on an 
interaction term between the individual influences of family and non-family large 
shareholders in a firm. To determine the influence of family large shareholder, we 
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focused on family ownership calculated as the percentage of total shares owned by 
a founding family’s members, firms, and other institutions. For the influence of 
non-family large shareholders, due to lack of shareholding data we focused on the 
number of non-family large shareholders, which tend to correlate with their 
aggregate level of shareholding. As such, the interaction effect reflects the 
marginal impact of non-family large shareholders’ influence on management 
turnover when the influence of family large shareholder is held constant. To 
supplement the focal measure of shareholder conflicts, we also used alternative 
measures based on the interactions between family ownership and total types of 
non-family large shareholders, a Herfindahl index accounting for varying 
numbers of non-family large shareholders in each type, and presence inequality of 
foreign v. domestic large shareholders. The consistent results based on the 
alternative measures (as reported in the results section), together with our 
contingency tests for Hypotheses 2 to 4, verify the internal validity of our focal 
measure in reflecting shareholder conflicts as the underlying operative factor.   
Weak corporate governance. We assessed a firm’s corporate governance 
quality based on two criteria. First, we referred to a firm’s information disclosure. 
We obtained the sample firms’ information disclosure rating from Information 
Disclosure and Transparency Rankings System (IDTRS) of Taiwan’s Securities 
and Futures Institute (SFI) over 2005 to 2011. IDTRS provides seven grades 
(A++, A+, A, A-, B, C, C-) of rating based on 113 corporate governance indices 
such as compliance with the mandatory disclosures, disclosure of financial 
forecasts, and reporting timeliness; other studies on Taiwanese firms’ governance 
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(e.g., Chiang & He, 2010) have also used this data. In order to obtain a firm’s 
ranking for all years from 2000 to 2011 and avoid significant sample reduction 
(2,258 observations), we averaged a firm’s disclosure rankings from 2005 to 2011 
and created a rating for each firm which is constant for all years from 2000 to 
2011. The rating was the mean of seven numbers assigned to the rankings, with 7 
corresponding to A++ and 1 corresponding to C-. To assess the moderating role 
of weak governance (H2), we analysed two subsamples with high versus low 
information disclosure ratings. We compared a firm’s rating to the median of all 
sample firms. Values above or equal to (below) median indicate good (poor) 
corporate governance.  
Second, we used a 0-1 dummy variable to indicate firms associated with a 
pyramid ownership structure. A pyramid exists if a focal firm has an ownership 
chain involving at least two other public firms (Carney & Child, 2012). Pyramids 
reflect weak governance because they separate voting rights from cash flow rights, 
creating opportunities for large shareholders to exert greater control than their 
ownership share; 39% of the sample firms are embedded in pyramid structures. 
Resource intangibility. Compared to tangible resources such as plant, 
machinery, and inventory, intangible resources such as technical skills and market 
reputation face more multifaceted interpretations in how they can be utilized to 
create value, thereby creating higher resource intangibility. We determined a 
firm’s resource intangibility based on intangible assets ratio measured by the 
percentage of a firm’s intangible assets to total assets; the data is obtained from 
Compustat Global Annual Fundamental database available on WRDS. Values 
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above or equal to time-varying sample medians indicate higher ambiguity, 
whereas values below medians indicate lower ambiguity.  
Executive power. We used two variables to measure executive power. First, 
we assessed executive ownership, measured by total shares owned by a firm’s 
senior officers (e.g., CEO, CFO, COO/President, and other C-level executives) 
divided by a firm’s total outstanding shares; executive ownership averages 1.54% 
in Taiwanese firms. Second, we assessed executive presence in board, measured 
by the percentage of board directors who are senior executives; the average 
presence is 29%. To determine CEO power we separately referred to two dummy 
variables: first, we assessed CEO-chairman duality indicating whether the CEO 
also serves as board chair (Wiersema & Zhang, 2011); second, we looked at CEO 
affiliation with ultimate controller indicating that whether the CEO is appointed 
by the ultimate controller. 
Control variables  
We controlled for firm attributes that may lead to executive turnovers (age, 
size, cash flow, ROA, and business group affiliation). Firm age is the number of 
years since founding. Firm size is the logarithm of total assets. Cash flow is the 
ratio of a firm’s current assets to liability. Following prior studies on management 
turnover (e.g., Puffer & Weintrop, 1991; Farrell & Whidbee, 2003; Wowak, 
Hambrick, & Henderson, 2011),  we control for prior ROA measured by operating 
return divided by total assets, with operating return indicated by EBITA (earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization). To account for an important 
institutional idiosyncrasy of Taiwanese firms, we controlled for business group 
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affiliation of the firms. We also controlled for year and industry fixed effects. 
We assessed governance factors (critical shareholding, board size, 
independent board members, CEO-chairman duality, CEO appointed by ultimate 
controller, and executive ownership) that may confound the effect of interest 
conflicts on management turnover. Critical control level is the shareholding 
percentage necessary for a shareholder to exert control in a firm, calculated by 
TEJ based on three criteria: the probability that a shareholder will vote in 
shareholder meetings, the probability a shareholder will win in voting, and the 
firm’s ownership concentration. Board size is the number of board directors and 
supervisors. Independent board members is the number of board directors and 
supervisors who are unaffiliated with a firm (Boeker, 1992; Huson, Parrino, & 
Starks, 2001; Weisbach, 1988). To reflect the independent effects of CEO or 
executive entrenchment on management turnover as identified in prior studies 
(e.g., Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Denis et al., 1997; Goyal & Park, 2002; Dahya 
et al., 2002), we included CEO-chairman duality, CEO affiliation with ultimate 
controller, and executive ownership as control variables in addition to assessing 
their moderating effects.  
Table 2.1 displays descriptive statistics. Among the firms, 47% have CEOs 
appointed by the controlling family. On average, Taiwanese firms have ten board 
members; 27% board chairs also serve as CEOs. There is a substantial variation in 
CEO and top executive turnover as well as family ownership and number of non-
family large shareholders. CEO and top executive turnover do not significantly 
correlate with either family ownership or non-family large shareholders; they 
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have limited correlations with CEO family affiliation, CEO-chairman duality, 
executive ownership, and executive presence in board.  
********** Table 2.1********** 
Model specification and simulation-based negative binomial regression for 
LDV models 
Our model specification for hypothesis tests is Turnoverit+1, t+2, 
t+3=ߚ0	+ߚ1Familyit +ߚ2LSHit +ߚ3Familyit*LSHit ൅ߚXit+Yeart +Industryi +εit , 
where Turnoverit+1, t+3, t+3 represents the total CEO or top executive turnovers over 
three years. Familyit indicates family ownership and LSHit indicates the number of 
non-family large shareholders in a firm. Xit represents the matrix of control 
variables and εit is an error term. Our focus for testing H1 is coefficient ߚ3, which 
indicates potential relationship of interest conflicts between family and non-
family large shareholders with senior executive turnovers. To test Hypotheses 2 to 
4, we estimate the model across subgroups of firms characterized by different 
levels of corporate governance stringency, resource intangibility, and executive 
power.  
We use simulation-based negative binomial estimator developed by Zelner 
and Blanchette (Zelner, 2009) with random effects and robust standard error for 
estimation (STATA 13 command Intgph nbreg). This approach addresses 
difficulties in interpreting two-way interaction effects in limited dependent 
variable (LDV) models in two respects (Ai & Norton, 2003; Hoetker, 2007; 
Zelner, 2009; Wiersma & Bowen, 2009; Bowen, 2012). First, unlike conventional 
approaches that compute standard errors using a calculus-based technique for 
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approximating nonlinear functions of random variables (Greene, 2008; King, 
Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2000), Zelner’s approach derives the standard errors of the 
effect at each observation based on repeated (1000 times by default) simulations 
from the multivariate normal distribution. The simulation-based approach 
produces more accurate results because it does not rely on the “delta method” and 
also corrects for a bias in the formula used for the calculation. Based on the 
simulations, an estimation table reports mean simulated coefficients and their 
distributions (King et al., 2000). While the accuracy of both coefficients and 
standard errors are improved, the signs and significance of the coefficients on 
interaction terms cannot be inferred directly due to the non-linearity of the model.   
Second and at least as importantly, unlike conventional approaches that only 
enable interpretations of the signs and significances of interaction effects based on 
coefficients and standard errors reported in the tables (which can be misleading 
due to non-linearity), Zelner’s approach depicts the signs and statistical 
significance of the estimated effect of each of the interaction term’s constitutive 
variables conditional on each observations of the other constitutive variable along 
with 95% confidence intervals. The confidence intervals reflect the entire range of 
sample values for the moderating variable on the X-axis, calculated based on 
repeated simulations. While the slope of the curves connecting mean values 
suggests the sign and magnitude of the moderating effect, the overlaps between 
the confidence intervals and the horizontal axis suggests whether the effects are 
significantly different from zero. If the confidence intervals overlap the horizontal 
axis, it indicates that the associated moderating effect value is not significantly 
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different from zero. Otherwise, the moderating effect is significant at 5% 
significance level.  
RESULTS 
Hypothesis 1: Baseline results and robustness tests 
Table 2.2 reports simulated coefficient estimates for negative binomial 
models that test H1, which predicts a positive relationship between interest 
conflicts among large shareholders and management turnover. Models 1 and 2 
include control variables for CEO (Model 1) and top executive (Model 2) 
turnover. Models 3 and 4 assess the relationships of interest conflicts among large 
shareholders with CEO (Model 3) and top executive (Model 4) turnovers by 
adding interactions between family ownership and number of non-family large 
shareholders. Models 5 and 6 provide supplemental tests, using interactions 
between family ownership and change in non-family large shareholders in 
predicting CEO turnover (Model 5) and top executive turnover (Model 6). 
Significance and magnitude for non-interacted variables can be interpreted 
directly, but the significance of interaction terms requires graphical analysis.  
********** Table 2.2********** 
Initially, the interaction coefficients in Table 2.2 suggest that only Model 4 
produces significant results for H1. Yet, significance of coefficients on the 
interaction terms is based on simple t-tests without considering other covariates in 
the models, whereas computation of interaction effects in non-linear models 
involves taking cross derivatives and accounting for different observations of all 
the covariates. As such, apparently insignificant coefficients in the models may 
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mask significant interaction effects.  
Figures 2.2 plots the marginal effect of interaction between family ownership 
and non-family large shareholders on CEO turnover and top executive turnover, 
providing graphical support for the results from all four interaction analyses 
(Models 3 to 6). Figure 2.2a depicts the predicted mean difference in CEO 
turnover associated with a unit (1%) increase in family ownership at different 
numbers of non-family large shareholders (along the x-axis). The vertical bars 
attached to a given value indicate the upper and lower limits of the 95% 
confidence interval for the mean differences. Figure 2.2b shows that the predicted 
mean difference associated with changes in family ownership in the absence of 
non-family large shareholders (the left end of the x-axis) decreases CEO turnover 
by one person every six years. However, the mean difference increases as the 
number of non-family large shareholders increases. In addition, the 95% 
confidence intervals surrounding the differences do not overlap with the 
horizontal axis when the number of non-family large shareholders ranges from 0 
to less than 5, although they are not different from zero when number of non-
family large shareholder exceeds 5. Together, Figure 2.2a suggests a positive and 
a significant (p<0.05) moderating effect of number of non-family large 
shareholders on the impact of family ownership on CEO turnover in firms with 
less than 5 non-family large shareholders; the magnitude of the moderating effect 
is around 25%. Consistently, Figure 2.2b shows a significantly positive (p<0.05) 
relationship of interaction between family ownership and non-family large 
shareholders with top executive turnover (Model 4); top executive turnover 
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increases by 20% as the number of non-family large shareholders increases with 
the impact of family ownership held constant. Thus, the results support H1. 
********** Figures 2.2********** 
Three supplemental analyses assessed our focal measure of shareholder 
conflicts (based on the number of non-family large shareholders). First, we 
measured the influence of non-family large shareholders using types of non-
family large shareholders: whether a large shareholder is a focal group manager, 
related business group, or external investor. Second, we constructed a Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) accounting for the number of large shareholders within 
each type. Third, we assessed the presence equality of domestic and foreign non-
family large shareholders based on a Euclidean distance measure (Nd-Nf)2, where 
Nd indicates the number of local non-family large shareholders and Nf indicates 
the number of foreign non-family large shareholders. Table A2.2 (Panel A) shows 
that the analyses yield consistent results. The robustness reduces concerns that 
grouping types of non-family large shareholders into one category may 
underestimate shareholder conflicts, thereby increasing the reliability of our 
results. 
Table A2 .2 (Panels B-D) also shows that the H1 results are robust to 
alternative measures for dependent variable, sample, and model specification. 
First, we assessed dummies for CEO turnover, top executive turnover, and total 
turnovers of CEO, CFO, plus chairman as alternative dependent variable. Second, 
we addressed potential bias from overlapping observations due to the three-year 
window for the dependent variable; we constructed a reduced sample, consisting 
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of non-overlapping observations of dependent variables for four years (2002, 
2005, 2008, and 2011). Third, we accounted for confounding factors such as 
major control change in a firm due to block M&A (i.e., M&A involving at least 5% 
ownership change) one year preceding executive turnovers (Walsh, 1988; Krug & 
Hegarty, 1997). 
We also conducted two tests to validate the conceptual mechanisms. First, in 
order to test the mechanism of incompatible job demands, we assessed whether 
the relationship between management turnover and interest conflicts declines 
when executives are more capable of performing their work. We determined 
executive capability based on prior firm ROA. Positive ROA reflects that 
executives are capable of handling their job requirements to create superior 
shareholder value, whereas negative ROA suggests the lack of executive 
capability. Results in Model 1a to 2b of Table A2.3 show that management 
turnover is less sensitive to conflict of interests in firms with higher executive 
capability, consistent with the job demand mechanism. Second, we excluded an 
alternative explanation based on generational succession, which might increase 
both executive turnover and dispersion of ownership among non-family large 
shareholders. We conducted a subsample analysis based on electronic firms, 
which are least likely to be at succession risk due to lowest family control 
(average=25%) and youngest firm age (average=21). Models 3a and 3b in Table 
A2.3 suggest that the baseline results do not reflect generational succession. 
Hypothesis 2: Moderating effect of weak corporate governance 
Table 2.3 presents simulated coefficient estimates regarding H2, concerning 
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the positive moderating relationship of weak corporate governance with interest 
conflicts and management turnover. Models 1a and 2a in Panel A report simulated 
coefficient estimates for the relationship of interest conflicts with CEO and top 
executive turnover in a subgroup of firms with high governance transparency 
(strong governance). Models 1b and 2b report coefficient estimates for CEO 
turnover and top executive turnover in firms with low transparency (weak 
governance). In parallel, Models 3a and 4a in Panel B report coefficient estimates 
in a subgroup of firms associated with pyramid ownership structure (weak 
governance); Models 3b and 4b report coefficient estimates for firms that do not 
have a pyramid structure (strong governance). Figures A1a and A1b in the 
appendix report the graphical analysis of significance. 
********** Table 2.3********** 
As the “Graphical support” row in Table 2.3 notes, the results (Figures 2.1a 
and 2.1b in the appendices) support H2. Both CEO turnover and top executive 
turnover increase significantly under increased interaction between family 
ownership and non-family large shareholders only in weakly governed firms due 
to low information transparency (Models 1b and 2b) rather than in strongly 
governed firms (Models 1a and 2a). Likewise, CEO and top executive turnover 
are more sensitive to conflict of interests between family and non-family large 
shareholders in pyramidal firms (Models 3a and 4a) than in non-pyramidal 
structure (Models 3b and 4b). 
Hypothesis 3: Moderating effect of resource intangibility 
Table 2.4 presents simulated coefficients regarding H3, concerning the 
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positive moderating effect of resource intangibility on the relationship between 
interest conflicts and management turnover. Models 1a and 2a report coefficients 
regarding the interaction of family ownership and non-family large shareholders 
on CEO turnover and top executive turnover for a subgroup of firms characterized 
by high resource intangibility. In parallel, Models 1b and 2b present coefficients 
for firms with low resource intangibility. Figure A2.2 in the appendices reports 
the graphical analysis of significance. As the “Graphical support” row in the table 
notes, as the number of non-family large shareholders grows, holding family 
ownership constant, CEO and top executive turnover increase more in the face of 
high resource intangibility (Models 1a and 2a) than of low resource intangibility 
(Models 1b and 2b). The results support H3. 
********** Table 2.4********** 
Hypothesis 4: Moderating effect of executive power 
Table 2.5 reports simulated coefficient estimations that test H4 concerning 
the negative moderating effect of executive power. Panel A addresses the 
relationships of interest conflicts with top executive turnover in firms 
characterized by high (Models 1a and 2a) and low (Models 1b and 2b) executive 
power. Panel B reports the relationships across firms with high (Models 3a and 4a) 
and low CEO power (Models 3b and 4b). Figures A2.3a and A2.3b in the 
appendices reports the graphical analysis of significance.  
********** Table 2.5********** 
As the “Graphical support” row in Table 2.5 notes, the results support H4 
regarding top executive turnover rather than CEO turnover. Top executive 
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turnover increase significantly more due to interest conflicts in the face of low 
executive ownership (Model 1b) than of high executive ownership (Model 1a). 
Consistently, interest conflicts significantly increase executive turnover more with 
low executive presence in board (Model 2b) than with high executive presence in 
board (Model 2a). Opposed to H4, though, the moderating effect of CEO power 
on the relationship between interest conflicts and CEO turnover is positive. CEO 
turnover increases significantly with increased interaction between family and 
non-family large shareholders in firms with high CEO power arising from the 
CEO’s appointment by the ultimate controller (Model 3a) or CEO-chairman 
duality (Model 4a).  
The inconsistent results for CEO power may arise because different sources 
of management power play distinct roles in insulating executive employment 
from large shareholders’ conflicts. While direct executive power of holding equity 
or participating in oversight as a consequence of shareholder negotiations protects 
executives from the influence of interest conflicts, as reflected in power 
contestation or incompatible job demands, indirect power arising from association 
only with the dominant controller as its agents rather than with other large 
shareholders constitutes a liability, increasing the chance for executives to be 
caught in the cross-fire. Scapegoating and dismissing executives affiliated with 
the ultimate controller is often an easy and effective solution to the conflicts 
among competing shareholders. 
DISCUSSION  
We set out to understand how potential conflicts among a firm’s large 
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shareholders affect the turnover of top executives. Interest conflicts among large 
shareholders are often reported by media to account for increased executive 
turnovers, yet there is little theoretical explanation for the phenomenon in 
corporate governance literature. We developed an argument accounting for social-
political processes surrounding shareholder-executive relations. Our central 
argument is that conflicting interests among large shareholders induce power 
contestation among shareholders and incompatible job demands towards 
executives; in turn, they lead to forced dismissals or abrupt voluntary exits of 
executives.  
We examined senior executive turnovers in Taiwanese public firms. We find 
that CEO and other senior executive turnovers are higher in firms with more 
interactions between family large shareholders and less than five non-family large 
shareholders. The patterns are stronger when executives are more likely to face 
power contestation among conflicting large shareholders with weaker corporate 
governance, when executives are more likely to face incompatible job demands 
from large shareholders with higher resource intangibility, and when some forms 
of lower executive power limit executives from insulating themselves from the 
influences of power contestation and incompatible job demands. 
Our findings based on Taiwanese firms are most relevant to contexts where 
family shareholders are prominent controllers. Family controlled firms are at least 
as common as widely-held and other nonfamily firms in many settings 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2004; 2010): they are widely documented in emerging 
markets (e.g., Kim et al., 2008; Carney & Child, 2012) and are also relevant in 
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developed economies such as the U.S. and Europe (Villalonga & Amit, 2010). 
More generally, the focal issue of interest, i.e., shareholder conflicts, has been 
documented in both emerging markets and traditional developed economies (Kim 
et al., 2008; Hambrick et al., 2008; Connelly et al., 2010). Although the nature 
and operationalization of shareholder conflicts may vary by settings, we believe 
the two resulting mechanisms proposed by us, i.e., power contestation and 
conflicting job demands, can be appropriately generalized.  
Nonetheless, while our findings have addressed two institutional 
idiosyncrasies in Taiwan (i.e., business group affiliation and potential generation 
succession), we recognize that at least three other institutions may attenuate the 
generalizability of our findings. First, compared to Taiwan, traditional developed 
economies such as U.S. often feature more stringent legal regulations of 
shareholder relations. Such stringent institutions help constrain power 
contestation, attenuating the impact of shareholder conflicts on managerial 
turnover. Second, the institution of independent directors as representatives of 
minority shareholders is recently established in Taiwan. In developed economics, 
effective monitoring and advisory roles of independent directors may constrain 
the impact of shareholder conflict on management turnover. Third, compared to 
many developed economies, the corporate takeover market in Taiwan is 
somewhat less active. As a result, shareholder compositions in Taiwanese firms 
have been relatively stable, historically dominated by family shareholders. Hence, 
it is possible that conflicts between family and recently emerged non-family 
shareholders are fiercer in Taiwan and similar settings. 
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Our study advances the literature on management turnover, in particular the 
impact of ownership structure on management turnover, in two respects. First, 
prior studies focus on the influence of individual groups of powerful shareholders 
such as outsider blockholders or insiders, and examine the impact of their 
ownership concentration on executive turnovers (e.g., Helwege et al., 2012; Denis 
et al., 1997). The studies do not consider interactions among different groups of 
powerful shareholders. By contrast, we jointly consider all large shareholders with 
divergent interests within a firm, and examine how their interactions in terms of 
conflicts lead to management turnovers. Relevant management turnover in this 
context includes both formal termination and abrupt voluntary exits that occur 
when executives become frustrated by the conflict among divergent interests, 
either because they are concerned that they might be fired or because they believe 
governance environments at other firms will offer them greater opportunity. We 
do not distinguish empirically between forced terminations and abrupt voluntary 
exits (or other exits) but argue that conflict among stakeholders with divergent 
interests will raise the incidence of both forms of precipitate management 
turnover. Second, prior studies linking ownership structure and management 
turnover emphasize the monitoring mechanism through which large shareholders 
induce management turnovers (e.g., Denis et al., 1997; Huson et al., 2001). 
Complementarily, our theory reveals two understudied mechanisms through 
which large shareholders affect management turnover, i.e., power contestation 
among shareholders and conflicting job demands on executives.  
We also contribute to studies on shareholder conflicts in strategic corporate 
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governance and financial economics. Traditional governance literature focuses on 
the consequences of diffuse ownership with only small investors or the largest 
controlling shareholders; dynamics among a firm’s shareholders tend to be 
overlooked (Connelly et al., 2010; Hambrick et al., 2008). Recent studies have 
shed light on interest conflicts between a firm’s controlling large shareholders and 
non-controlling minority shareholders, known as principal-principal conflict 
(Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). However, this stream of studies 
focuses on expropriation of minority shareholders by large shareholders, while 
assuming congruent interests among controlling large shareholders. Our study 
differs by explicitly examining the consequences of interest conflicts within the 
group of controlling large shareholders. A few studies have examined the effects 
of large shareholder conflicts on firm strategies such as innovation (Hoskisson et 
al., 2002) and firm performance (e.g., Maury & Pajuste, 2005; Attig et al., 2008). 
To our knowledge, though, there is no evidence on how executive employment is 
affected by competing large shareholders. 
The results also add two insights to studies of management successions in 
family firms. First, studies of family firms often find that management turnover is 
low under family control (Allen & Panian, 1982; Denis et al., 1997; Lausten, 
2002). We find a consistent main effect of family ownership in most situations. A 
more striking finding in our study, however, is that executive turnover increases 
in family-controlled firms with a higher presence of other non-family large 
shareholders. This finding suggests a need to study the consequences of dynamics 
between family and non-family large shareholders in family firms, especially 
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when non-family investors are increasingly exerting influences in family firms 
around the world (Carney & Child, 2012). Second, the family business literature 
often suggests that affective factors such as preserving socioemotional wealth are 
a fundamental driver of management turnover in family-controlled firms (Gómez-
Mejía et al., 2011). Complementarily, this study identifies two social-political 
drivers, i.e., power contestation and conflicting job demands. 
Two limits of our study suggest research opportunities. First, we relied on 
contingency tests to tease out the two mechanisms (i.e., political struggles among 
large shareholders and executive job demands). Future research may collect 
meso-level data to investigate directly how intra-shareholder power dynamics and 
executive job demands are shaped by a firm’s governance practices such as 
control and incentive schemes. Second, we largely treated a firm’s large 
shareholder composition and their interest conflicts as exogenous. Investigating 
determinants of ownership structures and potential conflicts among large 
shareholders across firms constitutes a promising avenue for future research.  
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H4 (-): Executive power 
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Presence in board; CEO-
chairman duality; family 
CEO)  
 H3 (+): Resource intangibility 
(Intangible assets) 
Incompatible job demands and 
subsequent difficulty for executives to 
meet large shareholders’ performance 
expectations  
Interest conflicts among large shareholders 
H1 (+): Precipitate management turnover 
H2 (+): Weak corporate governance 
(Non-transparency; pyramid) 
Power contestation among large 
shareholders  
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Figure 2.2. Marginal Effects of Interest Conflicts on Precipitate Management 
Turnover (H1)  
  
 
 Notes:  
 Graphs are generated by STATA 13 program intgph nbreg based on simulation-based coefficient 
estimates reported in Model 3 to Model 6 in Table 2.3. 
 Confidence intervals are two-tailed, at 95% confidence level. 
 Y-axis represents change in the expected mean in CEO turnover (in Figure 2.2a) and top executive 
turnover (in Figure 2.2b) over 3 years associated with 1% increase in family ownership; X-axis shows 
number of non-family large shareholders, taking value from 0 to 1 S.D. above the mean.  
 Figures 2.2a and 2.2b show that the mean differences in CEO and top executive turnover associated with 
an increase in family ownership increase significantly with the number of conflicting non-family large 
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Figure 2.2b: Marginal Impact of Shareholder Conflicts on Top Executive Turnover
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Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1. CEO turnover 0.43 0.73 1.00                
2. Top executive turnover 0.45 1.19 0.65 1.00                 
3. Family ownership (%) 29.13 16.63 -0.02 -0.06 1.00                 
4. Number of non-family LSH 3.36 2.57 0.02 0.03 -0.29 1.00                 
5. Change in non-family LSH 0.18 1.69 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.36 1.00                 
6. CEO affiliation with ultimate controller 
     (dummy) 0.47 0.50 -0.14 -0.12 -0.01 -0.09 -0.03 1.00                     
7. CEO-chairman duality (dummy) 0.27 0.44 -0.07 -0.03 -0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.48 1.00                   
8. Information disclosure 3.47 0.99 0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.17 -0.10 1.00             
9. Pyramid (dummy) 0.39 0.49 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.12 -0.12 0.09 1.00               
10. Intangible assets ratio 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 1.00             
11. Executive ownership (%) 1.55 2.82 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 0.06 0.00 -0.10 0.03 -0.03 -0.09 -0.04 1.00          
12. Executive directors (%) 29.15 19.26 -0.14 -0.10 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.36 0.30 -0.03 -0.06 0.02 0.19 1.00         
13. Firm age 29.57 14.71 0.03 0.02 0.10 -0.18 0.00 0.03 -0.1 0.03 0.21 -0.03 -0.26 -0.08 1.00   
14. Firm size 9.08 1.31 0.04 0.01 -0.09 0.11 0.04 -0.17 -0.14 0.4 0.31 0.08 -0.15 0.03 0.15 1.00   
15. Current ratio 2.15 3.20 0.00 -0.06 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.04 -0.11 1.00   
16. Group affiliation (dummy) 0.57 0.49 0.10 0.06 -0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.22 -0.14 0.23 0.26 0 -0.13 -0.07 0.13 0.54 -0.09 1.00     
17. ROA 0.04 1.07 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.004 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.003 -0.01 0.02 -0.2 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 1.00    
18. Critical control level (%) 11.66 6.36 0.03 0.01 0.52 -0.16 0.00 0.03 0.05 -0.11 -0.19 -0.06 0 -0.07 -0.06 -0.47 0.05 -0.24 -0.01 1.00 
19. Board size 10.00 3.42 0.03 -0.01 -0.07 0.02 0.02 -0.15 -0.18 0.13 0.11 -0.02 -0.06 -0.22 0.15 0.31 -0.03 0.20 0.08 -0.16 1.00 
20. Independent board members 0.76 1.32 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.18 -0.01 0.01 0.06 0.05 -0.22 0.04 0.13 -0.05 -0.30 -0.12 0.05 -0.18 0.03 0.10 0.01 1.00 
  N=3,919 for all variables other than change in non-family LSH (N=3,689) and information disclosure (N=3,875)
Strategic Corporate Governance, Employment Risk, and Risk Taking   Shuping Li  2014 
 
      85 
 
Table 2.2. Simulation-based Negative Binomial Regression Testing H1  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 







1. Family ownership -0.09*** -0.21*** 
(0.03) (0.05) 
2. Number of non-family LSH -0.12 -0.54* 
(0.19) (0.30) 
1*2 (x 1000 for scaling) [H1 +] 0.89 2.52*** 
(0.57) (0.97) 
Graphical support:H1 (Figure 2)   + + 
Firm age 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.08** 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) 
Firm size -0.22 -0.61 -0.33 -0.22 
(0.47) (0.66) (0.33) (0.59) 
Current ratio 0.07 -1.40*** 0.05 -1.35** 
(0.08) (0.50) (0.09) (0.55) 
Group affiliation 3.45*** 2.95* 2.95*** 3.09*** 
(1.29) (1.79) (0.73) (1.16) 
ROA 0.23 -0.06 -0.07 -0.34 
(0.50) (0.71) (0.17) (1.87) 
Critical control level -0.03 -0.01 0.10* 0.23*** 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09) 
Board size 0.08 -0.10 -0.11 -0.42*** 
(0.15) (0.22) (0.08) (0.16) 
Independent board members 0.22 0.18 0.11 0.76* 
(0.33) (0.50) (0.23) (0.40) 
CEO affiliation with ultimate 
controller -0.80 -1.80 -4.45*** -7.77*** 
 (0.92) (1.41) (0.68) (1.16) 
CEO-chairman duality -0.18 -0.24 -0.13 0.78 
(0.91) (1.38) (0.76) (1.26) 
Managerial ownership -0.01 0.12 -0.36*** -0.23 
(0.18) (0.25) (0.12) (0.16) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 155.39 4.51 -2.41 13.47 
(1306.18) (9.55) (4.57) (9.47) 
Log likelihood  -2984.68 -2658.95 -3309.95 -2836.26 
Observations 3,919 3,919 3,919 3,919 
Number of firms 599 599 599 599 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Notes:  
 Coefficients on interaction terms are scaled by multiplying 1000, while coefficients on other variables 
are scaled by multiplying 10. 
 While coefficient significance and magnitude of non-interacted variables can be interpreted directly 
based on coefficient estimates and associated standard errors, significance and magnitude of interaction 
terms should be interpreted based on the graphs generated automatically by intgph nbreg, available in 
STATA 13. 
 The row of “Graphic support” summarizes the visualized interaction effects shown in Figure 2.2.
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Table 2.3. Simulation-based Negative Binomial Regression Testing H2  
 Panel A: Information Disclosure  Panel B: Pyramid Structure 









transparency Pyramid Non-pyramid Pyramid Non-pyramid 
Dependent Variables CEO turnover Top executive turnover CEO turnover Top executive turnover 
1. Family ownership 0.04 -0.18*** -0.12* -0.23*** -0.15*** -0.01 -0.35*** -0.15** 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.06) 
2. Number of non-family 
LSH 0.37 -0.76** -0.25 -0.64 -0.64** 0.33 -0.128*** 0.21 
(0.23) (0.36) (0.39) (0.60) (0.30) (0.24) (0.47) (0.42) 
1*2 (x 1000) [H2] -0.49 17.94* 3.03** -0.59 1.52* 0.11 2.18 1.99 
(0.63) (5.46) (1.23) (1.98) (0.91) (0.68) (1.59) (1.25) 
Graphical support: H2 
(Figure A1a, A1b) n.s. + n.s. + + n.s. ++ + 
Information disclosure -0.85** -2.48 -3.60*** -8.46***     
 (0.42) (1.61) (8.10) (2.67)     
Pyramid     omitted omitted omitted omitted 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.83 -10.78 14.04 41.23*** -11.59* 11.48* -3.47 30.42*** 
(5.20) (9.67) (9.05) (14.88) (6.65) (6.10) (14.48) (11.30) 
Log Likelihood -2103.02 -1064.83 -1782.66 -904.22 -1309.45 -1923.20 -1154.19 -1637.14 
Observations 2,465 1,410 2,465 1,410 1,533 2,386 1,533 2,386 
 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Notes:  
 Variables included in estimation and yet not reported to conserve space are: firm age, firm size, current ratio, group affiliation, ROA, critical shareholding, 
board size, family presence in board, independent directors, family CEO, CEO-chairman duality and managerial ownership. 
 Coefficients on interaction terms are scaled by multiplying 1000, while coefficients on other variables are scaled by multiplying 10. 
 While coefficient significance and magnitude of non-interacted variables can be interpreted directly based on coefficient estimates and associated standard 
errors, significance and magnitude of interaction terms should be interpreted based on the graphs generated automatically by intgph nbreg, available in 
STATA 13. 
 The row of “Graphic support” summarizes the visualized interaction effects shown in Figures A2.1a and A2.1b. 
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Table 2.4. Simulation-based Negative Binomial Regression Testing H3 
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b 
Contingencies High Resource Intangibility Low Resource Intangibility High Resource Intangibility Low Resource Intangibility 
Dependent Variables CEO turnover Top executive turnover 
1. Family ownership -0.08** -0.06 -0.33*** -0.20** 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) 
2. Number of non-family LSH -0.17 -0.41 -1.47*** -0.73 
(0.25) (0.36) (0.43) (0.48) 
1*2 (x 1000) [H3] 0.74 1.29 4.88*** 2.57 
(0.82) (0.99) (1.35) (1.57) 
Graphical support: H3 (Figure A2) + n.s. ++ + 
Intangible assets ratio 39.29*** -491.27 81.64*** -1169.30* 
(13.66) (325.47) (26.20) (612.09) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.31 -5.57 22.22* 15.49 
(5.44) (9.17) (11.70) (11.84) 
Likelihood  -1093.68 -1412.51 -939.06 
Observations 1,993 1,364 1,993 1,364 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Notes:  
 Variables included in estimation and yet not reported to conserve space are: firm age, firm size, current ratio, group affiliation, ROA, critical shareholding, 
board size, family presence in board, independent directors, family CEO, CEO-chairman duality and managerial ownership.  
 Coefficients on interaction terms are scaled by multiplying 1000, while coefficients on other variables are scaled by multiplying 10. 
 While coefficient significance and magnitude of non-interacted variables can be interpreted directly based on coefficient estimates and associated standard 
errors, significance and magnitude of interaction terms should be interpreted based on the graphs generated automatically by intgph nbreg, available in 
STATA 13. 
 The row of “Graphic support” summarizes the visualized interaction effects shown in Figure A2.2. 
  
Strategic Corporate Governance, Employment Risk, and Risk Taking   Shuping Li  2014 
 
      88 
 
Table 2.5. Simulation-based Negative Binomial Regression Testing H4 
 Panel A: Executive Power Panel B: CEO Power 




















Dependent Variables Top executive turnover CEO turnover 
1. Family ownership -0.20*** -0.25*** -0.19** -0.31*** -0.15*** -0.02 -0.11** -0.05 
(0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) 
2. Number of non-family 
LSH -0.50 -0.81** -0.09 -1.37*** -1.32*** 0.37* -0.49 -0.01 
(0.48) (0.40) (0.51) (0.37) (0.35) (0.22) (0.36) (0.22) 
1*2 (x 1000) [H4] 1.95 3.45*** -0.27 5.64*** 4.06*** -0.53 1.46 0.57 
(1.66) (1.21) (1.68) (1.20) (1.06) (0.68) (1.03) (0.65) 
Graphical support: H4 
(Figures A3a, A3b) + ++ + ++ + n.s. + n.s. 
Executive ownership -0.29 -8.74 -0.11 -0.27     
(0.18) (5.82) (0.24) (0.20)     
Executive board presence   -0.16*** 0.15*     
  (0.05) (0.08)     
CEO affiliation with 
ultimate controller -8.82*** -8.40*** -7.07*** -7.22***    -0.48 -5.25*** 
(1.68) (1.52) (1.70) (1.72)    (1.49) (0.81) 
CEO-chairman duality 0.70 0.49 4.99*** -3.90** 1.41 -2.56**   
 (1.89) (1.81) (1.70) (1.91) (1.06) (1.23)   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 6.51 17.36* 0.87 -1.92 -14.74* -5.20 4.36 -3.86 
(12.02) (09.84) (18.48) (9.89) (8.25) (5.85) (9.43) (5.56) 
Log likelihood  -1362.84 -1430.66 -1208.59 -1574.85 -1286.89 -1958.17 -748.04 -2499.17 
Observations 1,981 1,938 2,031 1,888 1,836 2,083 1,065 2,854 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors in parentheses.  
 
Notes:  
 Variables included in estimation and yet not reported to conserve space are: firm age, firm size, current ratio, group affiliation, ROA, critical shareholding, 
board size, family presence in board, independent directors, family CEO, CEO-chairman duality and managerial ownership. 
 Coefficients on interaction terms are scaled by multiplying 1000, while coefficients on other variables are scaled by multiplying 10. 
 While coefficient significance and magnitude of non-interacted variables can be interpreted directly based on coefficient estimates and associated standard 
errors, significance and magnitude of interaction terms should be interpreted based on the graphs generated automatically by intgph nbreg, available in 
STATA 13. 
 The row of “Graphic support” summarizes the visualized interaction effects presented in Figure A2.3a and A2.3b. 
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Chapter 3: Employment Risk and Risk Taking with Different Time Horizons: 
The Moderating Impacts Of Internal and External Executive Markets 
Abstract: This paper develops a conceptual model to reconcile mixed predictions 
on the impact of executive employment risk on their firms’ risk taking, taking into 
account the time horizons inherent in risk taking and the social contexts 
surrounding the executives. Drawing on strategic corporate governance literature, 
I argue that employment risk reduces long-term risk taking relative to short-term 
risk taking by increasing executives’ emphasis on preserving their current wealth. 
While the effect is amplified as internal executive market increases the credibility 
of employment risk, it is attenuated when external executive market induces 
executives to build up a job reputation of creating long-term shareholder value. 
Longitudinal tests based on 715 Taiwanese firms from 1997 to 2011 show that 
executives’ employment risk reduces long-term risk taking (i.e., investment flow 
to Chinese subsidiaries and innovation) rather than short-term risk taking (i.e., 
acquisition). The impact decreases when executives have a greater prospect of 
future job opportunities in external market due to their firms’ managerial ties; the 
moderating effect is especially strong when high power contestation in internal 
executive market increases  the credibility of executives’ employment risk. The 
study contributes to strategic corporate governance literature by revealing the 




Strategic corporate governance scholars stress that employment risk, i.e., the 
threat of senior executives’ abrupt job termination in their firms, shapes 
executives’ risk preference and their firms’ risk taking (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 
1998; Walsh & Seward, 1990; Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella, 2009). 
However, theoretical and empirical debates exist suggesting that employment risk 
may both increase and reduce firm risk taking (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Larraza-Kintana, Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia, & Welbourne, 2007; Chakraborty, 
Sheikh & Subramanian 2007; Kempf, Ruenzi & Thiele, 2009). This paper argues 
that reconciling the controversy requires distinguishing different time horizons 
inherent in risky investments and taking into account social contexts surrounding 
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the executives. In turn, it distinguishes long-term risk taking from short-term risk 
taking and assesses how the impacts of employment risk on the two types of risk 
taking vary with executive market conditions. 
Drawing on agency theory and strategic corporate governance literature on 
executive turnovers, I argue that executives’ employment risk increases their 
focus on preserving immediate economic wealth. This often reduces executives’ 
preference for long-term risk taking with delayed and relatively uncontrollable 
payoff relative to short-term risk taking with immediate and relatively 
controllable payoff. The impacts of employment risk on different time horizons of 
risk taking are stronger when power contestation in a firm’s internal executive 
market increases the credibility of executives’ dismissals and thus amplifies their 
concern of losing current wealth. However, the impact of employment risk on 
long-term risk taking relative to short-term risk taking can be attenuated when 
external executive market increases executives’ prospect of future job 
opportunities, thereby shifting their focus away from preserving immediate 
payoffs to building up a future job reputation of creating long-term shareholder 
value to facilitate future job search. The moderating role of external executive 
market may increase with power contestation within the firm because the latter 
increases executives’ sensitivity to external executive market. 
The longitudinal analyses are based on 715 Taiwanese non-financial public 
firms from 1997 to 2011. Compared to the U.S. firms whose ownership structure 
is often diffuse, the Taiwanese setting is characterized by high ownership 
concentration enabling us to isolate the focal mechanism (i.e., change in 
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executives’ risk attitude) from other confounding mechanisms (e.g., effort 
aversion) more effectively. The analyses address the endogeneity of employment 
risk with recently developed Coarsened Exact Matching (Blackwell, Iacus, King  
& Porro, 2009). The results show that executives’ employment risk reduces a 
firm’s long-term risk taking (i.e., investment outflow to subsidiaries in China, 
R&D intensity, and patenting in new technological fields) while not affecting 
short-term risk taking (i.e., acquisition). The negative impact of employment risk 
on long-term risk taking relative to short-term risk taking decreases when a firm’s 
external connections through top management and board increase executives’ 
future job opportunities upon their dismissals; this effect is stronger for executives 
more sensitive to external executive market due to potentially high power 
contestation in their firms’ top management. Findings based on this setting can be 
appropriately generalized because executive employment risk in Taiwan is as 
common as that in traditional contexts such as the U.S..  
The study makes two primary contributions to strategic corporate governance 
literature. First, it shows that employment risk as a control mechanism can have 
distinct impacts on the executives’ preferences for long-term and short-term risk. 
Second, it reveals the interactive disciplining role of employment risk and 
executive market conditions in shaping executives’ risk choices. Hence, it 
highlights the importance of incorporating social contexts surrounding agency 
relations into understanding the efficacy of corporate governance practices 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodríguez & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). 
Most generally, the study also provides implications to studies on managerial 
Strategic Corporate Governance, Employment Risk, and Risk Taking   Shuping Li  2014 
92 
 
short-termism and executive mobility. 
BACKGROUND 
Employment risk, defined as the threat of senior executives’ abrupt job 
termination in their incumbent firms, has accelerated globally. As Kaplan and 
Minton (2012) note, while board and takeover driven CEO turnover rate in 
Fortune 500 firms averages about 12.6% from 1992 to 1999, it has increased to 
about 16.8% during 2000 to 2007. Consistently, the latest study by Booz & 
Company (Favaro, Karlsson & Neilson, 2012), a leading global management 
consulting firm, documents that forced CEO turnover in the world’s 2,500 largest 
companies has increased by around 110% from 1995 to 2012. Moreover, 
employment risk in emerging economies (e.g., Brazil, Russia, and India) is almost 
1.5 times as high as that in North American firms and European firms. Given the 
global prominence of increased executive employment risk, investigating its 
strategic consequences is important. 
Strategic corporate governance scholars traditionally consider employment 
risk as an important internal control mechanism that often shapes executives’ risk 
preference and their firms’ strategies (Walsh & Seward, 1990; Weisbach, 1995; 
Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Executive employment is tied to one firm at a 
time and cannot be diversified (Fama, 1980). Unexpected dismissals of executives 
often result in complete loss of executives’ firm-specific human capital, current 
economic wealth and also put in serious jeopardy their future income (Narayanan, 
1985). Executives, therefore, take into account the risks inherent in their 
investment choices in order to maximize personal wealth during their tenure.  
Strategic Corporate Governance, Employment Risk, and Risk Taking   Shuping Li  2014 
93 
 
However, a theoretical debate exists in strategic corporate governance 
literature regarding the effect of employment risk on firms risk taking. On the one 
hand, scholars predict employment risk to facilitate a firm’s risk taking because 
executives underinvesting in risk relative to shareholders’ preferences will likely 
be dismissed (Fama, 1980; Walsh & Seward, 1990). In addition, employment risk 
induces executives to frame their decision contexts negatively; such a loss 
framing induces executives to gamble on risky projects with potentially high 
payoffs now that they have nothing more to lose (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 
1998; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). On the other hand, scholars also suggest that 
employment risk may reduce firm risk taking because risky projects have a high 
probability of causing underperformance triggering executives’ dismissals. As 
such, executives concerned with job security tend to avoid risky investments ex 
ante (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Empirical evidence on the impact of employment risk on firm risk taking also 
remains mixed. Supporting the positive impact of employment risk on firm risk 
taking, Larraza-Kintana et al. (2007) find that CEOs perceiving high employment 
risk in 108 firms issuing an initial public offering (IPO) from 1993 to 1995 are 
more likely to increase a firm’s strategic risk taking as reflected in a composite 
measure constructed based on the firm’s downsizing, unrelated acquisition, new 
market entry, long-term debt, innovation, capital investment and advertising. 
Consistently, Matta & Beamish (2008) based on 293 U.S. public firms show that 
younger CEOs with presumably higher employment risk are more likely to 
engage in risk taking in terms of international acquisitions than CEOs nearing 
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retirement. Conversely, a number of studies also show that employment risk often 
reduces risk taking. For instance, Chakraborty, Sheikh & Subramanian (2007) 
show that CEOs under higher risk of dismissal in U.S. manufacturing firms take 
less risk, resulting in lower stock returns volatility of the firms. Relatedly, 
Chevalier & Ellison (1999) and Kempf, Ruenzi & Thiele (2009) find that younger 
mutual fund managers with higher employment risk hold less unsystematic risk 
and have more conventional portfolios than older managers. Consistently Hong, 
Kubik & Solomon (1998) also show that younger stock analyst managers produce 
earnings forecasts closer to the consensus forecast due to their concern with job 
security.  
Theoretically the apparent contradictions may result from previously 
unrecognized variables that drive the relationship between employment risk and 
risk taking. The neglected variables may arise from two sources. First, strategic 
risk is multifaceted (Baird and Thomas, 1985); employment risk may exert mixed 
influences on different dimensions of risk taking. Supporting this idea, strategic 
governance scholars have documented that corporate governance schemes often 
have divergent impacts on different time horizons of risky investments such as 
innovation (e.g., Kochhar & David, 1996; Hoskisson, Johnson & Grossman, 
2002). Second, the relationship between employment risk and risk taking may be 
contingent on overlooked contextual factors faced by executives. This is plausible 
because the theoretical basis of studies on employment risk, i.e., agency theory, 
focuses on principal-agent relations per se while overlooking the social contexts 
surrounding the relations (Wiseman et al., 2012; Aguilera & Jackson, 2010).  
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To reconcile the contradictions on the relationship between employment risk 
and firm risk taking, this study first discriminates strategic risk taking with long-
term verses short-term time horizons. Both long-term and short-term risk taking 
involve outcome uncertainty, i.e., variability in the distribution of potential 
outcomes (March, 1978; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). As such, the two types of 
investments differ from long-term vs. short-term investments that may not involve 
uncertainties in the outcomes. For instance, while CAPX represents an important 
long-term investment, it is not considered as long-term risk taking in this paper 
due to the minimal uncertainty involved in the activity. 
Long-term and short-term risk taking generate distinct implications to 
executives about maximizing their individual wealth during tenure due to their 
two differences. First, the two types of risk taking differ in the temporal 
distributions of the investments’ returns relative to their costs. In particular, long-
term risk taking often involves risky investments with long-term rewards and yet 
relatively shorter-term costs (e.g., greenfield FDI investment and innovation) 
(Souder & Shaver, 2010), whereas short-term risk taking involves risky 
investments with short-term rewards and yet relatively longer-term costs (e.g., 
acquisition) (Hoskisson et al., 2002). Because long-term strategic risks often 
create current costs and yet future payoffs, executives’ wealth may not benefit 
from taking such risks during their tenure. By contrast, short-term risk taking has 
the potential of yielding immediate payoff to executives during their tenure while 
spreading the costs to their successors. Second and relatedly, the two types of risk 
taking also suggest different possibilities for executives to manipulate potential 
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investment outcomes to achieve individual goals. Because the return on long-term 
risk taking likely shows up beyond an executive’s incumbency, executives are 
constrained from altering unsatisfactory outcomes to meet their personal goals. 
However, executives can alter the outcomes of short-term risk taking more easily 
since the outcomes often show up during their incumbency. 
Taking into account executive market conditions may also help reconcile the 
mixed relationships between executive employment risk and risk taking. Agency 
theorists have long recognized that executive markets shape executives’ 
incentives in principal-agent relations. For instance, Fama (1980) suggests that 
competitive internal and external executive markets can incentivize executives to 
act in the best interest of shareholders by continuously evaluating and updating 
information on the executive’s performance. Similarly, Holmström (1982) and 
Holmström (1999) demonstrate that both internal and external executive markets 
affect executives’ risk aversion through shaping their perception of future career 
opportunities. Moreover, Gibbons and Murphy (1991) also argue that internal and 
external executive markets shape executives’ perception of job security which in 
turn affects their incentives.  However, current strategic corporate governance 
studies largely overlook executive market conditions in understanding agency 
relations (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). 
HYPOTHESES 
Employment risk and different horizons of risk taking 
 Figure 3.1 presents a conceptual model illustrating how the impact of 
executives’ employment risk on risk taking varies with time horizons inherent in 
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strategic risk as well as executive market conditions. I first propose that 
employment risk reduces long-term risk taking while having a less negative 
impact on short-term risk taking (i.e., reduces long-term risk taking relative to 
short-term risk taking) due to executives’ increased emphasis on preserving 
immediate wealth in their firms. In turn, I examine how power contestation in the 
firm’s internal executive market and prospect of future job opportunities in 
external executive market independently and interactively moderate the 
relationship between employment risk and different time horizons of risk taking. 
********** Figure 3.1********** 
High employment risk increases executives’ emphasis on preserving current 
individual wealth within their firms. Employment risk represents the ultimate 
threat to a CEO’s wealth because abrupt job termination results in the complete 
loss of all current income (e.g., bonuses, normal raises and so on) as well as 
jeopardizes their future job reputation and income (Amihud and Lev, 1981; 
Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987; Larraza-Kintana et al. 2007). In such a loss 
context, executives become more sensitive to losing current wealth than to 
increasing future wealth (Wiseman and Gomez-Meijia, 1998). Hence, as 
employment risk increases executives tend to increase their emphasis on 
preserving their current wealth.  
Executives under employment risk often increase their emphasis on 
preserving current wealth, which consequently results in a reduction in the firm’s 
long-term risk taking. As noted above, long-term risk taking often takes multiple 
years to implement and pay off but executives may not be around to enjoy the 
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rewards or manipulate unsatisfactory results to their own interests. Moreover, 
high outcome uncertainty of long-term projects often increases executives’ 
perception of project failures and thus their chances of being dismissed. As such, 
while engaging in long-term risk taking takes a great amount of managerial efforts 
it cannot effectively compensate executives’ potential loss in their current wealth 
associated with employment risk. By contrast, reducing long-term expenses (e.g., 
R&D) likely boosts a firm’s current earnings, which may increase executives’ 
cash bonus and compensate their potential wealth loss caused by employment risk.  
However, executives’ increased emphasis on preserving current wealth has a 
less negative impact on short-term risk taking. That is, executives may reduce 
short-term risk taking to eliminate any uncertainties that potentially trigger their 
dismissals, but with a weaker magnitude than that of long-term risk taking. 
Alternatively, executives may not change or even increase short-term risk taking 
as compared to reducing long-term risk taking. These situations may arise for 
three reasons. First, lower outcome uncertainty inherent in short-term risk taking 
is less likely to induce project failures to trigger executives’ dismissals. Second, 
compared to long-term risk taking quick payoffs associated with short-term risk 
taking are more likely to accrue to executives during their incumbency. Third, 
short-term risk taking provides more opportunities for executives to manipulate 
investment outcomes to offset adverse impact of employment risk on their current 
wealth.  
Supporting the argument that employment risk may induce a shorter 
orientation in their risk preferences, Narayanan (1985) suggests that executives 
Strategic Corporate Governance, Employment Risk, and Risk Taking   Shuping Li  2014 
99 
 
concerned with their job security tend to be myopic, preferring lower-valued, 
short-term projects to higher-valued, long-term projects. Scharfstein and Stein 
(1990) demonstrate that executives concerned with their employment security 
increase the tendency of mimicking others’ investment decisions rather than 
explore new investments to reduce uncertainty. Zwiebel (1995) also suggests that 
executives concerned with employment security prefer inferior and standard 
technologies to new technologies with superior payoff. Consistently, Palley (1997) 
demonstrates that the likelihood of managerial exits induces managers to choose 
projects with short time horizons and low net present values. 
The example of Hewlett-Packard (HP) also illustrates that high executive 
employment risk often dampens executives’ incentive of pursuing long-term risk 
relative to short-term risk. HP has seen four CEO dismissals over 14 years, 
including Lew Platt (1999), Carly Fiorina (2005), Mark Hurd (2010), and Leo 
Apotheker (2011). As current CEO Meg Whitman described, “…the single 
biggest challenge facing Hewlett-Packard has been changes in CEOs and 
executive leadership, which has caused multiple inconsistent strategic choices” 
(Reuters, 2012) and “a reliance on short-term strategies that did not help the 
company in the long run” (Sheehan, 2012). 
Hypothesis 1 [H1]: The greater the employment risk faced by executives in 
their firms, the less long-term risk taking relative to short-term risk taking 
executives take. 
The following section investigates internal and external executive market 
conditions that may alter executives’ focus on immediate economic wealth under 
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employment risk and in turn moderate the relationship in Hypothesis 1. I expect 
power contestation among executives in a firm’s internal executive market to 
amplify the relationship in Hypothesis 1 because internal power contestation 
increases the credibility of executives’ employment risk and hence their focus on 
preserving immediate economic wealth. By contrast, a high prospect of future job 
opportunities in external executive market may shift executives’ focus on 
immediate economic wealth away towards building up a long-term job reputation 
in the market to facilitate their future job search, thereby attenuating the 
relationship of employment risk with risk taking. Moreover, I predict a joint 
moderating effect of power contestation and the prospect of future job 
opportunities; power contestation in internal executive market increases 
executives’ sensitivity to potential job opportunities in external executive market. 
Contingencies: Power contestation in internal executive market and prospect 
of future job opportunities in external executive market 
The impact of employment risk on different time horizons of risk taking may 
be shaped by power contestation in a firm’s internal executive market, defined as 
the emergent and recurrent struggles for position and control among a firm’s top 
executives (Ocasio & Kim, 1999; Combs, Ketchen, Perryman & Donahue, 2007). 
A firm’s top management team is a political coalition among top executives who 
have a high need for power and career advancement (March, 1962; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984; Shen & Cannella, 2002). Members of the coalition have 
independent interests from each other and constantly try to move up the corporate 
hierarchy to “run their own show” (Pfeffer, 1981; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004). 
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The extraordinary prestige and material benefits associated with the winner 
provide further incentives for senior executives to challenge each other and to 
compete for power, position, and privilege (Lazear, 1989).  
High power contestation in internal executive market increases the credibility 
of executive dismissal, thereby amplifying the strategic consequences of 
executives’ employment risk. Executives losing a contestation to rivals will often 
depart their companies prematurely due to a loss of prestige or dissatisfaction with 
the rivals’ agendas. For instance, Warner Bros’ CEO contestants Jeff Robinov and 
Bruce Rosenblum exited the corporation shortly after their rival Kevin Tsujihara 
was appointed the CEO successor in 2013 because of dissatisfaction with the 
corporation’s decision (McMillan, 2012). Ocasio (1994) also reports that the 
likelihood of CEO turnover increases when there is a high proportion of inside 
directors contesting the power of CEO. As executives’ employment risk becomes 
more credible due to high power contestation, executives tend to focus more on 
preserving immediate wealth to compensate potential wealth loss. As a result, the 
reduction in long-term risk taking relative to short-term risk taking will increase 
with power contestation. 
While power contestation moderates the relationship between employment 
risk and risk taking, it may not have a direct impact on a firm’s long-term or 
short-term risk taking. This may occur because strategic stability often results 
from an underlying pulling and tugging of contestants for power, especially for 
risky proposals. The strategic stability arises because executives may not initiate 
any risky proposals. Outcome uncertainty inherent in risky projects will put 
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executives at a disadvantage in the contestation. Also, fallout over the power 
struggle may make funding for the projects shrink and/or vanish unexpectedly. 
Moreover proposals of changing the firms’ existing strategies may be 
immediately opposed by contenders (e.g., inside board directors), resulting in 
strategic stability. For example, the power struggle among Warner Bros’ CEO 
heir apparent, Bruce Rosenblum, Jeff Robinov, and Kevin Tsujihara from 2010 to 
2013 has resulted in a slowed development of the corporations’ projects due to the 
uncertainty of the firm’s future political landscape (McMillan, 2012).  
Hypothesis 2 [H2]: The higher the power contestation in internal executive 
market, the higher the impact of employment risk on long-term risk taking 
relative to short-term risk taking. 
However, the impact of employment risk on different time horizons of risk 
taking can be attenuated when external executive market provides executives with 
future job opportunities upon dismissals in their current firms. High prospect of 
future job opportunities in the external market often motivates executives to 
building up a job reputation of creating long-term shareholder value in the market. 
Such a reputation will facilitate their subsequent job search in the market because 
due to limited ability of collecting fine-grained information about executives’ real 
capability, potential external employers often rely on media reports and focus on 
executives who have signalled a good reputation as in the market (Malmendier 
and Tate, 2005).  
Increasing long-term risk taking constitutes one way of building up a good 
job reputation of creating shareholder value. The market cannot observe noise-
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free internal accounting information, but it can easily learn manager’s decisions 
and strategies from media coverage that constitute the basis for the market to 
evaluate the executives’ reputation. Although long-term risk taking may not yield 
positive immediate payoffs in the short run, the investments per se may be signal 
executives’ high ability for four reasons. First, it signals to the market that the 
executives are long-term oriented as shareholders generally prefer. Second, it 
shows the executives’ confidence of their strategy finally turning out to be a 
success although the short-term payoffs may fluctuate. Such confidence is often 
interpreted by the market as associated with high ability executives. Third, long-
term investments afford the manager protection from the risk of being viewed as a 
failure early on (Hirshleifer, 1993). Fourth, long-term investments imply that 
executives are more likely to maintain the strategic consistence over time rather 
than correcting the strategies on short-term basis. As Sliwka (2007) suggests, 
executives’ reputation suffers in the market if they are observed to correct an 
initial strategic decision even though the correction may improve the firm’s short-
run financial performance. 
The case of General Motor’s (GM) former CEO Roger Smith illustrates how 
executives may intentionally choose long-term investment strategies to build up 
their job reputation. During the 1980s, Smith undertook vast capital expenditures 
and pursued his vision of GM as a leader in new production techniques and labor 
management, including self-consciously innovative development of the Saturn 
line of cars. The strategies were proved to be a failure causing declining market 
share and profitability. However, Smith’s reputation as a manager benefited from 
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his long-term strategies. Early signs of failure of his investments were not judged 
as harshly as they would have been because it was recognized that radical change 
is costly and that the payoff of long-term strategies does not arrive in the short-
term (Herfinsler, 1993).  
While the prospect of future job opportunities in external executive market 
shapes executives’ risk preferences, I argue that it takes effect through interacting 
with executives’ employment risk rather than having a main effect. If an 
executive is well into his career and faces minimal threat of being dismissed from 
the current firm, he may not be sensitive to future job opportunities in external 
market because the cost of moving across firms (e.g., loss of firm-specific human 
capital and social capital) often exceeds the benefits (e.g., achievement of 
personal goals). Supporting this idea, studies rarely show a main effect of external 
executive market in altering executives’ incentives. Rather, it is found that the 
incentive effect of external executive market is mostly relevant for younger 
managers than for managers near retiring; younger managers are subjected to 
higher employment risk (e.g. Homstrom, 1999). 
Hypothesis 3 [H3]: The higher executives’ prospect of future job 
opportunities in external executive market, the lower the impact of 
employment risk on long-term risk taking relative to short-term risk taking. 
The moderating impact of the prospect of job opportunities in external 
executive market tends to be amplified when power contestation among top 
executives within a firm is high, consequently attenuating the negative impact of 
employment risk on long-term risk taking relative to short-term risk taking. As 
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noted above, high power contestation among top executives often increases the 
credibility of executives’ dismissals and amplifies executives’ employment 
concern. In such a condition, executives become very sensitive to the conditions 
in external executive market because close attention paid to the market will 
facilitate their future job search upon dismissals in current firms. As a result, the 
prospect of job opportunities in the external market will exert greater moderating 
influence on executives’ long-term risk taking relative to short-term risk taking.   
Hypothesis 4 [H4]: The higher the power contestation in internal executive 
market, the stronger the moderating impact of prospect of future job 
opportunities in external market on the relationship between employment 
risk and long-term risk taking relative to short-term risk taking. 
DATA AND METHODS 
The setting is 715 non-financial public firms listed on the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange (TSE).8 Taiwanese firms are relevant for the study for two reasons. 
First, executive employment risk in the firms is as common as in traditional 
settings such as U.S. firms, with an average executive tenure of six years. Second, 
ownership of Taiwanese firms is often highly concentrated in the hands of family 
owners. Compared to firms with diffuse ownership structure such as U.S. firms, 
another managerial moral hazard problem, i.e., effort aversion, is limited due to 
closely aligned interests between executives and shareholders. As such, a firm’s 
risk strategies can be attributed more directly to changes in executives’ risk 
preferences, the focal mechanism of this paper.  
                                                            
8 Financial firms in the banking, securities, and insurance sectors are excluded because they face different 
governance regulations (Luo & Chung 2012). 
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I collected data from four sources. First, the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) 
database, the most comprehensive data for public companies in the Asia-Pacific 
region, provides information on top management turnovers in Taiwanese firms 
every three years from 1996 to 2011. It also provides annual information on the 
firms’ corporate governance conditions (e.g., ownership structure, board 
composition, and executive compensation) over the period and also on investment 
in China from 2000 to 2011. Recent studies have used this data (e.g., Luo & 
Chung, 2013; Chung & Luo, 2013). Second, Compustat Global, available on 
WRDS, provides financial information on all Taiwanese public firms from 1991 
to 2011. Third, Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions provides data 
on 307 Taiwanese non-finical public firms’ M&A activities as acquirers from 
1962 to 2013. Fourth, Harvard Patent Network Dataverse provides data on 361 
Taiwanese public firms’ patenting activities from 1977 to 2011. 
I combined the datasets, took one-period lags for all independent variables, 
and excluded missing data. The procedures yield an unbalanced panel of 715 non-
financial firms (7,267firm-year observations) from 1997 to 2011. As shown in 
Table A3.1 in the appendix, the initial sample includes 19 Taiwanese industries, 
with about half (372 firms) from electronics, the most globally competitive 
industry in Taiwan. Employment risk as reflected in CEO/Chairman turnover rate 
in an average Taiwanese firm is about one per three years.  
Measures 
Dependent variables: Long-term risk taking and short-term risk taking  
To measure a firm’s long-term risk taking, I assessed the investment in its 
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foreign subsidiaries and innovation. The payoff of both activities is uncertain and 
may take multiple years to show up whereas the costs are often immediate. For a 
firm’s investment in foreign subsidiaries, I looked at the annual investment 
outflow to its Chinese subsidiaries, a prominent foreign investment destination of 
Taiwanese firms. I took natural log of the variable to adjust for heterosckdasticity. 
For a firm’s innovation, I looked at its R&D intensity calculated as the ratio of 
R&D expenditure to sales and its technological exploration calculated as the 
percentage of the number of new 2-digit USPTO technological classes a firm has 
applied for patents in a year to the total number of existing technological classes it 
has entered in previous 5 years (Gilsing et al., 2008); a logistic transformation is 
applied to the variable to address its bounded nature to fit OLS estimation.9  
For a firm’s short-term risk taking, I assessed its total acquisition transaction 
value as an acquirer in a year. Acquisition is a typical risk taking behaviour 
because it involves high possibilities of loss (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; Metta 
& Beamish, 2008). However, it is a short-term risk taking because its effect on a 
firm’s income stream is often immediate while the associated costs (e.g., 
integration of functions) may take longer time to show up. Consistent with this 
operationalization, Hoskisson et al. (2002) have also used acquisition of 
innovation as a measure for short-term risk taking. 
Independent variables 
Employment risk. Following prior studies on employment risk (e.g., 
Brookman & Thistle 2009; Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007), I used the total number 
                                                            
9 Alternatively, I followed Papke and Wooldridge (1996) to estimate the original variable using glm 
estimation with family(binomial), link(logit), and robust options, which yield similar results. 
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of CEO and board chairman turnovers in a firm over past three years to reflect 
internal threat of dismissal faced by the firm’s incumbent senior executives. I 
focused on both CEO and board chairman due to their central roles in strategic 
decision making (Finkelstein et al., 2009).10 While the above measure focuses on 
firm-specific employment risk, I constructed two additional variables, i.e., 
industrial employment risk and macroeconomic employment risk, to reflect 
employment risk arising from industrial and macroeconomic uncertainties. 
Assessing the different sources of employment risk helps exclude the concern that 
the debating relationships between employment risk and risk taking may arise 
from the multifaceted dimensions of employment risk.  
To construct industrial employment risk, I regressed a dummy variable 
indicating a firm’s CEO/Chairman turnover on the firm’s industry conditions with 
a logit estimator. Such conditions include the industrial averages of ROA, CEO 
turnover, number of employee reassignments, employee tenure, firm fixed effects, 
and year fixed effects. A predicted probability of CEO/Chairman turnover is then 
generated for each firm based on the coefficients. Similarly, to construct the 
variable of macroeconomic employment risk, I regressed the dummy variable for 
CEO/Chairman turnover with a logit estimator on several annual macroeconomic 
conditions in Taiwan, including GDP growth rate, net increase in firm 
registrations, labor turnover rate, growth rate of total employees, growth rate of 
listed firms, growth rate of average daily stock trading value, growth rate of 
TAIEX index, and firm fixed effects. A predicted probability of CEO/Chairman 
turnover is then generated for each firm with the coefficients obtained.  
                                                            
10 A robustness check focusing on the turnover of CEOs only yields similar findings. 
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Power contestation in internal executive market. To reflect power 
contestation among a firm’s senior executives, I looked at total number of 
potential contenders to CEO or board Chairman in the firm. A large number of 
contenders indicate potentially high power contestation in the firm’s top 
management. To determine the contenders, I followed Zhang & Rajalapolan 
(2003) to include executives who possess managerial experience at the highest 
level, have established power bases in relation to the incumbent CEOs and/or 
boards, and have the opportunity to demonstrate their competencies to the boards. 
In Taiwanese firms, such executives often hold the titles of president (Zong Cai), 
vice president (Fu Zong Cai), associate or assistant vice president (Xie Li), deputy 
CEO (Fu Zhi Xing Zhang), and COO (Ying Yun Zhang). In the sample, a typical 
Taiwanese firm has about five contenders to CEO/Chairman. 
Prospect of future job opportunities in external executive market. Like 
executive markets in developed settings such as the U.S., the market for senior 
executives in Taiwan is thin and transactions highly rely on network referrals 
rather than market-based executive search firms. As such, I measured the prospect 
of job opportunities in external executive market by the number of external firms 
connected to a focal firm through its top management and board. I considered a 
connection to exist when a focal firm’s managers serve other firms’ board 
members or when board members of two firms are the same individuals or share 
the same affiliations. Inter-firm connections through the top enable the flow of 
refined information about potential job opportunities and also enhance executives’ 
visibility to future employers, thereby increasing their prospect of future job 
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opportunities in the market. In the sample, a typical Taiwanese firm’s external 
connection through its top management is about ten firms. 
Control variables 
I accounted for four firm specific governance attributes that may confound 
the impact of employment risk on firm risk taking, including executives’ incentive 
pay, executive ownership, ownership concentration, and monitoring intensity. 
First, executives’ viable compensation may provide incentives that shape their 
risk preference (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Hoskisson et al., 2009; Wright, 
Kroll, Krug & Pettus, 2007). Thus, I controlled for the ratio of executives’ 
incentive pay to a firm’s net income, with incentive pay including bonus, cash 
dividend, and stock dividend. Second, I controlled for executive ownership 
measured by total shares owned by a firm’s executives divided by a firm’s total 
outstanding shares to reflect its incentive effect on executives’ risk preferences 
(Wright, Ferris, Sarin & Awasthi, 1996). Third, I accounted for the impact of a 
firm’s ownership concentration on risk taking (Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991) 
by controlling for the critical control level of a firm, which is the holding 
percentage necessary for a shareholder to exert control in a firm. It is calculated 
by taking into account the probability that a shareholder will vote in shareholder 
meetings, the probability a shareholder will win in voting, and the firm’s 
ownership concentration. Finally, I assessed the impact of monitoring intensity on 
executive risk taking by controlling for the percentage of independent board 
members (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990) and number of large shareholders 
owning at least 5% of a firm’s voting rights (Connelly, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, & 
Strategic Corporate Governance, Employment Risk, and Risk Taking   Shuping Li  2014 
111 
 
Certo, 2010).  
I also controlled for four firm attributes that may affect a firm’s risk taking, 
i.e., firm size, firm age, firm profitability, and liability. Firm size is measured by 
the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets. Firm age is the number of years 
since the firm’s establishment. Firm profitability is the ratio of a firm’s return to 
assets. Finally, liability is the ratio of a firm’s total debt to total assets. I also 
controlled for year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. 
Censored exact matching (CEM) and model specification 
I employed Censored Exact Matching (CEM; Stata 13 command cem) 
proposed by Blackwell et al. (2009) to address the endogenity of employment risk; 
the method has been used by recent management and economics studies (e.g. 
Singh & Agrawal, 2011; Azoulay, Zivin & Wang, 2010). CEM temporarily 
coarsens each variable into substantively meaningful groups, exact matches on 
these coarsened data, and then runs focal analyses on the original value of the 
matched data. The procedures ensure similar distributions of determinants (Z) of 
employment risk in the firms without employment risk (i.e., without 
CEO/Chairman turnover in the past 3 years) versus firms with employment risk 
(i.e., with CEO/Chairman turnover in the past 3 years), yielding a sample with 
randomly distributed employment risk. Compared to traditional matching 
methods such as Propensity Score Matching, CEM is more advantageous in two 
respects. First, CEM enables the greatest extent of matching because CEM can 
adjust the imbalance on one variable without affecting the maximum imbalance of 
any other. Second, CEM is robust to measurement error, model dependence, and 
Strategic Corporate Governance, Employment Risk, and Risk Taking   Shuping Li  2014 
112 
 
estimation error of causal effect. 
CEM matches observations for employment risk based on the following 
model specification: ERDit=ߚ0	+ߚ1Zit-1 +εit, where ERDit is a dummy variable for 
CEO/Chairman turnover and Zit-1 represents the matrix of determinants of ERDit, 
including firm age, firm size, firm ROA, percentage of independent board 
members, and CEO/Chairman’s affiliation with a firm’s  ultimate controller. 
While firm age is coarsened into six strata with 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 as cut-off 
points, coarsening boundaries for firm size and firm ROA are determined using 
the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles. For CEO/Chairman’s affiliation with ultimate 
controller and percentage of independent board members, CEM default 
coarsening criteria are applied. The five variables and their coarsening criteria are 
chosen to balance the trade-off between the stringency of matching and the 
fraction of the sample for which a match can be found (Singh & Agrawal, 2011). 
Table 3.1 reports CEM matching statistics. The above matching criteria yield 
a final sample of 6,491 observations out of 7,267 original observations. In the 
matched sample, 3,627 observations are associated with no employment risk 
while 2,864 observations are associated with employment risk. A decrease in the 
multivariate L1 distance score from 0.57 to 0.37 suggests that the balance in the 
joint distribution of covariates has improved with the matching. L1 scores for 
each covariate in the treated and control samples also suggest that the balance in 
individual distributions of the covariates has improved. 
********** Table 3.1********** 
With the matched sample, OLS estimator is then used to assess the impact of 
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employment risk on risk taking with different time horizons based on the 
following model specification Riskit=ߚ0	+ߚ1ERit-1 +ߚ2EMt-1 +ߚ3ERit-1* EMt-
1	൅ߚXit-1+Yeart +αi +εit,. where ERit-1 indicates CEO/Chairman turnover in a firm 
over the past three years, EMt-1 indicates external and internal executive market 
conditions, and Xit-1 represents the matrix of control variables as described in the 
above section. To assess the interactive moderating effect between internal 
executive market and external executive market as proposed in Hypothesis 4, I 
compare the moderating impacts of external executive market across subsamples 
with high versus low power contestation in a firm’s internal executive market. 
The summary statistics and correlation matrix of CEM matched sample for 
estimation are presented in Table 3.2.  
********** Table 3.2********** 
RESULTS 
Hypothesis 1: Baseline results and robustness tests 
Table 3.3a and 3.3b report OLS estimation results that test Hypothesis 1, 
which predicts a more negative impact of employment risk on long-term risk 
taking relative to short-term risk taking. While Table 3.3a assesses a firm’s 
internal employment risk, Table 3.3b examines industrial employment risk and 
macroeconomic employment risk.  
Panel A of Table 3.3a contains control variables in predicting four forms of 
long-term risk taking (Models 1 to 3) and one form of short-term risk taking 
(Model 4). Panel B assesses the impact of employment risk on long-term risk 
taking (Models 5 to 7) and short-term risk taking (Model 8) by adding the variable 
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into the models. As shown in Modes 5 to 7, employment risk significantly reduces 
all forms of long-term risk taking. Specifically, an increase of one CEO/Chairman 
turnover in a firm over three years decreases the firm’s investment flow to its 
Chinese subsidiaries by 10.4% (Model 5; P<0.01), R&D intensity by 0.1% 
(Model 6; P<0.1), and exploring into new technological classes by 50%11 (Model 
7; P<0.05). However, employment risk has no impact on a firm’s M&A (Model 8; 
P>0.1). Thus, the results based on internal employment risk support H1. 
Table 3.3b reports the impacts of industrial employment risk and 
macroeconomic employment risk on long-term relative to short-term risk taking, 
showing largely consistent and yet weaker results than the impacts of internal 
employment risk. Models 1 to 4 in Panel A show that industrial employment risk 
reduces two forms of long-term risk taking significantly, i.e., investment flow to 
Chinese subsidiaries (decrease by 39.9% in Model 1; P<0.05). However, it has no 
impact on the firm’s short-term risk taking in terms of M&A (P>0.1). Similarly, 
Models 5 to 8 in Panel B show that macroeconomic employment risk significantly 
reduces two forms of long-term risk taking, i.e., investment flow to Chinese 
subsidiaries (decrease by 69.9% in Model 5; P<0.01) and technological 
exploration (decrease by 51% in Model 7; P<0.05), while having no effect on 
short-term risk taking (P>0.1). The weaker results may arise because employment 
risk associated with industrial and macroeconomic uncertainties is often beyond 
executives’ control. As such, changing investment strategies in the firms can only 
partially offset potential economic losses caused by the employment risk. 
Considering that internal employment risk is most relevant in affecting executives’ 
                                                            
11 Given logit transformation of the dependent variable, the marginal effect is calculated as 1/1+exp (-0.008). 
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risk preferences, the sections below focus on internal employment risk. 
********** Table 3.3a and 3.3b********** 
I excluded potential reverse causality underlying the negative relationship 
between employment risk and different time horizons of risk taking. That is, 
executives may be dismissed in a firm due to their underinvestment in long-term 
risk relative to short-term risk. Because this explanation is only plausible when a 
firm’s monitors are long-term oriented not evaluating executives’ capability based 
on short-term financial indicators, I assessed whether the baseline results reported 
in Table 3a are weaker in industries sensitive to firms’ assessment of executive 
capability based on ROA.12 As shown in Table A3.2, the relationship between 
employment risk and long-term risk taking relative to short-term risk taking does 
not vary with industrial sensitivity to ROA, excluding the concern of reverse 
causality. 
I also conducted three sets of tests checking the sensitivity of the baseline 
results to CEM matching procedures, sample composition, and the measure of 
short-term risk taking. Results reported in Tables A3.3 and A3.4 add support to 
Hypothesis 1. First, I assessed the impact of employment risk on risk taking based 
on the raw sample without CEM matching, which yield consistent and yet weaker 
results as reported in Table A3.3. I also obtained different matched samples by 
varying the number of covariates and their coarsening criteria for CEM matching. 
                                                            
12 To distinguish sensitive industries from non-sensitive industries, I regressed a dummy variable indicating 
CEO/Chairman turnover on firm ROA by each industry with a logit model, controlling for other variables 
affecting the turnover (i.e., firm age, firm size, CEO’s affiliation with ultimate controller, CEO-chairman 
duality, percentage of independent board members, and number of large shareholders). Industries with a 
significantly negative coefficient on firm ROA are considered sensitive to ROA in assessing executives’ 
capability, whereas industries with insignificant coefficients or significantly positive coefficients are 
considered non-sensitive to ROA in assessing executives’ capability. 
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As shown in the Panel A of Table A3.4, the relationships between employment 
risk and different time horizons of risk taking are highly robust. Second, I exclude 
the concern that oversampling electronic firms (half of the sample) may drive the 
baseline results. Tests based on a CEM matched sample of non-electronic firms 
only (3,904 observations) show consistent results for long-term risk taking in 
terms of investment to its Chinese subsidiaries and short-term risk taking; 
insignificant results for innovation may arise due to low technological intensity of 
non-electronic firms. Third, I assessed the impact of employment risk on a firm’s 
short-term risk taking in terms of IVST. Consistent with the prediction in 
Hypothesis 1, the results show that employment risk has no impact on IVST.  
Hypothesis 2: Moderating effect of power contestation in internal executive 
market 
Table 3.4 reports OLS coefficient estimates regarding Hypothesis 2, which 
predicts a negative moderating impact of power contestation in internal executive 
market on the relationship between employment risk and different time horizons 
of risk taking. Models 1 to 3 concern three forms of long-term risk taking. In 
parallel, Model 4 concerns short-term risk taking. Not supporting the prediction in 
Hypothesis 2, the non-significant interaction terms in Models 1 to 3 suggest that 
the impact of employment risk on all forms of long-term risk taking do not vary 
with power contestation in a firm’s internal executive market. Moreover, opposite 
to the prediction in Hypothesis 2, the negative and significant interaction term in 
Model 5 (-0.04; P<0.05) suggests that employment risk reduces short-term risk 
taking when power contestation is high within a firm. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is 
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not supported.  
********** Table 3.4********** 
Hypothesis 3: Moderating effect of prospect of job opportunities in external 
executive market 
Table 3.5 presents OLS coefficient estimates regarding Hypothesis 3, 
concerning the positive moderating relationship of prospect of job opportunities in 
external executive market with employment risk and long-term risk taking relative 
to short-term risk taking. Models 1 to 3 report coefficient estimates for the 
moderating impact of prospect of future job opportunities in external executive 
market on three forms of long-term risk taking, while Model 4 reports coefficient 
estimates on the moderating impact for short-term risk taking.  
Consistent with the prediction in Hypothesis 3, positive and significant 
interaction terms in Models 1 and 3 suggest that the prospect of future job 
opportunities in external executive market attenuates the negative impact of 
employment risk, ultimately increasing a firm’s three forms of long-term risk 
taking including investment flow to China (Model 1; P<0.1) and technological 
exploration (Model 3; P<0.1). However, the moderating impact of job 
opportunities on the relationship between employment risk and R&D intensity is 
not significant (Model 2; P>0.1). Moreover, the negative and significant 
interaction term between employment risk and prospect of future job 
opportunities in Model 4 suggests a consequence of decreased short-term risk 
taking in terms of acquisition. Taken together, Hypothesis 3 is largely supported. 
********** Table 3.5********** 
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Figure 3.2 plots the moderating effects based on the coefficient estimates in 
Models 1, 3, and 4 in Table 3.5, adding support to Hypothesis 3. Figure 3.2a 
shows that while employment risk decreases a firm’s investment flow to its 
Chinese subsidiaries at the low level of job opportunities in external executive 
market (2 SD below the mean), it increases the investment at a high level of future 
job opportunities (2 SD above the mean). Moreover, 95% confidence intervals of 
the impacts do not overlap over most data ranges of the employment risk, 
suggesting that the moderating effect of job opportunities is meaningful and 
significant at a confidence level of 0.05. Similarly, Figures 3.2b suggests that 
negative impacts of employment risk on a firm’s technological exploration 
become significantly positive when the prospect of job opportunities increases. 
By contrast, Figure 3.2c shows that while employment risk increases a firm’s 
acquisition at a low level of job opportunities in external executive market (2 SD 
below the mean), the impact reduces at a high level of future job opportunities (2 
SD above the mean). 
********** Figure 3.2********** 
For robustness checks, I alternatively use annual growth rate of listed firms in 
Taiwan to measure potential job opportunities for executives in the external 
market. The test yields consistent but weaker results; this is likely because the 
measure reflects opportunities in a broader executive market and thus has weaker 
immediate impacts on executive incentives. In addition, I test whether prospect of 
future job opportunities has non-significant main effect on long-term risk taking 
relative to short-term risk taking as argued. As predicted, the main impact of 
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external executive market is not significant. 
Hypothesis 4: Interactive mmoderating effect of power contestation and 
prospect of future job opportunities 
Table 3.6 reports regression results testing Hypothesis 4, which predicts that 
the positive moderating impacts of job opportunities in external executive market 
on the relationship between employment risk and different time horizons of risk 
taking are stronger when power contestation in a firm’s internal executive market 
is higher. Models 1, 3, and 5 report coefficients regarding the interaction of 
employment risk and prospect of job opportunities on three forms of long-term 
risk taking for a subgroup of firms characterized by high power contestation, 
while Models 2, 4, and 6 present coefficients for firms with low power 
contestation. Models 7 and 8 report coefficients concerning the impacts of 
employment risk on short-term risk taking based on firms with high and low 
power contestation respectively. 
Highly consistent with Hypothesis 4, interaction terms in Models 1, 3, and 5 
show that the moderating impacts of prospect of future job opportunities on the 
relationship between employment risk and investment flow to Chinese 
subsidiaries, R&D intensity, and technological exploration are significantly 
positive in the sub-sample of firms with high power contestation. However, the 
moderating effects for the sub-sample of firms with low power contestation are 
not significant as shown in Models 2, 4, and 6. As for technological exploration, 
although Models 5 and 6 both show that the moderating effects of job 
opportunities are significantly positive for firms with high and low power 
Strategic Corporate Governance, Employment Risk, and Risk Taking   Shuping Li  2014 
120 
 
contestation, the effect is stronger with high power contestation. For short-term 
risk taking, Models 7 and 8 show that the significantly negative moderating 
impact of the prospect of job opportunities with employment risk only holds for 
firms with high power contestation rather than low contestation. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 4 is strongly supported. 
********** Table 3.6********** 
DISCUSSION 
This paper set out to understand how the employment risk of a firm’s senior 
executives affects their strategic risk taking. Despite increased executive 
employment risk around the world, its strategic consequences remain 
understudied. In particular, a controversy exists regarding the impact of 
employment risk on firm risk taking. This paper assesses whether the controversy 
can be reconciled by distinguishing different time horizons of risk taking and also 
taking into account internal and external executive market conditions. Based on 
Taiwanese public firms I find that employment risk reduces long-term risk taking 
(i.e., investment in the firm’s foreign subsidiaries and innovation) relative to 
short-term risk taking (i.e., acquisition). The finding is consistent with a reality 
observation that economies with high rates of managerial turnover such as the U.S. 
are more likely to be short-term oriented than do economies with low managerial 
turnovers due to life-time employment practices such as Japan (Palley, 1997). 
Further, I show that an active external executive market abundant with job 
opportunities attenuates the impact of employment risk on different time horizons 
of risk taking, especially when executives are sensitive to the external market 
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given the adverse environment in their firms’ internal executive market. 
This study adds two new insights to strategic corporate governance literature. 
First, the study reveals the conditional disciplining roles of executive market 
conditions in affecting executives’ risk preferences. Current corporate governance 
studies are often criticized of overlooking the social contexts in which principal-
agent relations are embedded (e.g., Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Wiseman et al., 
2012). Particularly the studies often overlook the role of executive market 
conditions in affecting managerial incentive, assuming the market to be inefficient 
(Ang et al. 2003; Finkelstein et al. 2009; Khurana 2002; Zhang, 2008). While this 
study does not find significant main effects of internal or external executive 
markets, it shows that executive markets affect the incentive of executives with 
employment concerns due to stringent internal governance. Moreover, strategic 
corporate governance research typically studies a variety of governance 
mechanisms independently. This study contributes by showing that the efficacy of 
internal control scheme such as management turnover in aligning the divergent 
interests between shareholders and executives can be influenced by disciplining 
forces outside the firm.  
The study also provides important managerial implications on balancing the 
trade-off between stringent corporate governance and managerial short-termism. 
Studies on short-termism (Laverty, 1996; Marginson & Mcaulay, 2008) advocate 
that important organizational factors should be assessed to better understand the 
arising of managerial short-termism. However, no study up to date has focused on 
the impact of employment risk, a prominent internal control scheme, on 
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managerial short-termism. Our baseline finding confirms the significance of 
internal employment risk for causing a short-term orientation in pursuing risk, 
suggesting a trade-off between the efficiency benefits of stringent governance 
through management turnover and the costs of short-termism in firms’ value 
creation. The positive moderating role of executive market conditions further 
suggests that a fluid external executive market constitutes a plausible solution to 
the trade-off, attenuating short-termism. 
The study also relates to the studies on the consequences of executive 
mobility. Current studies on executive mobility often show that executive 
mobility affects the new hiring firm’s strategy by introducing new human capital 
or social capital. For instance, Boeker (1997) explores how the movement of top 
managers across firms influences decisions to enter new product markets in the 
semiconductor industry. Geletkanycz & Hambrick (1997) investigate how top 
management team’s pattern of external ties including those formed through 
mobility influences the firm’s strategic positioning. Complementarily, this study 
suggests that executive mobility also affects executives’ prior employer’s risky 
strategies due to their prospect of immediate income loss. 
Two topics warrant future research. First, future study may also examine how 
the interaction between various corporate governance schemes to affect firm 
strategies and performance. For instance, executive compensation scheme is 
suggested to affect firm value in mixed way (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007). 
One reason might be that current studies on executive compensation largely 
ignore other co-existing governance schemes within and outside the firms such as 
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internal monitoring or competition in external executive market. Second, future 
studies can further explore the impacts of other dimensions of external executive 
market on principal-agent relations. For instance, one may research the role of 
third-party intermediaries such as executive search firms and talent agents in 
executive market on the functioning and efficacy of internal governance 
mechanism such as CEO selection and compensation design processes.  
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Figure 3.1. The Impact of Employment Risk on Different Horizons of Risk Taking 
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Figure 3.2. Moderating Impacts of Prospect of Job Opportunities in External 
Executive Market (H2) 
Figure 3.2a FDI Investment in China                                                                                                 
 
                           Figure 3.2b Technological Exploration   
 
                                                                                                  
 Figure 3.2c M&A Transaction Value as Acquirers 
 
Notes:  1. Graphs are generated by STATA 13 program marginsplot program following OLS estimations as reported in 
Table 3.4; confidence intervals are two-tailed, at 95% confidence level; 2. Y-axis represents the expected mean in long-
term risk taking (Figures 3.2a and 3.2b) or short-term risk taking (Figure 3.2c); X-axis shows number of CEO/Chairman 
turnover over past three years. 3. Figures 3.2a and 3.2b show that the negative impacts of employment risk on long-term 
risk taking are less for high job opportunities than for low job opportunities in external executive market. 4. Figure 3.2c 
show that the positive impact of employment risk on short-term risk taking is less for high job opportunities than for low 
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Table 3.1. Summary Statistics of Censored Exact Matching (CEM) 
Initial Sample (Multivariate L1 distance = 0.57) CEM Matched Sample (Multivariate L1 distance = 0.37) 
All sample 
Control sample without 
employment risk 
Treated sample with 
employment risk All sample 
Control sample without 
employment risk 





score Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
L1 
imbalance 
score Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Firm age 0.07 28.81 13.70 30.41 15.32 0.04 29.91 13.80 30.79 14.94 
Firm size 0.11 12.30 1.20 12.50 1.29 0.05 12.35 1.21 12.48 1.27 
Firm ROA 0.06 0.02 1.44 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.01 1.57 0.03 0.08 
CEO or Chairman Affiliation with 
ultimate controller 0.13 0.89 0.31 0.77 0.42 0.00 0.90 0.30 0.79 0.41 
Percentage of independent board 
members 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.05 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09 
Notes:  
 
 The statistics are obtained with STATA 13 program: cem. 
 The Multivariate L1 statistic includes imbalance with respect to the full joint distribution, including all interactions of the covariates; the lower the value, 
the greater the balance of the variables’ joint distribution. 
 The L1 imbalance score computes the imbalance for each variable separately, without including interactions; ; the lower the value, the greater the balance 
of the variable’s distribution.
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Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. Number of 
CEO/Chairman turnover in 3 1.32 1.50 1.00 
 
2. Investment flow to 
Chinese Subsidiaries (ln) 3.60 4.46 -0.07* 1.00 
 
4. R&D intensity 0.03 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 1.00 
 
5. Technological exploration 
(logit transformed) 1.06 0.35 -0.02 0.08* 0.02 1.00 
 
6. M&A value (ln) 0.18 0.84 0.01 0.12* 0.05* 0.08* 1.00            
7. Number of firms 
connected through top 
t
9.79 19.56 -0.01 0.09* 0.04* 0.07* 0.09* 1.00 
8. Number of executive 
contenders 5.06 4.17 -0.03* 0.27* 0.03 0.23* 0.28* 0.16* 1.00 
9. Incentive pay to NI ratio 6.13 14.04 -0.06* 0.15* 0.12* 0.23* 0.12* 0.14* 0.25* 1.00 
10. Executive ownership 
(%) 1.47 2.77 -0.05* 0.02 0.10* 0.06* -0.01 0.01 0.07* 0.18* 1.00 
11. Critical control level (%) 12.40 7.47 0.07* -0.15* -0.04* -0.02 -0.13* -0.02 -0.20* -0.00 -0.02 1.00 
12. CEO-chairman duality 
(dummy) 0.26 0.44 -0.05* 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.03* -0.10* -0.06* 0.01 0.002 0.01 1.00 
13. Percentage of 
independent board members 
(%) 0.06 0.12 -0.03* 0.10* 0.15* 0.01 0.02 0.05* 0.06* 0.16* 0.12* 0.04* 0.01 1.00 
14. Number of large 
shareholders 5.47 2.76 -0.02 0.05* 0.05* -0.01 0.08* 0.01 0.12* 0.00 -0.06* -0.18* -0.02 0.13* 1.00 
15. Firm age 30.20 14.75 0.04* -0.04* -0.21* -0.10* -0.05* -0.17* -0.12* -0.28* -0.24* -0.09* -0.06* -0.29* 0.01 1.00 
16. Firm size 12.40 1.28 -0.02 0.27* -0.07* 0.09* 0.28* 0.14* 0.45* 0.04* -0.14* -0.43* -0.13* -0.10* 0.21* 0.17* 1.00 
17. Debt to assets ratio 0.23 0.16 0.07* -0.03* -0.14* -0.03* -0.02 -0.02 -0.04* -0.18* -0.13* -0.10* -0.004 -0.19* 0.04* 0.10* 0.23* 1.00 
18. Firm ROA 0.03 0.98 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03* 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.03* -0.01 -0.01 0.03* -0.03* 1.00 
 
Note:  
 N=6,491other than FDI investment in China (5,702), FDI investment worldwide (6,404), R&D intensity (4,181), and Technological exploration (6,378)
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Table 3.3a. OLS Estimation on the Impact of Internal Employment Risk on Risk Taking with Different Horizons (H1) 
 Panel A Panel B 
 Long-term Risk Taking 
Short-term Risk 














Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Employment risk (H1: -)     -1.04*** -0.70* -0.08** -0.07 
    (0.40) (0.37) (0.03) (0.08) 
Incentive pay to NI ratio 0.02 -0.23*** 0.03*** 0.02* 0.01 -0.23*** 0.03*** 0.02* 
(0.05) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) 
Executive ownership 0.01 0.12 -0.04 -0.07 0.01 0.10 -0.04 -0.07 
(0.40) (0.34) (0.03) (0.08) (0.40) (0.34) (0.03) (0.08) 
Critical control level 0.14 0.02 0.02* -0.01 0.13 0.02 0.02* -0.01 
(0.13) (0.10) (0.01) (0.02) (0.13) (0.10) (0.01) (0.02) 
CEO-chairman duality -0.42 -0.80 -0.06 -0.31 -0.35 0.71 -0.05 -0.30 
(1.81) (1.53) (0.15) (0.37) (1.80) (1.53) (0.15) (0.37) 
Independent board 
members 15.52** -10.31 -1.30* -4.92*** 15.30** -10.26 -1.31* -4.90*** 
(7.70) (6.44) (0.70) (1.71) (7.69) (6.44) (0.70) (1.71) 
No. of large shareholders 0.17 -0.24 -0.02 -0.004 0.16 -0.24 -0.02 -0.01 
(0.25) (0.22) (0.02) (0.05) (0.25) (0.22) (0.02) (0.05) 
Firm age -9.53 -0.48 -0.53 1.83 -.8.63 0.23 -0.47 1.89 
(35.28) (25.51) (3.19) (7.90) (35.26) (25.51) (3.19) (7.90) 
Firm size 8.30*** -1.37 -0.99*** 1.02*** 8.13*** -1.53 -1.00*** 1.01*** 
(1.46) (1.18) (0.11) (0.27) (1.46) (1.18) (0.11) (0.27) 
Debt -24.47*** -6.85 0.62 -2.84** -24.07*** -6.31 0.66 -2.80** 
(5.92) (5.30) (0.48) (1.19) (5.92) (5.31) (0.48) (1.19) 
ROA 0.44 -42.57*** 0.01 0.00 0.44 -43.5*** 0.01 0.00 
(0.48) (7.35) (0.04) (0.11) (0.48) (7.37) (0.04) (0.11) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 156.96 61.07 34.48 -51.89 139.28 48.8 33.20 -53.05 
(861.26) (529.63) (70.92) (175.64) (860.80) (529.5) (70.90) (175.65) 
Observations 5,702 4,181 6,378 6,491 5,702 4,181 6,378 6,491 
R-squared 0.32 0.37 0.50 0.11 0.33 0.38 0.51 0.12 
Number of firms 715 601 715 715 715 601 715 715 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors in parentheses.  
 
Notes:  
 Coefficients in models 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 are multiplied by 10; coefficients in models 2 and 6 are multiplied by 1000. 
 Implication: employment risk reduces all three forms of long-term risk taking (i.e., investment flow to Chinese subsidiaries, R&D, and technological 
exploration) while having no impact on short-term risk taking, supporting H1. 
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Table 3.3b. OLS Estimation on the Impact of Industrial and Macroeconomic Employment Risk on Risk Taking with Different Time 
Horizons (H1) 
 Panel A: Industrial Employment Risk Panel B: Macroeconomic Employment Risk
Variable 
Long-term Risk Taking Short-term Risk Taking Long-term Risk Taking Short-term Risk Taking 
Investment in 




Chinese subsidiaries R&D 
Tech 
exploration M&A 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Employment risk (H1: -) -3.99** 2.13 -0.07 0.22 -6.99*** -1.02 -0.21** 2.88 
(1.65) (1.59) (0.12) (0.31) (1.60) (1.21) (0.11) (13.53) 
Incentive pay to NI ratio 0.02 -0.23*** 0.03*** 0.02* 0.03 -0.25*** 0.02*** 0.02* 
(0.05) (0.03) (0.004) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.004) (0.01) 
Executive ownership -0.02 0.13 -0.04 -0.07 0.06 0.03 -0.04 -0.07 
(0.40) (0.34) (0.03) (0.08) (0.40) (0.35) (0.03) (0.08) 
Critical control level 0.13 0.03 0.02* -0.01 -0.09 -0.04 0.02* -0.02 
(0.13) (0.10) (0.01) (0.02) (0.13) (0.10) (0.01) (0.02) 
CEO-chairman duality -0.31 -0.88 -0.06 -0.32 -0.40 -0.78 -0.07 -0.31 
(1.81) (1.53) (0.15) (0.37) (1.82) (1.61) (0.15) (0.38) 
Independent board members 15.83** -10.29 -1.29* -4.94*** 19.52*** -12.49** -1.24* -5.40*** 
(7.70) (6.45) (0.70) (1.71) (7.44) (6.20) (0.66) (1.74) 
No. of large shareholders 0.16 -0.22 -0.02 -0.004 0.19 -0.30 -0.02 -0.02 
(0.25) (0.22) (0.02) (0.05) (0.25) (0.23) (0.02) (0.05) 
Firm age -11.26 0.28 -0.56 1.92 -1.50*** 0.08 -0.06*** 0.62 
(35.29) (25.52) (3.19) (7.90) (0.23) (0.25) (0.02) (2.36) 
Firm size 8.20*** -1.46 -0.99*** 1.01*** 6.01*** -1.17 -1.07*** 0.83*** 
(1.46) (1.18) (0.11) (0.27) (1.44) (1.26) (0.11) (0.29) 
Debt -24.51*** -6.42 0.62 -2.83** -19.29*** -6.24 0.95** -2.65** 
(5.92) (5.31) (0.48) (1.19) (5.90) (5.51) (0.48) (1.24) 
ROA 0.43 -42.55*** 0.01 0.001 0.41 -44.22*** 0.02 -0.0004 
(0.48) (7.36) (0.04) (0.11) (0.49) (7.62) (0.04) (0.11) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 206.45 43.70 35.16 -54.04 35.73* 53.60*** 26.24*** -39.40 
(861.57) (529.90) (7.098) (175.79) (19.54) (17.21) (1.52) (133.48) 
Observations 5,697 4,180 6,373 6,486 5,702 4,021 6,143 6,249 
R-squared 0.33 0.38 0.50 0.11 0.13 0.35 0.45 0.09 
Number of firms 715 601 715 715 715 599 715 715 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Notes:  
 Coefficients in models 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 are multiplied by 10; coefficients in models 2 and 6 are multiplied by 1000. 
 Implication: Industrial employment risk reduces one form of long-term risk taking (i.e., investment flow to Chinese subsidiaries) while having no impact on short-term risk 
taking (i.e., acquisition), weakly supporting H1; macroeconomic employment  risk reduces two forms of long-term risk taking (investment flow to Chinese subsidiaries and 
technological exploration) while having no impact on short-term risk taking (i.e., acquisition), largely supporting H1. 
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Table 3.4. OLS Estimation on the Moderating Impact of Power Contestation in 
Internal Executive Market (H2) 





Chinese subsidiaries R&D  
Tech 
exploration  M&A  
Model 1 
Model 
2 Model 3 Model 4 
Employment risk -1.03 -0.58 -0.04 0.13 
(0.66) (0.60) (0.06) (0.14) 
Power contestation 0.56 -0.35 0.02 -0.13 
(0.50) (0.47) (0.05) (0.11) 
Employment risk* power contestation 
(H2: -) -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04* 
(0.11) (0.09) (0.01) (0.02) 
Incentive pay to NI ratio 0.01 
-
0.23*** 0.03*** 0.02* 
(0.05) (0.03) (0.003) (0.01) 
Executive ownership 0.02 0.11 -0.04 -0.07 
(0.40) (0.34) (0.03) (0.08) 
Critical control level 0.13 0.02 0.02* -0.01 
(0.13) (0.10) (0.01) (0.02) 
CEO-chairman duality -0.39 -0.70 -0.05 -0.28 
(1.81) (1.53) (0.15) (0.37) 
Independent board members 15.46** -10.37 -1.34* -5.17*** 
(7.71) (6.45) (0.70) (1.71) 
No. of large shareholders 0.17 -0.24 -0.02 -0.01 
(0.25) (0.22) (0.02) (0.05) 
Firm age -8.47 0.05 -0.49 1.71 
(35.27) (25.51) (3.19) (7.90) 
Firm size 8.08*** -1.54 -1.01*** 1.01*** 
(1.46) (1.18) (0.11) (0.27) 
Debt -23.99*** -6.45 0.66 -2.84** 




* 0.01 0.003 
(0.48) (7.38) (0.04) (0.11) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 13.322 54.84 33.57 -48.46 
(86.091) (529.64) (70.91) (175.59) 
Observations 5,702 4,181 6,378 6,491 
R-squared 0.33 0.38 0.51 0.13 
Number of firms 715 601 715 715 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors in parentheses.  
 
Notes: 
 Coefficients in models 1, 3, and 4 are multiplied by 10; coefficients in models 2 are multiplied by 1000. 
 Implication: The impacts of employment risk on all three forms of long-term risk taking don’t vary 
with power contestation within a firm’s internal executive market; employment risk reduces short-term 
risk taking (i.e., acquisition) with high power contestation within a firm’s internal executive market. 
Together, the results don’t support H2. 
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Table 3.5. OLS Estimation on the Moderating Impact of Prospect of Job 
Opportunities in External Executive Market (H3) 




Investment in Chinese 
subsidiaries  R&D  
Tech 
exploration  M&A  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Employment risk -1.38*** -0.85** -0.11*** -0.01 
(0.43) (0.39) (0.04) (0.09) 
Prospect of job opportunities -0.05 -0.04 -0.01* 0.02* 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.004) (0.01) 
Employment risk* Prospect of 
job opportunities (H3: +) 0.05** 0.02 0.004** -0.01* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.002) (0.004) 
Incentive pay to NI ratio 0.02 -0.23*** 0.03*** 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) 
Executive ownership 0.01 0.10 -0.04 -0.07 
 (0.40) (0.34) (0.03) (0.08) 
Critical control level 0.12 0.01 0.01* -0.01 
 (0.13) (0.10) (0.01) (0.02) 
CEO-chairman duality -0.36 -0.70 -0.05 -0.30 
 (1.80) (1.53) (0.15) (0.37) 
Independent board members 15.56** -9.99 -1.25* -5.09*** 
 (7.70) (6.46) (0.70) (1.71) 
No. of large shareholders 0.17 -0.24 -0.02 -0.00 
 (0.25) (0.22) (0.02) (0.05) 
Firm age -8.43 0.26 -0.46 1.90 
 (35.25) (25.51) (3.18) (7.90) 
Firm size 8.00*** -1.59 -1.01*** 1.04*** 
 (1.46) (1.19) (0.11) (0.27) 
Debt -24.40*** -6.23 0.66 -2.81** 
 (5.92) (5.31) (0.48) (1.19) 
ROA 0.45 
-
43.39*** 0.02 -0.001 
 (0.48) (7.38) (0.04) (0.11) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 136.35 49.42 33.32 -53.71 
(860.44) (529.54) (70.87) (175.62) 
Observations 5,702 4,181 6,378 6,491 
R-squared 0.34 0.38 0.52 0.12 
Number of firms 715 601 715 715 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors in parentheses.  
 
Notes:  
 Coefficients in models 1, 3, and 4 are multiplied by 10; coefficients in models 2 are multiplied by 1000. 
 Implication: the negative impacts of employment risk on two forms of long-term risk taking (i.e., 
investment in Chinese subsidiaries and technological exploration) are attenuated with high prospect of 
job opportunities, while the impact of employment risk on short-term risk taking (i.e., acquisition) 
becomes more negative with the prospect of job opportunities. Together, the results largely support H3. 
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Table 3.6. OLS Estimation on the Interactive Moderating Impact of Power Contestation and Prospect of Job Opportunities (H4) 
 Long-term Risk Taking Short-term Risk Taking 
Variables Investment in Chinese subsidiaries R&D Tech exploration M&A 











Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Employment risk -2.41*** -0.89 -1.73*** 0.04 -0.14** -0.02 -0.09 0.01 
(0.68) (0.58) (0.62) (0.52) (0.07) (0.02) (0.17) (0.07) 
Prospect of job opportunities -0.05 -0.07 -0.03 0.02 -0.01* 0.001 0.03* -0.00 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.01) (0.002) (0.02) (0.01) 
Employment risk* Prospect of 
job opportunities (H4: + for 
higher contestation) 0.06** 0.05 0.03* -0.03 0.01* 0.003*** -0.01* 0.001 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.003) (0.001) (0.01) (0.004) 
Power contestation 0.52 0.04 -0.37 -3.67** 0.04 0.10* -0.14 0.17 
(0.60) (1.67) (0.56) (1.75) (0.07) (0.05) (0.16) (0.21) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -77.90*** 139.67 1.03*** 93.73 3.238*** 9.26 -19.34*** -46.42 
(29.80) (796.99) (0.22) (486.24) (2.83) (22.80) (6.60) (90.35) 
Observations 3,040 2,662 2,363 1,818 3,363 3,015 3,447 3,044 
R-squared 0.38 0.47 0.76 0.35 0.78 0.37 0.20 0.15 
Number of firms 492 411 399 323 492 408 492 411 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors in parentheses.  
 
Notes: 
 Coefficients in models 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 are multiplied by 10; coefficients in models 3 and 4 are multiplied by 1000.  
 Variables included in estimation and yet not reported to conserve space are: incentive pay to NI ratio, executive ownership, critical control level, CEO-chairman duality, 
independent board members, No. of large shareholders, firm age, firm size, debt, and ROA. 
 Implication: The moderating effects of  prospect of job opportunities only exist when power contestation in a firm’s top management is high, strongly supporting H4. 
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Table A1.1: DID Estimation for Alternative Dependent Variables [H1]: Investment Shift Following Change in Monitoring Based on 
Codified Information  
(Negative coefficients indicate reduced investment after change) 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Shorter-term Operational Investments Capital Expenditure 
Compustat Items SGA-XRD CAPX 
Predictions relevant to H1  ( + ) ( + or n.s. ) 
Short-term  
expenditure 
Relatively certain  
expenditure 
   
Effect of change in monitoring  0.22*** 0.17** 
on U.S. firms (US*SOX) (0.06) (0.08) 
   
Constant -0.03 -0.59*** 
(0.11) (0.19) 
Observations 3,529 3,879 
R-squared 0.661 0.249 
Number of firms 542 586 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (two-tailed tests; standard errors in parentheses).  
 The U.S. time-constant firm-specific variable drops out of the firm fixed effects analysis. 
 Variables included in estimations but not reported to conserve space are: SOX, debt asset ratio, debt equity ratio, current ratio, equity dependence, ln sales, ln assets, ease of financing, 
compliance cost, technological competition, market concentration, propensity score strata dummies, year fixed effects, and firm fixed effects.  
 Implication: The tests are consistent with the logic underlying Hypothesis 1. 
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Table A1.2. DID Estimation for Result Robustness of H1: Investment Shift Following Change in Monitoring Based on Codified 
Information  
(Negative coefficients indicate reduced investment after change) 
 
 Alternative Empirical Designs Alternative Propensity Score Approaches Alternative Estimation 
 Level1&4 sample Unmatched sample 1987-2011 PSC Modeling PSC matching 5 PSC strata  Robust S.E. 
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b Model 4a Model 4b Model 5a Model 5b  Model 6a Model 6b 
 R&D IVST R&D IVST R&D IVST R&D IVST R&D IVST R&D IVST 
H1 predictions ( - ) ( + ) ( - ) ( + ) ( - ) ( + ) ( - ) ( + ) ( - ) ( + ) ( - ) ( + ) 
H1: Effect of change in 

























(US*SOX) (0.08) (0.17) (0.04) (0.12) (0.06) (0.19) (0.08) (0.17) (0.08) (0.17) (0.10) (0.33) 
Pscore     0.03*** -0.12***       
     (0.01) (0.02)       
PSC estimation Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PSC strata Yes Yes No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.52** 0.35 -0.59*** -1.03*** -0.26* -1.87*** -0.46** -0.15 -0.56** 0.50 -0.34 -1.21* 
 (0.23) (0.27) (0.05) (0.16) (0.15) (0.49) (0.22) (0.45) (0.23) (0.55) (0.27) (0.70) 
Observations 1,147 1,147 11,025 10,588 3,879 3,863 712 704 1,147 1,131 3,879 3,863 
R-squared 0.41 0.23 0.66 0.18 0.47 0.16 0.55 0.14 0.40 0.06 0.48 0.16 
Number of firms 232 232 993 927 586 585 65 65 232 224 586 585 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (two-tailed tests; standard errors in parentheses).  
 
 The U.S. time-constant firm-specific variable drops out of the firm fixed effects analysis. 
 Variables included in estimations but not reported to conserve space are: SOX, debt asset ratio, debt equity ratio, current ratio, equity dependence, ln sales, ln assets, ease of financing, 
compliance cost, technological competition, market concentration, propensity score strata dummies, year fixed effects, and firm fixed effects.  
 Implication: The alternative empirical designs, propensity score approaches, and estimations are consistent with H1 for R&D, though more mixed for short-term investment (just as the 
base results were somewhat more mixed for short-term investment). 
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Table A1.3a. DID Estimation for Alternative Explanations of H1 (Mechanisms 1 to 3) 
(Negative coefficients indicate reduced investment after change in monitoring) 
 
Alternative Mechanism 1: 
Compliance Cost 
Alternative Mechanism 2: Risk Aversion of 
Directors Alternative Mechanism 3: Valuation Difficulty of IP-related Assets 
 
Model 1a Model 1b      Model 2a   Model 2b Model 3a  Model 3b Model 4a Model 4b Model 5a Model 5b Model 6a Model 6b Model 7a Model 7b 
 R&D IVST R&D IVST R&D IVST R&D IVST R&D IVST R&D IVST R&D IVST 
Effect of change on 
U.S. firms 
(US*SOX)
-0.18** 0.42* 0.04 0.87*** -0.03 0.16 -0.19** 0.27 -0.21*** 0.24 -0.09 0.68 -0.01 0.76 
(0.07) (0.24) (0.08) (0.31) (0.05) (0.20) (0.08) (0.21) (0.07) (0.19) (0.19) (0.62) (0.19) (0.61) 
Compliance cost 
(SGA/SALE) 
0.02*** -0.04*             
(0.01) (0.02)             
Moderator 1: 
Number of board 
meetings 
-0.01 -0.02         
(0.01) (0.03)         
Moderator 2: 
Change in number of 
board meetings 
-0.01 0.02         
(0.01) (0.03)         
Moderator 3: 
Intangible assets ratio  
      -0.16 1.26       
      (0.45) (0.95)       
Moderator 4: 
Goodwill assets ratio 
        -0.12 1.04     




          -0.00 -0.01   




            -0.01 -0.01 
      (0.01) (0.02) 
Constant -0.33** -0.97** -1.10*** -2.87*** -0.79*** -3.42*** -0.54*** -0.67*** -0.51*** -0.88*** -0.39** -0.44* -0.41*** -0.60*** 
(0.14) (0.47) (0.29) (0.92) (0.29) (1.27) (0.17) (0.21) (0.14) (0.17) (0.15) (0.23) (0.14) (0.20) 
Observations 3,562 3,546 1,267 1,259 1,221 1,213 3,321 3,969 3,377 3,995 3,879 3,863 3,879 3,863 
R-squared 0.49 0.16 0.76 0.38 0.60 0.19 0.50 0.18 0.50 0.19 0.48 0.156 0.48 0.16 
Number of firms 553 552 187 187 186 186 550 667 560 682 586 585 586 585 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (two-tailed tests; standard errors in parentheses).  
 
 The U.S. time-constant firm-specific variable drops out of the firm fixed effects analysis. 
 Variables included in estimations but not reported to conserve space are: SOX, debt asset ratio, debt equity ratio, current ratio, equity dependence, ln sales, ln assets, ease of 
financing, compliance cost, technological competition, market concentration, propensity score strata dummies, year fixed effects, and firm fixed effects.  
 Estimations concerning moderators 1 to 6 were obtained with difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) estimator based on the model specification: ln R&Dit (ln IVSTit) = β0 +β1USi +β2SOXt +β3USi*SOXt +(β4USi +β5SOXt +β6USi*SOXt)* Mit-1+β7Mit-1+ βX it-1+Yeart+αi+ Stratai+εit, where the coefficient β6 captures the triple difference caused 
by the firm-level moderators Mit-1  
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Table A1.3b. DID Estimation for Alternative Explanations of H1 (Mechanisms 4 to 6) 
(Negative coefficients indicate reduced investment after change in monitoring) 
 
Alternative Mechanism 4:  
Delisting 
Alternative Mechanism 5: 
IT-Boom Collapse 
Alternative Mechanism 6: 
Scandal Effect 
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a (IT) Model 2b (IT) Model 3a (non-IT) Model 3b (non-IT) Model 4 
Dependent variable R&D IVST R&D IVST R&D IVST 
1. ROA 
Effect of change on U.S. 
firms -0.24** 0.41* 0.52 -0.84** -0.31*** -0.04 0.03 
(US*SOX) (0.11) (0.24) (0.34) (0.39) (0.08) (0.18) (0.06) 
Constant 0.02 1.97** -0.23 2.23* -0.92*** 1.14* -0.48*** 
(0.40) (0.88) (0.96) (1.26) (0.27) (0.64) (0.13) 
Observations 289 288 204 202 1,129 1,124 3,879 
R-squared 0.46 0.29 0.35 0.31 0.38 0.08 0.07 
Number of firms 34 34 35 34 223 221 586 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (two-tailed tests; standard errors in parentheses).  
 The U.S. time-constant firm-specific variable drops out of the firm fixed effects analysis. 
 Variables included in estimations but not reported to conserve space are: SOX, debt asset ratio, debt equity ratio, current ratio, equity dependence, ln sales, ln assets, ease of 
financing, compliance cost, technological competition, market concentration, propensity score strata dummies, year fixed effects, and firm fixed effects.  
 Model 1a and 1b compare a subsample of matched foreign level 1 and level 4 firms and U.S. firms appearing all years from 1996 to 2006; 
 Model 2a and 2b compare matched U.S. IT firms and foreign level 1 and 4 IT firms;  
 Model 3a and 3b compare matched U.S. Non-IT firms and foreign level 1 and 4 Non-IT firms;  
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Table A1.4a. DID Estimation: Managerial Discretion, Technological Intensity and post-SOX Change in R&D  
 (Negative coefficients indicate reduced investment after SOX) 
 Panel A. R&D Investment with High Technological Intensity 
 A1. Managerial Discretion:  A2. Managerial Discretion:  A3. Managerial Discretion:  
 Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a Model 5a Model 6a Model 7a 
 High Medium High Medium High Medium Low
        
Effect of SOX on U.S. firms  0.14 -0.21 0.02 -0.15 0.16 -0.19 0.08 
(US*SOX) (0.11) (0.21) (0.11) (0.22) (0.16) (0.20) (0.42) 
Constant -0.78* (0.42) -0.89*** (0.29) -0.97*** (0.37) -1.10*** (0.30) -1.69** (0.83) -0.88*** (0.25) 2.47 (1.69) 
Observations 702 1,087 735 1,042 251 1,435 144 
R-squared 0.55 0.44 0.55 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.60 
Number of firms 227 309 246 315 83 365 66
 Panel B. R&D Investment with Low Technological Intensity 
H4 predictions B1. Managerial Discretion:  B2. Managerial Discretion:  B3. Managerial Discretion:  
 Model 8a Model 9a Model 10a Model 11a Model 12a Model 13a Model 14a 
 High Medium High Medium High Medium Low
        
H4. Effect of SOX on U.S. firms  -0.24** -0.20*** -0.24* -0.16*** -0.37** -0.04 5.21 
(US*SOX) (0.12) (0.05) (0.12) (0.05) (0.15) (0.05) (8.23) 
Constant 0.51 (0.43) 0.40 (0.30) 0.62 (0.43) 0.56* (0.30) 0.77 (1.16) 0.38 (0.25) 1.94 (11.24) 
Observations 925 1,095 972 1,049 246 1,720 83 
R-squared 0.51 0.47 0.52 0.44 0.54 0.50 0.97 
Number of firms 277 309 294 318 88 389 54
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (two-tailed tests; standard errors in parentheses).  
 Variables included in estimations but not reported to conserve space are: U.S., SOX, debt asset ratio, debt equity ratio, current ratio, equity dependence, log sales, log assets, 
ease of financing, compliance cost, technological competition, product and process IPR, market concentration, propensity score strata dummies, year fixed effects, and firm 
fixed effects. 
 Due to insufficient observations, estimations with some subsamples of low discretion (Executive-Director duality; compensation flexibility) do not yield results. 
 T-tests show that the coefficients in italics (models 8a v. 9a; 8a v. 1a; 10a v. 11a; 10a v. 3a; 12a v.13a; 12a v. 5a; 13a v. 14a; 13a v. 6a) differ significantly (p<0.05). 
 Implication: The decrease in R&D in response to increased unengaged monitoring is greater with both higher levels of managerial discretion and lower levels of 
technological intensity. 
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Table A1.4b. DID Estimation: Managerial Discretion, Technological Intensity and post-SOX Change in Short-term Investments  
(Negative coefficients indicate reduced investment after SOX) 
 Panel A. Short-term Investments with High Technological Intensity 
 A1. Managerial Discretion:  A2. Managerial Discretion:  A3. Managerial Discretion:  
 Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b Model 5b Model 6b Model 7b 
 High Medium  High Medium  High Medium  Low  
        
Effect of SOX on U.S. firms 1.18*** -1.25** 1.11*** -1.27** 0.86 -1.31** -1.25 
(US*SOX) (0.35) (0.62) (0.40) (0.61) (0.53) (0.60) (1.25) 
Constant -2.92** (1.32) -2.80*** (0.86) -1.86 (1.39) -4.32*** (0.84) -1.13 (2.80) -3.70*** (0.76) 2.98 (5.06) 
Observations 701 1,083 733 1,039 251 1,430 144 
R-squared 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.64 
Number of firms 227 308 246 313 83 364 66 
 Panel B. Short-term Investments with Low Technological Intensity 
H 4 predictions B1. Managerial Discretion:  B2. Managerial Discretion:  B3. Managerial Discretion:  
 Model 8b Model 9b Model 10b Model 11b Model 12b Model 13b Model 14b 
 High  Medium  High  Medium  High Medium  Low  
        
H4. Effect of SOX on U.S. firms  0.38 -0.11 0.33 -0.06 -0.26 0.13 12.82 
(US*SOX) (0.42) (0.18) (0.45) (0.16) (0.63) (0.16) (7.70) 
Constant 2.39 (1.59) -0.50 (1.02) 1.25 (1.63) 0.56 (0.97) -0.39 (4.88) 0.73 (0.84) -7.60 (10.51) 
Observations 918 1,091 965 1,045 244 1,711 83 
R-squared 0.16 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.23 0.99 
Number of firms 277 308 294 318 88 389 54 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (two-tailed tests; standard errors in parentheses).  
 Variables included in estimations but not reported to conserve space are: U.S., SOX, debt asset ratio, debt equity ratio, current ratio, equity dependence, log sales, log assets, 
ease of financing, compliance cost, technological competition, product and process IPR, market concentration, propensity score strata dummies, year fixed effects, and firm 
fixed effects. 
 Due to insufficient observations, estimations with some subsamples of low discretion (Executive-Director duality; compensation flexibility) do not yield results. 
 T-test statistics show that the coefficients in italics (model 8b v. 9b; 8b v. 1b; 10b v. 11b; 10b v. 3b; 12b v.5b; 13bv. 6b) differ significantly (p<0.05). 
 Implication: The increase in short-term investments in response to increased unengaged monitoring is greater with two forms of discretion under low technological intensity, 
but not for low versus high technological intensity.
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Notes:  
 Graphs are generated by STATA 13 program intgph nbreg automatically based on simulation-based coefficient estimates in 
Model 1a to Model 2b in Table 2.3. 
 Confidence intervals are two-tailed, at 95% confidence level. 
 Y-axis represents expected CEO turnover (in Figure A1a.1 and A1a.2) and top executive turnover (in Figure A1a.3 and 
A1a.4) over 3 years associated with 1% increase in family ownership; X-axis in all figures shows number of non-family 
large shareholders, taking value from 0 to 1 S.D. above the mean. 
 Figure A1a.1 and A1a.2 show that the effect of interest conflicts between family and non-family large shareholders on CEO 
turnover is significantly higher in firms with lower information disclosure (Figure A1a.2), supporting H2. 
 Figure A1a.3 and A1a.4 show that the effect of interest conflicts between family and non-family large shareholders on top 
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 Figure A2.1b. Moderating Effect of Corporate Governance Indicated by Pyramid Structure (H2) 
 
 
                       
 
 
                      
 
Notes: 
 Graphs are generated by STATA 13 program intgph nbreg automatically based on simulation-based coefficient estimates in 
Model 3a to Model 4b in Table 2.3. 
 Confidence intervals are two-tailed, at 95% confidence level. 
 Y-axis represents expected CEO turnover (in Figure A1b.1 and A1b.2) and top executive turnover (in Figure A1b.3 and 
A1b.4) over 3 years associated with 1% increase in family ownership; X-axis in all figures shows number of non-family 
large shareholders, taking value from 0 to 1 S.D. above the mean. 
 Figure A1b.1 and A1b.2 show that the effect of interest conflicts between family and non-family large shareholders on CEO 
turnover is significantly higher in firms associated with pyramid structure (Figure A1b.1), supporting H2. 
 Figure A1b.3 and A1b.4 show that the effect of interest conflicts between family and non-family large shareholders on top 
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Figure A2.2. Moderating Effect of Resource Intangibility (H3) 
 
   








 Graphs are generated by STATA 13 program intgph nbreg automatically based on simulation-based coefficient estimates in 
Model 1a to Model 2b in Table 2.4. 
 Confidence intervals are two-tailed, at 95% confidence level. 
 Y-axis represents expected CEO turnover (in Figure A2.1 and A2.2) and top executive turnover (in Figure A2.3 and A2.4) 
over 3 years associated with 1% increase in family ownership; X-axis in all figures shows number of non-family large 
shareholders, taking value from 0 to 1 S.D. above the mean. 
 Figure A2.1 and A2.2 show that the effect of interest conflicts between family and non-family large shareholders on CEO 
turnover is significantly higher in firms with higher intangible assets (Figure A2.1), supporting H3. 
 Figure A2.3 and A2.4 show that the effect of interest conflicts between family and non-family large shareholders on top 
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Figure A2.3a. Moderating Effect of Executive Power (H4) 
 
 
                  
 
 
                        
 
Notes:  
 Graphs are generated by STATA 13 program intgph nbreg automatically based on simulation-based coefficient estimates in 
Model 1a to Model 2b in Table 2.5. 
 Confidence intervals are two-tailed, at 95% confidence level. 
 Y-axis represents expected executive turnover over 3 years associated with 1% increase in family ownership; X-axis in all 
figures shows number of non-family large shareholders, taking value from 0 to 1 S.D. above the mean. 
 Figure A3a.1 and A3a.2 show that the effect of interest conflicts between family and non-family large shareholders on top 
executive turnover is significantly higher in firms with lower executive ownership (Figure A3a.2), supporting H4.  
 Figure A3a.3 and A3a.4 show that the effect of interest conflicts between family and non-family large shareholders on top 
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 Figure A2.3b. Moderating Effect of CEO Power (H4) 
 







 Graphs are generated by STATA 13 program intgph nbreg automatically based on simulation-based coefficient estimates in 
Model 3a to Model 4b in Table 2.5. 
 Confidence intervals are two-tailed, at 95% confidence level. 
 Y-axis represents expected CEO turnover (in Figure A3b.1 and A3b.2) and top executive turnover (in Figure A3b.1and 
A3b.2) over 3 years associated with 1% increase in family ownership; X-axis in all figures shows number of non-family 
large shareholders, taking value from 0 to 1 S.D. above the mean. 
 Figure A3b.1 and A3b.2 show that the effect of interest conflicts between family and non-family large shareholders on CEO 
turnover is significantly higher in firms with CEO appointed by ultimate controller (Figure A3b.1), not supporting H4.  
 Figure A3b.3 and A3b.4 show that the effect of interest conflicts between family and non-family large shareholders on CEO 









































































































































Table A2.1. Descriptive Statistics of Final Sample (599 Firms; 2000 to 2011)  
Industry (TEJ 2-digit code) 
# of 
Firms 





3 years  
(mean) 
Top executive 





Firms with family 
large shareholder 
# of non-family 
large shareholders 
(mean) 
Cement (11) 7 54 46 0.4 1.3 34% 100% 3 
Food (12) 20 127 47 0.3 1.0 32% 100% 2 
Plastics (13) 20 169 38 0.5 1.2 32% 100% 3 
Textiles (14) 46 305 33 0.3 1.0 34% 98% 2 
Electric and machinery (15) 33 217 32 0.6 1.1 29% 97% 4 
Electric Appliance and cable (16) 12 77 43 0.6 1.4 30% 100% 2 
Chemical (17) 32 209 36 0.4 1.3 34% 94% 3 
Glass and ceramics (18) 4 37 44 0.3 0.9 42% 100% 1 
Paper and pulp (19) 7 68 43 0.6 1.3 26% 100% 1 
Steel and iron (20) 26 174 32 0.4 1.4 28% 88% 3 
Rubber (21) 9 81 41 0.6 1.8 28% 100% 2 
Automobile (22) 5 38 49 0.7 1.1 38% 100% 2 
Electronics (23) 285 1,708 21 0.4 1.1 25% 87% 4 
Construction (25) 22 145 32 0.6 1.7 31% 95% 3 
Transportation (26) 17 135 36 0.6 1.8 40% 100% 3 
Tourism (27) 5 30 36 0.3 0.9 44% 80% 2 
Wholesale and retail (29) 10 85 49 0.4 1.6 35% 90% 3 
Gas and Petroleum (97) 8 46 27 0.4 1.1 40% 100% 3 
Others (99) 31 214 31 0.4 1.1 31% 100% 3 
Total 599 3,919 38 0.4 0.4 33% 92% 3 
  
Note: 
 Industries in the final sample include all 19 Taiwanese sectors covered by the TEJ database (other than financial sectors, which we excluded).   




Table A2.2. Robustness Checks Based on Simulation-based Negative Binomial (Logit) Regressions (H1) 
 Panel A: Alternative Measures for Shareholder Conflicts Panel B: Alternative Dependent Variables Panel C: Reduced Sample Panel D: M&A   












































1. Family ownership -0.06* -0.14*** -0.05** -0.13*** -0.04 -0.12*** -0.10** -0.23*** -0.08** -0.08*** -0.13** -0.27*** -0.12 -0.54* 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07) (0.19) (0.30) 
2. Number of non-
family LSH 0.05 -0.45 -0.03 -0.17 -0.37 -0.89** -0.08** -0.21*** 
(0.26) (0.34) (0.25) (0.14) (0.30) (0.45) (0.03) (0.05) 
3. Number of  non-
family LSH type -0.28 -2.28           
  
(0.95) (1.54)             
4.Non-family LSH 
HHI   3.07 1.59       
    
  (3.74) (7.17)           
5. Nationality 
inequality of  non-
family LSH     0.03 0.02     
    
    (0.02) (0.03)         
1*2(x 1000) [H1]       0.69 2.68** 0.001* 1.24*** 3.42* 1.70** 0.88 2.51** 
      (0.83) (1.11) (0.001) (0.44) (1.49) (0.89) (0.57) (0.98) 
1*3(x 1000) [H1] 1.11 -0.47             
(2.83) (4.91)             
1*4(x 1000) [H1]   -15.08 -58.59**           
  (12.79) (26.60)           
1*5(x 1000) [H1]     -0.05 -0.09         
     (0.06) (0.11)         
Block M&A             0.66 1.87 
             (2.01) (3.17) 
Graphical support  + + + U - - + + + + + + n.s. + 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -6.00 6.67 -3.14 8.89 -7.31 4.24 -0.42 0.36 1.34 6.27** -6.11 0.58 -3.23 18.13* 
(4.32) (8.80) (4.59) (9.28) (4.45) (8.91) (6.25) (8.04) (0.77) (3.17) (7.27) (11.79) (4.91) (9.85) 
Log likelihood -3311.72 -2837.13 -3310.92 -2833.57 -3310.85 -2839.24 -2353.89 -1564.77 -2562.24   -5827.88 -1001.63 -1178.45 -3309.91 -2836.19 
Observations 3,919 3,919 3,919 3,919 3,919 3,919 3,919 3,919 3,919 3919 1420 1420 3,919 3,919 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed tests) 
 
Notes:  
 Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
 Variables included in estimation and yet not reported to conserve space are: firm age, firm size, current ratio, group affiliation, ROA, critical shareholding, board size, family 
presence in board, independent directors, family CEO, CEO-chairman duality and managerial ownership.  
 Coefficients on interaction terms are scaled by multiplying 1000, while coefficients on other variables are scaled by multiplying 10. 4. “Graphic support” summarizes the 
visualized interaction effects, which are available on request.




Table A2.3. Mechanism Tests Based on Simulation-based Negative Binomial Regression (H1) 
 
 
 Panel A: Working Mechanism of Incompatible Job Demands 
Panel B: Alternative mechanism of 
Generation Succession 
  Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b 















Capability Electronics firms Electronics firms 
1. Family ownership -0.04 -0.12*** -0.25*** -0.19*** -0.58** -0.45** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.28) (0.21) 
2. Number of non-
family LSH -0.29 -0.07 -1.07** -0.31 
-0.17*** -0.15*** 
(0.27) (0.24) (0.52) (0.36) (0.05) (0.04) 
1*2(x 1000) [H1] 1.36* 0.96 4.92*** 1.39 2.60*** 2.41*** 
(0.79) (0.74) (1.63) (1.18) (0.66) (0.86) 
Graphical support 
(Figures available on 
request) 
n.s. + + ++ + + 
Executive capability 
(ROA) -11.94 0.13 -13.52 0.16 
  
(8.16) (0.16) (15.22) (0.22)   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -6.17 -4.86 25.22* 2.38 6.00 12.52** 
(6.95) (6.17) (13.17) (10.04) (5.46) (4.96) 
Likelihood -1519.88 -1731.6 -1181.62 -1618.60 -2390.83 -1345.96 
Observations 2,017 1,902 2,017 1,902 1,708 1,708 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed tests). 
 
Notes:  
 Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
 Variables included in estimation and yet not reported to conserve space are: firm age, firm size, current ratio, group affiliation, ROA, critical 
shareholding, board size, family presence in board, independent directors, family CEO, CEO-chairman duality and managerial ownership.  
 Coefficients on interaction terms are scaled by multiplying 1000, while coefficients on other variables are scaled by multiplying 10. 
 While coefficient significance and magnitude of non-interacted variables can be interpreted directly based on coefficient estimates and 
associated standard errors, significance and magnitude of interaction terms should be interpreted based on the graphs generated 
automatically by intgph nbreg, available in STATA 13. 
 The row of “Graphic support” summarizes the visualized interaction effects, which are available on request. 
 
  













# of CEO/Chairman 
turnover 3 years (mean) 
# of firms connected through 
top management (mean) 
# of executive 
contenders (mean) 
Sensitivity to ROA in assessing 
executive capability 
Cement (11) 7 104 46 1.1 10.4 4.3 0 
Food (12) 20 283 48 1.2 3.9 4.7 0 
Plastics (13) 21 288 40 1.3 6.8 3.7 0 
Textiles (14) 47 640 34 1.1 4.8 3.3 1 
Electric and machinery 
(15) 37 396 34 1.3 7.1 3.7 1 
Electric Appliance and 
cable (16) 13 162 42 1.4 5.5 4.5 0 
Chemical (17) 42 406 37 1.3 8.1 3.4 0 
Glass and ceramics 
(18) 4 59 45 1.3 1.1 4.5 1 
Paper and pulp (19) 7 104 44 1.6 7.9 4.3 0 
Steel and iron (20) 29 368 32 1.4 8.4 4.1 0 
Rubber (21) 10 133 42 1.5 5.6 3.5 1 
Automobile (22) 5 66 50 1.3 5.9 5.5 0 
Electronics (23) 372 3,027 22 1.2 12.0 6.7 1 
Construction (24) 23 287 34 1.9 3.5 3.6 1 
Transportation (25) 19 234 39 2.0 7.7 5.3 1 
Tourism (27) 7 77 38 1.5 4.0 4.5 0 
Wholesale and retail 
(29) 10 147 47 1.5 7.7 6.3 1 
Gas and Petroleum (97) 8 93 29 1.4 25.0 3.0 0 
Others (99) 34 393 32 1.3 10.4 4.9 1 
715 7,267 31 1.3 7.7 4.4 N.A. 
Notes:  
 Industries in the initial sample include all 19 Taiwanese sectors covered by the TEJ database other than financial sectors which are excluded.  
 The dummy variable for sensitivity to ROA in assessing executive capability is obtained by regressing the dummy variable of CEO/Chairman turnover on firm ROA by each 
industry with a logit model, controlling for other variables affecting CEO/Chairman turnover (i.e., firm age, firm size, CEO’s affiliation with ultimate controller, CEO-
chairman duality, percentage of independent board members, and number of large shareholders). Industries with a significantly negative coefficient on firm ROA are 
considered sensitive to ROA in assessing executives’ capability, whereas industries with insignificant coefficients or significantly positive coefficients are considered not 
sensitive to ROA in assessing executives’ capability. 




Table A3.2. OLS Estimation for Excluding Reverse Causality (H1) 
 Long-term Risk Taking Short-term Risk Taking 
Variables 
Investment in Chinese 
subsidiaries R&D Tech exploration M&A 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Employment risk -2.52*** 0.24 -0.01 -0.03 
(0.73) (0.70) (0.06) (0.15) 
Industrial sensitivity to ROA 
(dummy) Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted 
     
Employment risk*industrial 
sensitivity 2.13** -1.28 -0.10 -0.05 
(0.87) (0.82) (0.07) (0.18) 
Incentive pay to NI ratio 0.01 -0.23*** 0.03*** 0.02* 
(0.05) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) 
Executive ownership 0.03 0.09 -0.04 -0.07 
(0.40) (0.34) (0.03) (0.08) 
Critical control level 0.14 0.01 0.01* -0.01 
(0.13) (0.10) (0.01) (0.02) 
CEO-chairman duality -0.16 -0.83 -0.06 -0.31 
(1.81) (1.53) (0.15) (0.37) 
Independent board members 15.51** -10.39 -1.32* -4.93*** 
(7.69) (6.44) (0.70) (1.71) 
No. of large shareholders 0.15 -0.23 -0.02 -0.005 
(0.25) (0.22) (0.02) (0.05) 
Firm age -7.44 -0.63 -0.52 1.86 
(35.25) (25.50) (3.19) (7.90) 
Firm size 8.42*** -1.64 -1.02*** 1.00*** 
(1.46) (1.19) (0.11) (0.27) 
Debt -24.67*** -6.01 0.70 -2.78** 
(5.92) (5.31) (0.49) (1.19) 
ROA 0.45 -43.43*** 0.01 0.00 
(0.48) (7.37) (0.04) (0.11) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 106.67 68.10 34.56 -52.28 
(860.47) (529.51) (70.90) (175.68) 
Observations 5,702 4,181 6,378 6,491 
R-squared 0.34 0.39 0.51 0.12 
Number of firms 715 601 715 715 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Notes:  
 Coefficients in models 1, 3, and 4 are multiplied by 10; coefficients in models 2 are multiplied by 1000. 
 Implication: The negative impact of employment risk on long-term risk taking becomes insignificant or positive in 
industries sensitive to short-term financial indicators in assessing executives’ capability, while the insignificant impact of 
employment risk on short-term risk taking doesn’t vary with the industrial sensitivity. The results are opposite to the logic of 
reverse causality, i.e., firms with short-term orientation tend to dismiss executives, leading to high employment risk. 




Table A3.3. OLS Estimation Based on the Raw Sample without CEM Matching (H1) 
 Long-term Risk Taking Short-term Risk Taking 
Variables 
Investment in Chinese 
subsidiaries R&D Tech exploration M&A 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Employment risk -0.56 -0.52 -0.06* -0.07 
(0.38) (0.35) (0.03) (0.08) 
Incentive pay to NI ratio 0.02 -0.22*** 0.03*** 0.02* 
(0.05) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) 
Executive ownership 0.14 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 
(0.38) (0.32) (0.03) (0.08) 
Critical control level 0.11 0.01 0.02* -0.01 
(0.13) (0.10) (0.01) (0.02) 
CEO-chairman duality -0.65 -0.21 0.02 -0.31 
(1.70) (1.43) (0.13) (0.35) 
Independent board members 18.26*** -17.54*** -1.19** -4.16*** 
(6.63) (5.51) (0.57) (1.49) 
No. of large shareholders 0.22 -0.26 -0.01 0.002 
(0.24) (0.20) (0.02) (0.05) 
Firm age -8.42 -0.24 -0.46 1.87 
(35.97) (25.79) (3.09) (8.11) 
Firm size 6.49*** -1.82 -1.04*** 1.06*** 
(1.39) (1.14) (0.10) (0.27) 
Debt -19.79*** -9.38* 0.88** -2.77** 
(5.63) (5.06) (0.44) (1.16) 
ROA 0.46 -48.84*** 0.02 0.00 
(0.49) (7.01) (0.04) (0.11) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 146.56 64.74 33.06 -51.91 
(856.08) (52.13) (66.75) (175.21) 
Observations 6,478 4,705 7,152 7,267 
R-squared 0.29 0.43 0.61 0.11 
Number of firms 715 601 715 715 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors in parentheses.  
 
Notes:  
 Coefficients in models 1, 3, and 4 are multiplied by 10; coefficients in models 2 are multiplied by 1000. 
 Implication: Without addressing the endogeneity of employment risk with CEM, employment risk reduces one form of 
long-term risk taking (i.e., technological exploration) while having no significant impact on short-term risk taking. The 
results are consistent with the baseline finding, although with a weaker effect. 
  




Table A3.4. OLS Estimation for Sensitivity Checks (H1) 
 Panel A: Alternative CEM Matching Procedures Panel B: Alternative CEM Matched Sample of Non-electronic Firms 
Panel C: Alternative 
DV 
 Long-term Risk Taking 
Short-term Risk 









China R&D Tech exploration M&A IVST (ln) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 10 
Employment risk -1.08** -0.33 -0.09** -0.13 -1.24*** 0.42 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 
(0.44) (0.39) (0.04) (0.09) (0.47) (0.48) (0.02) (0.08) (0.13) 
Incentive pay to NI ratio -0.00 -0.14*** 0.02*** 0.01 -0.12 0.06 -0.0003 0.04** 0.05*** 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.11) (0.13) (0.004) (0.02) (0.01) 
Executive ownership -0.29 0.02 -0.06 -0.06 0.04 0.24 -0.01 0.01 0.47*** 
(0.43) (0.33) (0.04) (0.09) (0.57) (0.50) (0.02) (0.09) (0.13) 
Critical control level 0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.12 -0.01 0.001 -0.00 0.01 
(0.14) (0.10) (0.01) (0.02) (0.14) (0.12) (0.004) (0.02) (0.04) 
CEO-chairman duality -1.09 -0.91 -0.11 -0.38 0.16 -2.15 -0.03 0.07 0.90 
(1.91) (1.55) (0.16) (0.39) (2.22) (1.99) (0.08) (0.35) (0.56) 
Independent board 
member 11.86 -11.23* -1.45* -5.18*** 8.06 -0.15 0.25 -1.69 -3.14 
(8.35) (6.72) (0.78) (1.87) (13.84) (0.13) (0.54) (2.47) (2.39) 
No. of large shareholders -0.08 -0.23 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.46* 0.01 -0.04 0.06 
(0.27) (0.22) (0.02) (0.05) (0.30) (0.28) (0.01) (0.05) (0.07) 
Firm age 0.28 -0.09 -0.02 0.11** -6.72 -4.91 -0.15 2.03 2.41 
(0.28) (0.22) (0.02) (0.05) (33.40) (24.25) (1.30) (6.02) (10.19) 
Firm size 8.37*** 0.64 -1.03*** 1.20*** 2.66 0.79 -0.04 0.83*** 5.12*** 
(1.59) (1.20) (0.12) (0.29) (2.00) (2.03) (0.07) (0.31) (0.45) 
Debt -22.07*** -7.15 0.65 -2.52* -13.88* -13.28* -0.33 -0.46 -6.22*** 
(6.45) (5.43) (0.54) (1.29) (7.48) (7.75) (0.26) (1.20) (1.80) 
ROA 0.33 -30.64*** 0.01 0.00 0.38 -16.73* 0.01 0.00 -0.25* 
(0.49) (7.48) (0.05) (0.11) (0.46) (9.65) (0.02) (0.08) (0.14) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -77.22*** 26.89* 23.73*** -15.67*** 201.65 152.62 1.507 -68.74 -96.23 
(20.71) (14.94) (1.55) (3.69) (1052.55) (709.28) (37.57) (174.03) (221.46) 
Observations 5,009 3,759 5,690 5,798 3,277 2,087 3,864 3,904 4,996 
R-squared 0.31 0.24 0.47 0.13 0.21 0.09 0.12 0.09 1.16 
Number of firms 715 601 715 715 343 254 343 343 704 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors in parentheses.  
 
Notes: 
 Coefficients in models 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 are multiplied by 10; coefficients in models 2 and 6 are multiplied by 1000.  
 Results in Panel A are based on a new CEM matched sample, which includes two additional covariates, i.e., family ownership and number of large shareholders, in the 
matching model for employment risk. 
 Implication: The impact of employment risk on investment in China is highly robust across different sample and CEM matching procedure, while the impacts with R&D and 
Technological exploration vary. The impact of employment risk on short-term risk taking is highly robust across different sample, matching procedures, and measure. 
